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JURISDICTION OF THE UTAH SUPREME COURT
Utah Supreme Court has original jurisdiction per Utah Code Ann. §78-2-2(3)(j).
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
1.

In viewing the facts and all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom in a light

most favorable to Allstate Insurance Co., did the trial court err in granting attorney fees
and costs to Allstate Insurance Company?
The standard of review for questions of facts is a clearly erroneous standard; the
standard of review for "without merit" or a Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 11
violation is a question of law reviewed for correctness. Barnard v. Sutliff 846 P.2d 1229,
1234 (Utah 1992), Jeschke v. Willis, 811 P.2d 202, 203-204 (Utah App. 1991).
2.

In viewing the facts and all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom in a light

most favorable to Allstate Insurance Co., did the trial court err in refusing to grant
plaintiffs second Motion for Summary Judgment when the law of the case was a factual
dispute existed as to the reasonableness of expenses charged and the necessity of Mr.
Pennington's treatment?
The standard of review for denial of a motion for summary judgment is whether
the pleadings, depositions, affidavits and admissions submitted in the case established a
genuine issue of material fact. Ross v. Schackel 920 P.2d 1159, 1161 (Utah 1996);
Snvder v. Merklev. 693 P.2d 64, 65 (Utah 1984).
3.

In viewing the totality of the facts and the trial court's advantaged position

to observe the testimony of the witnesses first hand, are the trial court's findings of fact
against the clear weight of the evidence such that this Court reaches a firm conviction a
mistake has been made?

1

The standard of review of a trial court's findings of fact is whether the findings of
fact are clearly erroneous and are against the clear weight of the evidence such that the
appellate court reaches a firm conviction a mistake has been made. Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure. Rule 52(a); ProMax Development Corp. v. Mattson. 943 P.2d 247 (Utah App.
1997); State v. Goodman, 763 P.2d 786 (Utah 1988).
4. On Cross Appeal, did the trial court err in reducing Allstate's attorney's fees
when Pennington did not dispute the reasonableness inasmuch as his attorney charged
more per hour and had more time invested in the lawsuit.
The standard of review is a trial court discretion in an award of attorney fees must
be based on an evaluation of the evidence. Dixie State Bank v. Bracken. 764 P.2d 985,
991 (Utah 1988).
DETERMINATIVE LAW
The determinative law in awarding attorney fees and costs is as follows:
Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-56. Attorney's fees—Award where action or
defense in bad faith—Exceptions.
(1) In civil actions, the court shall award reasonable attorney's fees to a
prevailing party if the court determines that the action or defense to the action was
without merit and not brought or asserted in good faith, except under Subsection
(2).
(2) The court, in its discretion, may award no fees or limited fees against a
party under Subsection (1), but only if the court:
(a)findsthe party hasfiledan affidavit of impecuniosity in the
action before the court; or
(b) the court enters in the record the reason for not awarding fees
under the provisions of Subsection (1).
Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-56.5. Attorney's fees-Reciprocal rights to
recover attorney's fees.
A court may award costs and attorney's fees to either party that prevails in
a civil action based upon any promissory note, written contract, or other writing
executed after April 28, 1986, when the provisions of the promissory note, written
contract, or other writing allow at least one party to recover attorney's fees.
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Utah Code Ann § 78-33-10 Costs (regarding Declaratory Judgments)
In any proceeding under this chapter the court may make such award of
costs as may seem equitable and just
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. Rule 11 Every pleading, motion, and other
paper of a party represented by an attorney shall be signed by at least one attorney
of record in his individual name who is duly licensed to practice in the state of
Utah
The signature of an attorney or party constitutes a certification by him
that he has read the pleading, motion, or other paper, that to the best of his
knowledge, information, and belief formed after reasonable inquiry it is well
grounded in fact and is warranted by existing law or a good faith argument for the
extension, modification, or reversal of existing law, and that it is not interposed for
any improper purpose, such as to harass or to cause unnecessary delay or needless
increase in the cost of litigation
If a pleading, motion, or other paper is signed
in violation of this rule, the court, upon motion or upon its own initiative, shall
impose upon the person who signed it, a represented party, or both, an appropriate
sanction, which may include an order to pay to the other party or parties the
amount of the reasonable expenses incurred because of the filing of the pleading,
motion, or other paper, including a reasonable attorney's fee
For awarding costs, the determinative law is Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule
54, which is set forth fully in Addendum A
For awarding attorney fees and costs on appeal, the determinative law is Utah
Rules of Appellate Procedure. Rule 33, which is set forth fully in Addendum B
The determinative law in reviewing the trial court's findings of fact is Utah Rules
of Civil Procedure. Rule 52(a) which provides
(a) Effect In all actions tried upon the facts without a jury or with an advisory
jury, the court shall find the facts specially and state separately its conclusions of law
thereon, and judgment shall be entered pursuant to Rule 5 8 A,
Findings of fact,
whether based on oral or documentary evidence, shall not be set aside unless clearly
erroneous, and due regard shall be given to the opportunity of the trial court to judge the
credibility of the witnesses
The determinative statutes regarding Personal Injury Protection (PIP) benefits are
Utah Code Ann §31A-22-307 0953 as amended) located in Addendum C, and Utah
Code Ann S31A-22-309 0953 as amended) located in Addendum D
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A. Nature of the Case.
On January 24, 1994, Attorney Dan Wilson filed a complaint for his son-in-law
Lorin Pennington against Allstate Insurance Company (hereinafter referred to as
"Allstate"), Burns Chiropractic, Dr. David R. Trimble, D.C., Dr. Dale Bennett, D.C., Dr.
Bryson Smith, Dr. Joan Balcombe, St. Benedict's Hospital and Associates in Radiology
(R. 001-005). The complaint alleged Allstate had failed to pay the required $3,000
Personal Injury Protection (hereinafter referred to as "PIP") benefits to Pennington or his
medical providers (the other named defendants) arising from an automobile accident on
June 18, 1993, as required by statute and contract. Pennington claimed the bills were past
due and prayed for judgment against Allstate; or in the alternative, judgment against the
defendant medical providers in the event the services rendered were determined by the
court to be unreasonable and/or unnecessary (R. 001-005).
Mr. Pennington, pursuant to his complaint, requested the trial court to determine
the treatment he received and resulting expenses incurred after the accident were
reasonable and necessary in relationship to the injury he received m the motor vehicle
accident. If the court so determined (or if $1 not paid by Allstate was determined to be
reasonable and necessary), Pennington demanded he be awarded attorney fees, costs and
interest. In the alternative, he requested judgment against the medical providers claiming
they provided him with unnecessary or unreasonable treatment and charges, and he had
no obligation to pay their bills.
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Under the insurance contract between Allstate and Pennington, Allstate had paid
$1,694.59 of Mr. Pennington's medical expenses incurred after the accident. The amount
in controversy was $1,305.41 (R. 006-007).
B. Course of the Proceedings.
(1) Prior to filing suit. Prior to the automobile accident of June 18, 1993,
Pennington entered into a contract of insurance with Allstate. Pursuant to the contract
Allstate agreed to pay $3,000 of reasonable and/or necessary medical expenses caused
by an accident covered under the policy. The contract was drafted in accordance with
Utah Code Ann. §31A-22-307(l)(a)(1953 as amended) (R. 372-399, Exhibit D-33,
Addendum E). Unnecessary medical expenses are fees for medical services which are not
usually and customarily performed for treatment of the injury, including fees for an
excessive number, amount, or duration of medical services. Unreasonable medical
expenses are fees for medical services which are substantially higher than the usual and
customary charges for those services (R. 372-399, Exhibit D-33, p.ll; R. 1089,
Addendum E).
Under the insurance contract, Pennington must notify his company, Allstate, if he
files a third party complaint. He may be required to take medical examinations by
physicians Allstate chooses. He was to cooperate with Allstate in the investigation,
settlement and defense of any claim or lawsuit. If Pennington voluntarily took any action
or mades any payments other than for covered expenses, Allstate would not be bound (R.
372-399, R. Exhibit D-33, p.12-13, Addendum E).
Mr. Pennington was injured in an automobile accident on June 18, 1993, in
Ogden, Utah, suffering injury of an uncomplicated cervical strain (R. 1090; Vol. 2 T.
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1439). He sought treatment the next day from his treating physician, Dr. Paul Taylor. Dr.
Taylor's examination of Pennington revealed he had full range of motion. Dr. Taylor did
not feel it necessary to take any x-rays or administer any further tests on that visit and told
the plaintiff to follow a treatment plan of flexion exercises, ice, heat and rest and
Ibuprofen. Mr. Pennington was told to report back if the problem was not resolved over
the following weekend. Dr. Taylor mentioned the possibility of x-rays if the problem did
not resolve but stated he ". . . doubted this will be necessary" (R. 1090; Exhibit P-l,
Addendum F).
The following Monday, June 22, 1993, Pennington returned to his primary care
physician, Dr. Taylor, who prescribed more neck and shoulder exercises, ice and heat and
a muscle relaxant, Flexeril (R. 1090; Exhibit P-l, Addendum F).
Pennington never returns to his primary care physician, Dr. Taylor. On July 1,
1993, Pennington goes to the Emergency Room at St. Benedict's Hospital and was
examined by Dr. Joan Balcombe, an emergency physician. Pennington has full range of
motion in his neck. Dr. Balcombe's diagnosis is likewise a cervical strain. Because of
the Emergency Room setting, x-rays are ordered, which are normal. Dr. Balcombe
ordered physical therapy for Pennington and told him to specifically call the next day to
arrange for physical therapy (R.1093; Vol. 1 T. 1230-1237).
Pennington did not call the next day to arrange for physical therapy. On July 6,
1993, Pennington receives another examination, by Dr. Trimble at the Burns Chiropractic
Clinic.

Now,

Mr.

Pennington

is

diagnosed

with

"an

acute

traumatic

acceleration/deceleration injury to the cervical spine resulting in myofascities with
bilateral occupital neuralgia and grade II radiculopathy of the right upper extremity and an
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acute traumatic lumbosacral sprain/strain resulting in myofascitis." Mr. Pennington seeks
treatment from Burns Chiropractic seven times during the next eight days and receives
manipulative treatment to his entire spine, hip and ribs. He receives x-rays from Burns
Chiropractic—normal thoracic spine, two views with an interpretation; normal lumbar
spine, four views with an interpretation (R. 1093-1094; Exhibit D-44).
Attorney Dan Wilson, Pennington's father-in-law, then suggested he go to his,
Attorney Wilson's, personal chiropractor and long-time acquaintance, Dr. Dale Bennett,
at Bennett Chiropractic. On July 15, 1993, Mr. Pennington received a fifth physical
examination from Bennett Chiropractic. His diagnosis is now "Acute, Moderate to
Severe, Constant" (1) "Brachial Radicular Neuralgia," (2) "Cervical Hyperflex/Hyperext.
Inj-*" (3) "Multiple Cervical Subluxation," (4) "Thoracic Subluxation Unspec," and (5)
"Lumbar Subluxation Unspec." (R. Exhibit D-45). He goes to Bennett Chiropractic 20
times during the next 30 calendar days receiving spinal manipulations and adjustments to
treat problems to his thoracic spine, his hips, his ribs, his lumbar spine, and cervical spine
(R. 1093; Exhibit P-6).
On July 23, 1993, Pennington receives a manipulation from Dr. Bennett of the
anterior ribs, the cervical 1, the sacroiliac 1, and the thoracic 6, 4, and 1. On July 24,
1993, Pennington reports to Dr. Val Rollins, an emergency room physician, claiming he
had been experiencing severe back pain for two days. Dr. Rollins finds no swelling or
other objective symptoms, but because of plaintiff s self-reported persistent complaints of
pain and the normal x-ray previously taken in the Emergency Room, he refers him to Dr.
Bryson Smith for a neurological consultation (R. 1094, Vol. 1 T. 1249, Exhibits, P-5, 6).
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Dr. Bryson Smith saw Pennington, and based on plaintiffs subjective complaints
(Vol. 2 T. 1488) and treatment history, he ordered an MRI scan (R.1094). Dr. Smith's
objective finding of Pennington was his cervical spine had full range of motion (Vol. 2 T.
1513).
The MRI scan was performed at St. Benedict's Hospital on about August 3, 1993,
and was normal. Physical therapy was again recommended, and this time Pennington
went to physical therapy six times along with massage therapy about three times (all of
the massage therapy occurred on the same day as the physical therapy). During this
period of time, Pennington also continued chiropractic treatment, some on the same day
as the physical therapy. All treatment was completed by about August 26, 1993, and
Pennington had achieved his goal of exceeding the $3,000 cap on medical expenses so he
could pursue a claim against the other driver (R. 1094-1095).
From June 18, 1993, until August 26, 1993, Pennington saw at least four different
medical doctors, about five different chiropractors, involved an x-ray techinician and
MRI technician and at least two medical doctors were apparently involved in the reading
of those results, two physical therapists and a massage therapist, for a minimum of 12
different medical providers (R. 1095).
On July 30, 1993, Pennington came to the Ogden Allstate Claim Office. He met
with Clay Hamblen on that day in the lobby. Mr. Pennington claimed to have a cervical
strain and a back strain. Mr. Hamblen situated himself in such a way that Pennington had
to move in full range of motion to talk with him. Mr. Hamblen observed he had no
guarded movement. He observed him sit, stand, walk, and run to his car and bring
something back in the office, without any difficulty (R. 1096, Vol. 3 T. 1688-1689).

8

Because Mr. Pennington had seen so many different providers and seem
determined to see additional providers, and because he did not appear injured in any
manner, Mr. Hamblen, with his manager, Hal Palmer, decided Mr. Pennington, under his
insurance contract with Allstate, should undertake an independent medical examination
(R. 1096, Vol. 3 T. 1691-1692, Vol. 4 T. 1882).
Mr. Hamblen indicated to Pennington he needed to submit to an independent
medical examination. Shortly thereafter, on August 13, 1993, Attorney Wilson called Mr.
Hamblen. Attorney Wilson was very antagonistic in regard to an independent medical
examination, and he refused to have his client submit to the independent medical
examination. He informed Mr. Hamblem he had convinced Pennington to not see so
many providers. Attorney Wilson engaged in other tactics which made it difficult to
obtain an independent medical examination by Allstate until September 28, 1993 (R. 852,
853,1096, Vol. 3 T. 1696-1698).
When Dr. Nord examined Mr. Pennington on September 28, 1993, his spine was
normal (Vol. 2, T. 1438). Dr. Nord determined Mr. Pennington had sustained an
uncomplicated acute cervical strain as a result of the motor vehicle accident of June, 1993
(Vol. 2, T. 1439). He involved too many players with this injury. He unnecessarily went
from practitioner to practitioner which was not conducive to good care (Vol. 2, T. 1440).
Other than continuation of a home exercise program already established and follow-ups
as needed with his primary care physician, Dr. Paul Taylor, no further treatment or
medical follow-up was indicated (Vol. 2, T. 1441, Addendum G).
Attorney Wilson filed this lawsuit against all defendants on January 21, 1994.
Rather than structuring the lawsuit in accordance with Utah Code Ann. §31A-22-
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309(5)(d), Attorney Wilson sued Allstate and all health care providers which had not
been paid. Pursuant to that lawsuit, Attorney Wilson sent letters, dismissal agreements,
and acceptance of service to each one of the named defendants (but not his client's own
insurance company, Allstate) (see example, Addendum H, letter, Addendum I, Dismissal
Agreement and Acceptance of Service, R. 708-710). In these letters, Attorney Wilson
informed the health care providers the lawsuit against them was a sham in that he was
personally going against Allstate Insurance Company for the attorney's fees and costs
and not against the medical providers. He stated he knew the dispute was, in reality,
between the health care providers and Allstate. However, Attorney Wilson stated he was
intending on pursuing this law suit against Allstate. Attorney Wilson stated: "However,
my experience is that because of the cost, the health care providers never pursue the case
and the insurance company gets away without paying the bills. This doesn't make me
very happy so I don't plan to do that in this case. Instead I plan to press this matter
to trial." (Addendum H, letter).
The Agreement, drafted by Attorney Wilson, provided that if the court deemed the
charges of the provider were reasonable and necessary, he would collect the money from
Allstate and pay the money over to the health care providers (even though more money
was owing to the health care providers than the remaining PIP benefits). In exchange, if
the health care provider would sign the dismissal agreement and acceptance of service,
and the court determined the charges were not reasonable or not necessary, the health care
provider would not pursue Mr. Pennington (R. 1102-1103, Addendum I).
Attorney Wilson did not inform the health care providers in the dismissal
agreement sufficient funds were not left under the remaining policy PIP benefits to pay
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each health care provider if the court determined the charges were reasonable and
necessary (R. 1103, Addendum I).
Attorney Wilson went further than sending the letters and dismissal agreements to
the health care providers. He contacted specifically Dr. Bryson S. Smith and informed
him that Allstate had determined his treatment was not medically necessary in regard to
the injuries Mr. Pennington had sustained (although he did not inform him of all the
various health care providers that had been seen by Pennington prior to Dr. Smith).
Attorney Wilson asked Dr. Smith permission to do "whatever was necessary to obtain
reimbursement from the insurance company for his client." Attorney Wilson "explained
carefully to me that he did not believe that any of the medical care given by the various
providers including myself, was in any way inappropriate. Nevertheless, he wanted to
name me as a defendant in the suit claiming inappropriate care. He felt this maneuver
might motivate the insurance company to pay the claim." Finally, Attorney Wilson
"assured me that he did not believe my care of this patient had been inappropriate. He
offered that, should this go to trial, he had a friend in town who would be willing to
defend me at no charge." (R. Vol. 2 T. 1501, Exhibits D-16, D-17, Addendum J).
On February 3, 1994, Attorney Wilson then wrote a letter to Hal Palmer indicating
Allstate was required to pay the additional $1,305.41 or else he would bring suit for and
on behalf of Lorin Pennington under Utah Code Ann. §31A-22-309(5)(d) (he already had
filed the suit and served Allstate in Salt Lake). He threatened Mr. Palmer that if Allstate
refused to pay this additional amount which Allstate had deemed was unreasonable and
unnecessary, pursuant to the statute, if he recovered $1, he, being Attorney Dan Wilson,
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would be entitled to full payment of attorney's fees and costs (R. 001, 018, 1101, Exhibit
P-52,Vol.4T. 1938).
(2) After suit was filed. Allstate initially filed a Motion to Dismiss or in
the alternative a Motion to Appoint a Medical Panel on the basis plaintiffs claim for
relief was not ripe for decision under contract law, tendered the remaining $1,305.41
under the PIP statute and contract with Pennington to the court for decision as to whether
any was owing, and requested the court to appoint a medical panel, pursuant to Utah
Code Ann. §31A-22-307(2)(d) to determine the reasonableness and the necessity of the
claimed charges and tender the remaining amount either to the providers or back to
Allstate depending upon the medical panel's decision (R. 006-016). The Motion was
denied, and Allstate filed an Answer (R. 024-025, 043-047).
On February 19, 1994, Attorney Wilson filed a third-party complaint against Brad
Beasley for the injuries Mr. Pennington allegedly received on June 18, 1993 (R. 1099).
Attorney Wilson did not send a copy of the complaint to Allstate although his client was
required to do so under his insurance contract with Allstate (R. 1089,1099).
On March 17, 1994, Attorney Wilson had his client enter into a release with Brad
Beasley and others releasing any and all claims, damages, actions, causes of actions or
suits of any kind or nature whatsoever on account of injuries Pennington received in the
automobile accident of June 18, 1993. A copy of the release and notice of the settlement
was never sent to Allstate (R. 1100).
In this suit, the defendant, St. Benedict's Hospital, filed an Answer and a
Counterclaim against Pennington on June 11, 1994 (R. 058-073). Defense was tendered
to Allstate, and Allstate settled the counterclaim against its insured, Pennington, and
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Pennington's complaint and St. Benedict's counterclaim were dismissed with prejudice
(R. 1118-1119).
The defendant, Dr. Joan Balcombe, filed a Motion to Dismiss on the basis Dr.
Balcombe was an employee of St. Benedict's and did not bill Pennington for any services
(R. 091-93, 074-089). The trial court granted the Motion, and Dr. Balcombe was ordered
dismissed with prejudice (R. 234-236).
Defendant Associates in Radiology filed an Answer to complaint and
Counterclaim against Pennington (R. 241-250). Defense was tendered to Allstate, and
Allstate settled the counterclaim against its insured, Pennington, and Pennington's
complaint and Defendant Associates in Radiology's counterclaim were dismissed with
prejudice (R. 1127-1128).
Defendant Dr. Bryson Smith was served on May 11, 1994. A Default Certificate
was entered on August 29, 1994 (R. 162-165). On July 31, 1995, counsel for Pennington
and counsel for Allstate stipulated to dismissal of Dr. Smith (R. 505). An Order of
Dismissal was signed by the trial court on August 24, 1995 (R. 613-614, Addendum K).
Attorney Wilson argues now on appeal Dr. Smith should have had a default judgment
entered against him. Inasmuch as Pennington agreed to the dismissal, this argument is
moot.
Defendants Burns Chiropractic, Dr. David Trimble, D.C, and Dr. Dale Bennett,
D.C. were served with the summons and complaint (per representation of Attorney Dan
Wilson) and signed the dismissal agreement (per representation of Attorney Dan Wilson)
(R. 712). Per stipulation of the parties, an Order of Dismissal was signed by the trial
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court on August 24, 1995, dismissing with prejudice Burns Chiropractic, Dr. David
Trimble, D.C. and Dr. Dale Bennett (R. 613-614, Addendum K).
During the discovery phase, numerous requests for hearings and numerous
motions were filed by Pennington. On August 16, 1995, documents filed by Attorney
Wilson for Pennington consisted of 77 pages (R. 532-609). Numerous hearings were
conducted, and the same issue argued numerous times (for example the Associates in
Radiology $30 charge was argued at least three separate times) (see trial court index).
On May 22, 1995, Attorney Wilson sent a letter and his time records to Hal
Palmer of Allstate with a copy to Allstate's attorney indicating he would be willing to
resolve the matter at $100 per hour for 74.7 hours. This would have amounted to $7,470
(R. 663-678). He later informed counsel his hourly charge was $125. By extrapolating
his fee through the end of trial, Attorney Wilson would have incurred $51,027 in attorney
fees which he wanted Allstate to pay to him (R. 1034).
When trial commenced on February 22, 1996, Pennington was not exposed to any
medical providers in that all defendants had been dismissed. The only reason the trial
continued was an effort by Attorney Wilson to get Allstate to pay his attorney fees for his
filing the action against Allstate for his son-in-law (Vol. 1 T. 1169).
Trial was held on this matter on February 22, 23, 26, 27, 1996 (R. 797-815). The
trial court actively participated in trial and reviewed volumes of evidence, kept extensive
personal notes, reviewed all the exhibits in evidence as well as documents filed by each
side, including numerous memorandum, and carefully observed the demeanor of the
witnesses during their testimony and reached conclusions as to the truthfulness and
untruthfulness of the witnesses (R.1081).
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Closing arguments were originally scheduled for February 28, 1996, but were
continued to March 1, 1996, because of a conflict in scheduling by the court (R. 815).
Attorney for Allstate did not get word the closing arguments were scheduled on March 1,
1996, and was in the hospital on that date running tests (Vol. 4 T. 1941-1942). (Attorney
Wilson argues the trial court should have awarded Pennington attorney fees because of
this miscommunication. Such an award is not justified under the facts or law of this
case). Written notice was then sent by the court for closing arguments on March 15, 1996
(R. 819). On March 15, 1996, Attorney Dan Wilson called Dr. Trimble as a rebuttal
witness. Closing arguments were heard in the afternoon, and Pennington did not attend
(Vol. 5 T. 2040). Attorney Wilson read the newspaper during closing argument (Vol. 5
T. 2075).
C. Disposition at Trial Court (Addendum L, M, N)
The trial court determined the lawsuit was filed with a lack of good faith and was
an abusive use of the courts (R. 1100).

The court found Pennington had an

uncomplicated cervical strain, and the treatment plan by Dr. Taylor was a standard and
proper treatment (R. 1091). The court further found that if Pennington would have
followed Dr. Taylor's recommendations, his injury would have been resolved as soon, or
possibly sooner, (because of unnecessary and apparently damaging stressful chiropractic
manipulations) as if he had not obtained treatment from numerous other medical
providers (R. 1091-1092).
The court further found the purpose of the numerous other medical providers was
so Pennington could incur medical expenses above the $3,000 PIP in order to sue the
other driver (R. 1092).

Further, Allstate paid several claims submitted to it for
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unnecessary and unreasonable treatment but should not be punished for these payments
because Pennington was somewhat successful in deceiving Allstate (R. 1099).
The court also awarded attorney fees to Allstate based in part on Attorney
Wilson's questionable conduct in attempting to obtain releases from medical providers
and at least implying to those medical providers he would protect their interests even
though he was suing them (R. 1101). The court also found Attorney Wilson attempted to
force Allstate to pay unnecessary and unreasonable expenses incurred by Pennington and
threatened Allstate with the fact he would recover several thousands of dollars in
attorney's fees under the PIP statute for bringing this action while he knew or should have
known most of the medical expenses and treatment were unreasonable (R. 1101).
Finally, the court awarded judgment for attorney's fees in the amount of $15,000
because of the misconduct in bringing this "spurious action" which was "without merit
and not in good faith" (R. 1083).
ARGUMENT
I. The Trial Court Did Not Err in Granting Attorney Fees, Costs and Expenses Against
Dan Wilson and His Son-in-Law, Lorin Pennington
The trial court was extremely concerned about the motivation of Attorney Dan
Wilson and his son-in-law, Lorin Pennington in bringing this lawsuit (R. 1100). The
court found Pennington engaged in intentional conduct of incurring unnecessary medical
treatment and engaged in conduct to run up unnecessary medical bills and force Allstate
to pay for those bills (R. 1100). Specifically, the trial court, from his advantaged position
of observing the demeanor of the witnesses and in review of the exhibits, found (1) Mr.
Pennington willfully failed to follow his treating physician's properly prescribed
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treatment plan; (2) chose to 'shop' for other medical providers with the intent of creating
unnecessary medical bills; (3) utilized Attorney Dan Wilson's personal chiropractor and
long time acquaintance as one of those unnecessary medical providers; (4) willfully
exaggerated his symptoms in order to make his injury seem more severe than it was; (5)
intentionally created medical bills for the purpose of exceeding the $3,000 PIP cap under
Utah law in order to pursue a personal injury claim and thereby wrongfully receive a
several thousand dollar's settlement against the other driver; (6) never was diagnosed
with any objective filings to support any injury or treatment beyond Dr. Taylor's original
diagnosis and treatment; (7) the plaintiff or his attorney's failed to notify Allstate of the
filing of the complaint against the other driver, and the resulting settlement against the
other driver as required by the insurance contract and attorney ethics; (8) questionable
conduct by Attorney Wilson in attempting (and in some instances succeeding) to obtain
releases from medical providers and implying to those providers he would protect their
interests as much as they could expect their claims to be protected by their own attorney
even though he was the attorney representing the party suing them; (9) an attempt by
Attorney Wilson to force Allstate to pay unnecessary and unreasonable expenses incurred
by the plaintiff; (10) obstructionist conduct by Attorney Wilson to avoid or delay medical
examination by Allstate's doctor; and (11) Attorney Wilson's strong assertion throughout
the case that he was entitled to several thousands of dollars in attorney's fees under the
PIP statute for bringing this action while he knew or should have known, most of the
medical expenses and treatment were unreasonable (R. 1085-1 111).
A. Attorney Fees Were Properly Awarded Against Pennington Under Utah Code
Ann. §78-27-56 (1981 as amended).
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The first basis for the award of attorney fees against Pennington was under Utah
Code Ann. §78-27-56 (1981 as amended)(R. 1082). Utah Code Ann. §78-27-56 (1981 as
amended) provides as follows:
(1) In civil actions, the court shall award reasonable attorney's fees to a
prevailing party if the court determines that the action or defense to the action was
without merit and not brought or asserted in good faith, except under Subsection
(2).
(2) The court, in its discretion, may award no fees or limited fees against a
party under Subsection (1), but only if the court:
(a)findsthe party hasfiledan affidavit of impecuniosity in the
action before the court; or
(b) the court enters in the record the reason for not awarding fees
under the provisions of Subsection (1).
(1) Lack of Good Faith. The trial court in the Judgment and Findings of
Fact found this lawsuit was not brought in good faith (R. 1083, 1088, 1092-1096, 10981104). "This lack of good faith turns on subjective intent, and for purposes of the statute
is synonymous with a finding of "bad faith." Jeschke v. Willis, 811 P.2d 202, 204 (Utah
App. 1991). "While there may be a distinction between bad faith and "lack of good faith"
in other areas of the law, for purposes of U.C.A. 1953, Sec. 78-27-56, the two terms are
synonymous." Cadv v. Johnson, 671 P.2d 149,152 (Utah 1983).
The issue of bad faith is a question of fact to be ascertained by the trier of fact and
is reviewed under the "clearly erroneous" standard. Id.; see also Topik v. Thurber, 739
P.2d 1101, 1104 & n. 5 (Utah 1987); Broadwater v. Old Republic Sur., 854 P.2d 527, 534
n. 3 (Utah 1993); Coalville City v. Lundgren, 930 P.2d 1206, 1211 (Utah App. 1997).
The trial court must have found one of the following elements was lacking in order to
determine the suit was brought in bad faith: "(1) An honest belief in the propriety of the
activities in question; (2) no intent to take unconscionable advantage of others; and (3)
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no intent to, or knowledge of the fact that the activities in question will, [sic] hinder,
delay or defraud others." Cadv v, Johnson, 671 P.2d 149, 151 (Utah 1983), quoting from
Sparkman and McLean Co. v. Derber, 481 P.2d 585 (Wash. App. 1971).
From the facts and evidence introduced at trial, the trial court determined: "it
was plaintiffs purpose to deceive the medical providers as well as the insurance carrier. .
." (R. 1099, par. 41). Specifically, the trial court found Pennington willfully failed to
followed Dr. Taylor's properly prescribed treatment plan (R. 1100, par. 46). Pennington
intentionally created unnecessary medical bills by shopping for other medical providers in
order to exceed the $3,000 PIP limit so he could sue the other driver and willfully
exaggerated his symptoms in order to make them seem more severe than they were (R.
1092, par. 23,1100, par. 46).
In regard to Attorney Wilson's actions, the trial court determined his conduct was
questionable in suing medical providers while at the same time telling the providers the
lawsuit against them was a sham and implying he would protect their interests (R.l 101).
Further, Attorney Wilson failed to tell the medical providers if they signed the dismissal
agreement, sufficient funds were not available from Allstate to pay each defendant. In
addition, Attorney Wilson offered to provide the very defendants he was suing, an
attorney, for free, if the matter went to trial (R. 1103). Attorney Wilson further threatened
employees at Allstate that if Allstate refused to pay medical expenses and treatment when
he knew or should have known it was unreasonable, he would recover all his attorney's
fees and costs in the lawsuit. Attorney Wilson informed Allstate employees he had
convinced Pennington to not see so many health care providers; yet, he thereafter
informed the health care providers he felt their services were reasonable and necessary.

19

Attorney Wilson further, even inappropriately, indicated to these defendants he wanted to
get at Allstate for not paying the PIP benefits to the extent of providing them free legal
service tofightPennington's own insurance company (R. 1103-1104).
Any one of these actions would satisfy one or all of the elements which establish a
lack of good faith on Pennington's part in bringing the law suit. The trial court, with the
opportunity to view and assess the demeanor of witnesses and attorneys first hand, found
the requisite facts to sustain a finding of lack of good faith. A reading of the record
likewise can lead this Court to the conclusion his determination of those facts was not
"clearly erroneous."
(2) Without Merit. Under Utah Code Ann. §78-27-56 (1981 as amended), the
trial court must also make the determination the case was brought "without merit." "To
prove that a claim is "without merit" under the statute, the party asserting an award of
attorney fees must first demonstrate the claim is "frivolous" or "of little weight or
importance having no basis in law or fact." Jeschke v. Willis, 811 P.2d 202, 203 (Utah
App. 1991), quoting from Cadv v. Johnson, 671 P.2d 149, 151 (Utah 1983). In Cady, the
Utah Supreme Court further explained:
The dictionary definition of "frivolous" is "of little weight or importance
having no basis in law or fact." While there may be some distinction between
these two terms in other areas of the law, for purposes of this statute we believe
the terms are synonymous. While this definition may lack some of the nuances
found in common law definitions, it adequately serves the purpose of the statute
before us and is clearly understood.
Id. "The "without merit" determination is a question of law. . ." and is reviewed for
"correctness." Jeschke v. Willis, 811 P.2d 202,203 (Utah App. 1991).
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Based upon the facts presented to the trial court, Pennington had no legal claim
for any of the funds he sought from Allstate. He was in violation of his contract with
Allstate at the time of his lawsuit against Allstate. Pennington clearly had no legal basis
for recovery of any additional expenses which were incurred by him solely for the
purpose of having enough medical expenses ($3,000) to bring his third party claim. The
trial court correctly applied the legal standard to the facts, and the requirements of Utah
Code Ann. §78-27-56 (1981 as amended) for awarding attorney's fees were completely
satisfied. Attorney fees against Pennington, and Attorney Wilson should be affirmed.
B. Attorney Fees and Costs Are Proper Under Utah Code Ann. §78-27-56.5
(1986 as amended).
The trial court also opined attorney fees may also be proper under Utah Code
Ann. §78-27-56.5 (1986 as amended)(R. 1082). Utah Code Ann. §78-27-56.6 provides as
follows:
A court may award costs and attorney's fees to either party that prevails in
a civil action based upon any promissory note, written contract, or other writing
executed after April 28,1986, when the provisions of the promissory note, written
contract, or other writing allow at least one party to recover attorney's fees.
The insurance contract between Pennington and Allstate in regard to Personal
Injury Protection (PIP) benefits adopts by specific reference the Utah Insurance Code (R.
372-399). Under Utah Code Ann. §31A-22-309(d) (1953 as amended), an insured, who
believes he has been wrongfully denied payment of PIP benefits, is to sue his insurance
carrier under his contract for those benefits. The Insurance Code provides as follows: (d)
The person entitled to the benefits may bring an action in contract to recover the
expenses plus the applicable interest. If the insurer is required by the action to pay any
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overdue benefits and interest, the insurer is also required to pay a reasonable attorney's
fee to the claimant (emphasis added)." Under the writing of the statute, adopted by the
contract, the reciprocal right is also true. If an insurer, Allstate, has been wrongfully sued
by its insured, the insured, Pennington, should likewise be required to pay a reasonable
attorney's fee to the insurer, Allstate.
The statute also awards costs and expenses which were properly awarded by the
trial court.
C. Other Legal Basis' for Awarding Attorney Fees and Costs.
Although not specifically cited by the trial court, attorney fees could have been
awarded by the trial court against Attorney Dan Wilson and Pennington on several other
legal theories argued in the lower court (R. 1019-1053). As this Court has stated in Limb
v. Federated Milk Producers Ass'n. 23 Utah 2d 222,461 P.2d 290,293 n. 2 (1969):
The appellate court will affirm the judgment, order, or decree appealed
from if it is sustainable on any legal ground or theory apparent on the record, even
though such ground or theory differs from that stated by the trial court to be the
basis of its ruling or action, and this is true even though such ground or theory is
not urged or argued on appeal by appellee, was not raised in the lower court, and
was not considered or passed on by the lower court."
(quoting 5 C.J.S. Appeal & Error § 1464(1)).
(1) Violation of Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 11.

Utah Rules of

Civil Procedure, Rule 11, provides as follows:
Every pleading, motion, and other paper of a party represented by an
attorney shall be signed by at least one attorney . . . The signature of an attorney or
party constitutes a certification by him that he has read the pleading, motion, or
other paper; that to the best of his knowledge, information, and belief formed
after reasonable inquiry it is well-grounded in fact and is warranted by existing
law or a good faith argument for the extension, modification, or reversal of
existing law, and that it is not interposed for any improper purpose, such as to
harass or to cause unnecessary delay or needless increase in the cost of
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litigation. .. If a pleading, motion, or other paper is signed in violation of this
rule, the court, upon motion or upon its own initiative, shall impose upon the
person who signed it, a represented party, or both, an appropriate sanction,
which may include an order to pay to the other party or parties the amount of the
reasonable expenses incurred because of the filing of the pleading, motion, or
other paper, including a reasonable attorney's fee.
(emphasis added). "The determination of whether conduct violates Rule 11 is made on
an objective basis." Taylor v. Estate of Taylor, 770 P.2d 163, 171 (Utah App. 1989).
Utah courts have great leeway under Rule 11 to tailor the sanction to fit the requirement
of the particular case. Id.
The trial court made several factual findings supporting a finding of a Rule 11
violation including the frivolous filing of the lawsuit by Attorney Wilson, the filing of the
lawsuit against medical providers while telling them the filing was a sham and Attorney
Wilson would provide an attorney to represent them on the suit free of charge, bringing a
lawsuit against Dr. Joan Balcombe without a legal basis, needless filings of motions to
harass and increase the cost of litigation, and filing an action for inflated attorney fees on
an action which could have been filed in Small Claims Court and settled in one day.
What is interesting to note is Attorney Wilson recently filed an appeal on another
case involving damages less than $1,500 (including attorney fees) against an insurance
company. See Castillo v. Atlanta Cas. Co., 939 P.2d 1204 (Utah App. 1997). His
awarded attorney fees in that case were only $300 (a far cry from the extrapolated
$51,027 in attorney fees he wanted in this case).
The trial court specifically found Attorney Wilson and Pennington brought this
suit in bad faith and as an abusive use of the courts. Accordingly, under Utah Rules of
Civil Procedure, Rule 11, the attorneys fee award should be upheld. Further, under Utah
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Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 11, the costs awarded are also entirely appropriate as
reasonable expenses incurred by Allstate, which in justice, Pennington and his attorney
should pay because of their conduct.
(2) The Lawsuit Was Brought as a Declaratory Judgment Which Allows a Trial
Court to Award Attorneys' Fees and Expenses. Under the case of Western Casualty
Insurance Company v. Marchant 615 P.2d 423 (Utah 1980), this Court established that
attorneys' fees may be awarded under a declaratory judgment action. Utah Code Ann.
§78-33-10 (1953 as amended) provides that "a court may make such award of cost that
may seem equitable and just." The Supreme Court in the Western Casualty case stated:
The basic rule which this Court has declared and long adhered to is that
attorneys' fees are not to be allowed unless they are provided for by contract or by
statute or where they are a legitimate item of damages caused by the other party's
wrongful act. As an extension of the latter proposition, we have no doubt that the
statutory authorization to award such "costs as may seem equitable and just" may
include an award of attorneys' fees if they were necessarily incurred because of
litigation which was not resorted to in good faith, but was merely spiteful,
contentious or obstructive.
The trial court has specifically entered the factual finding that Pennington's
purpose was to deceive the medical providers and Allstate (R. 1099). The court found the
lawsuit was spurious, without merit and not in good faith (R. 1083). Accordingly,
attorney fees could have been properly awarded under the Declaratory Judgment Act.
Inasmuch as the Act specifically allows the award of equitable costs, the trial court's
award of costs likewise should be upheld.
(3) Pennington's Breach of Duty of Good Faith with Allstate Warrants an
Award of Attorney Fees and Costs. Pennington had an insurance contract with Allstate.
Pennington ignored the insurance contract provisions. Pennington ignored his duties and
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obligations under his insurance contract with Allstate. The trial court found the action
was not brought in good faith. According to the insurance contract and contract law
relating to insurance and breach of good faith, attorneys' fees and costs should be
awarded. Beck v. Farmers Insurance Exchange, 701 P.2d 795, 801 (Utah 1985).
(4) Attorney fees and costs are proper under the Utah Supreme Court's
Rationale in Barnard v. Wassermann. The Utah Supreme Court has long adhered to the
rationale that attorneys and their clients should be sanctioned where cases are brought
because of the inappropriate behavior of plaintiff s counsel and plaintiff. In this litigious
society with overcrowding of the courts, frivolous lawsuits should be sanctioned.
Attorneys who bring lawsuits for the wrong reason, along with their clients, should bear
the burden of paying for their wrongful actions. The party wrongfully sued should not.
Attorney fees are proper in this action "to compensate for time lost and inconvenience
occasioned by" Attorney Wilson's behavior and that of his client.

Barnard v.

Wassermann, 855 P.2d 243, 248 (Utah 1993). In the Barnard case the Utah Supreme
Court stated:
Rather, the court was properly exercising its inherent power to enforce
compliance with its rules. As we noted nearly a century ago:
"It is undoubtedly true that courts of general and superior jurisdiction
possess certain inherent powers not derived from any statute. Among these are
the power to punish for contempt, to make, modify, and enforce rules for the
regulation of the business before the court,... to recall and control its process, to
direct and control its officers, including attorneys as such, and to suspend, disbar,
and reinstate attorneys. Such inherent powers of courts are necessary to the
proper discharge of their duties.... [Absent legislative limitations] a constitutional
court of general and superior jurisdiction may exercise such inherent powers and
summary jurisdiction as the necessity of the case may require, and in [a] manner
comporting with a proper discharge of its duties in the premises...
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The summary jurisdiction which the court has over its attorneys as officers
of the court... is inherent, continuing, and plenary ... and ought to be assumed and
exercised ... not only to maintain and protect the integrity and dignity of the court,
to secure obedience to its rules and process, and to rebuke interference with the
conduct of its business, but also to control and protect its officers, including
attorneys."
In re Evans. 42 Utah 282,130 P. 217, 224-25 (1913) (emphasis added);
see also In re Barclay, 82 Utah 288, 24 P.2d 302, 303 (Utah 1933) (noting
inherent power to discipline attorneys in discussion of court's power to suspend
attorneys from practice); In re Burton, 67 Utah 118,246 P. 188,199 (1926)
(describing court's inherent power to deal with its own officers, including
attorneys).
As we suggested in In re Evans, courts of general jurisdiction, such as the
district court in this case, possess certain inherent power to impose monetary
sanctions on attorneys who by their conduct thwart the court's scheduling and
movement of cases through the court. 130 P. at 224; see also Jean E. Maess,
Annotation, Authority of Trial Judge to Impose Costs or Other Sanctions Against
Attorney Who Fails to Appear at, or Proceed with, Scheduled Trial, 29 A.L.R.4th
160 (1984). Similarly, trial courts in the federal system have such inherent power.
Roadway Express, Inc. v. Piper, 447 U.S. 752,100 S.Ct. 2455, 65 L.Ed.2d 488
(1980); see also Debra T. Landis, Annotation, Inherent Power of Federal District
Court to Impose Monetary Sanctions on Counsel in Absence of Contempt of
Court, 77 A.L.R.Fed. 789 (1986). This inherent power of trial courts is separate
and distinct from the contempt powers they may exercise in appropriate cases.
A court's power to enforce its rules implies the existence of a mechanism
for enforcement. That mechanism may take a variety of forms, one example of
which is the assessment of attorney fees. Without sanctions, the power to
enforce would be meaningless. As well as being consistent with our precedent in
this area, this result also comports with the trial court's statutory authority to
control proceedings before it. Utah Code Ann. Sees. 78-7-5, 78-7-17.
Id. at 248-249.
This case falls under the trial court's power to impose attorney fees on a
meaningless misuse of the courts by the filing of afrivolouslawsuit. Sanctions, in terms
of attorney fees and costs and expenses, were warranted to impress upon the attorney of
record, Wilson, and his client that Utah courts will not abide by being used as vehicles of
harassment, bribery, or other unlawful or wrongful purposes.
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D. The Trial Court Did Not Erred in Not Granting Sanctions Against Allstate's
Attorney in Regard to Pennington's Motions to Compel.
On February 19, 1994, Pennington filed an action against the driver of the other
vehicle. This action was settled on March 17, 1994. Counsel for Allstate believed this
minor case would thereafter be dismissed because research indicated under the case of
Jones v. Transamerica Insurance Company, 592 P.2d 609 (Utah 1979), Pennington was
now attempting a double recovery of his medical expenses. Allstate, through counsel,
presented this analysis to Pennington's counsel. When it began apparent, Pennington was
seeking a double recovery, the interrogatory answers and documents were provided (R.
193-201).
Pennington also filed a Motion to Compel on Pennington's Third Set of
Interrogatories. Counsel for Allstate was experiencing severe health difficulties of which
Attorney Wilson was aware. Numerous courtesies have been extended to Attorney
Wilson on this appeal because of health problems; however, Attorney Wilson filed a
Motion to Compel while Allstate's counsel was ill. The trial court was aware of the
health difficulties, and no order to compel was issued.
In reviewing the trial court's action, this Court needs to make a finding the trial
court abused its discretion by not imposing sanctions. W. W. & W. B. Gardner, Inc. v.
Park West Village, Inc., 568 P.2d 734 (Utah 1977). A mere filing of a motion to compel
does not justify automatic imposition of sanctions. Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule
37(a)(4) provides the trial court need not award expenses when "the court finds that the
opposition to the motion was substantially justified or that other circumstances make an
award of expenses unjust."

The trial court refused to grant sanctions given the
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circumstances of the entire case, as well as the misconduct of plaintiff s counsel in the
case. The trial court's decision should be upheld.
E. The Trial Court's Award of Costs Was Proper.
The lower court awarded costs to Allstate in the amount of $6,148.15 (R. 954,
1054-1056). Allstate initially requested costs in the amount of $7,185.55 (R. 913-916).
Plaintiff did not, pursuant to Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 54(d)(2), file a motion
to have the bill of costs taxed by the court. Instead, plaintiff objected to the costs.
Allstate filed a memorandum in support of the costs (R. 944-952). The court reviewed
the memorandums on file and ruled the costs of $6,148.15 were properly awarded against
the plaintiff (R. 954, 1054-1056).
The Utah Supreme Court has stated: f,[t]he determination to award taxable costs
is within the sound discretion of the trial court and will not be disturbed absent an abuse
of that discretion." Ong Int'l (U.S.A.) Inc. v. 11th Ave. Corp., 850 P.2d 447, 460 (Utah
1993). Further, the Utah Supreme Court has stated: f'[t]he trial court may exercise
reasonable discretion in awarding taxable costs," Cornish Town v. Roller, 817 P.2d 305,
316 (Utah 1991). The trial court reviewed the costs and necessary disbursements in the
action incurred because of the plaintiff and the plaintiffs attorney's actions and made the
determination as to which costs were appropriate. This Court should uphold his decision.
Pennington complains some inappropriate expenses were included. Pennington
complains of deposition costs being taxed. Allstate requested only the expense it incurred
in obtaining a transcript of depositions taken by Pennington. Pennington took the
depositions and cannot now argue he really did not need those to prepare for his case.
Frampton v. Wilson, 605 P.2d 771, 774 (Utah 1980). Pennington complains Allstate
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necessarily incurred costs to call expert witnesses to refute his unfounded accusations. A
trial court may award costs of any expert witness which is indicated might be called at the
time of trial. Ames v. Maas, 846 P.2d 468 (Utah App. 1993). The expert witness fees
were properly awarded.
Finally, the costs and expenses awarded are proper if they can be awarded under
any legal ground or theory presented in the lower court. Limb v. Federated Milk
Producers Ass'n, 23 Utah 2d 222, 461 P.2d 290, 293 n. 2 (1969). As indicated, such costs
and expenses are appropriate under Rule 11, Declaratory Judgment Act, Pennington's
breach of duty of good faith, or a Barnard v. Wassermann analysis. The trial court's
award of costs should be upheld.
II. The Trial Court Did Not Err in Denying Plaintiffs Second Motion
for Summary Judgment.
This Court has consistently held summary judgment is only proper when the
pleadings before the trial court establish no genuine issue of material fact. Ross v.
Schackel 920 P.2d 1159, 1161 (Utah 1996); Snvder v. Merklev, 693 P.2d 64, 65 (Utah
1984). As stated by this Court in the Snvder case:
Summary judgment is proper only if the pleadings, depositions,
affidavits, and admissions submitted in a case show that there is no genuine
issue of material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a
matter of law. It should be granted only when is clearly appears that there is
no reasonable probability that the party moved against could prevail
Id.
The complaint filed by Mr. Pennington asks the trial court for an evidentiary
hearing on whether the medical services received by him and medical expenses incurred
were reasonable and necessary for the treatment of injuries received by him (R. 004). The
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issue before the trial court was the treatment viewed in its entirety not in isolation. See
also Utah Code Ann. §31A-22-307 (1953 as amended), "personal injury protection
coverages and benefits include (a) The reasonable value of all expenses for necessary
medical . . . services." A party moved against need only to demonstrate some factual
disputes are in question. The defendant need not establish and prove his legal theory, he
only need establish and show facts exist which controvert the facts stated in the moving
parties' affidavits. Salt Lake City Court v. James Constructors, 761 P.2d 42, 47 (Utah
App. 1988). The trial court ruled a factual dispute existed as to the reasonableness and
necessity of the Associates in Radiology $30 charge in view of the entire issues for trial.
The trial court also determined at trial the Associates in Radiology charge was not
necessary (as well as all additional treatment sought by Mr. Pennington beyond that
recommended by Dr. Taylor) (R. 1081-1111).
A. The Law of the Case Was a Factual Dispute Existed as to the Reasonableness
and Necessity of the $30 Associates in Radiology Charge Prior to Mr. Pennington's
Filing His Second Motion for Summary Judgment.
Mr. Pennington, through his attorney, Dan Wilson, filed a Motion for Partial
Summary Judgment on December 8, 1994, requesting the court to grant partial summary
judgment against Allstate for its refusal to pay for claimed "reasonable and necessary"
charges from Burns Chiropractic, Bennett Chiropractic, St. Benedict's Hospital and
Associates in Radiology.
To dispute the reasonableness and necessity of the charges, Allstate Insurance Co.
had filed with the court the following information: (1) an affidavit of Clay Hamblen, the
Allstate Ogden claims adjuster who had direct control of the matter (R. 014-015). His

30

affidavit stated Allstate denied payment for the medical expenses because an independent
medical provider determined the expenses were not reasonable and also determined the
medical providers' services were unreasonable and unnecessary.
The record before the trial court also included (2) an affidavit of Jay Marks, the
Unit Claims Manager over the Personal Injury Protection (PIP) claims for Allstate's
Ogden office (Mr. Hamblen's supervisor) (R. 292-294). His affidavit indicated the
payments not made were based upon the independent medical provider's review that any
further payments would not be reasonable given the minor injury to Mr. Pennington and
the unreasonableness and excessive treatments of the providers (R. 292-302).
In opposition to the motion, Allstate also filed (3) an affidavit of Dr. Nathaniel M.
Nord with accompanying exhibits (R. 303-313, Addendum G). Dr. Nord stated: "My
review of the medical reports, medical expenses, medical treatment, and in speaking to
and personally examining Mr. Pennington, has led me to the conclusion that Mr.
Pennington sustained no more than a cervical strain as a result of the motor vehicle
accident on June 18, 1993. After that accident, Mr. Pennington generated undue personal
concern as to his condition which led to the involvement of an excessive number of
practitioners.

This undue personal concern led to his generating some duplicative

treatment and expenses which were not necessary." Further, in Dr. Nord's report attached
as an exhibit to his affidavit, he stated: "Other than the continuation of a home exercise
program already established, and follow-ups as needed with his primary care physician,
Dr. Paul Taylor, no further treatment or medical follow is indicated."
Specifically in regard to the x-rays, Dr. Nord testified: "Further, Mr. Pennington
received numerous x-rays in relationship to this motor vehicle accident, including x-rays
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taken on July 1, 1993, at St. Benedict's Hospital (which were normal); x-rays taken on
July 6, 1993, at the Burns Chiropractic Clinic (which were normal); x-rays taken on July
15, 1993, at the Bennett Chiropractic Clinic (which were normal except for a mild
thoracolumbar scoliosis); and a cervical MRI scan taken August 3,1993, at St. Benedict's
Hospital (which was also normal).

This further reflects Mr. Pennington's undue

solicitation of various providers and services" (R. 304-305, Addendum G).
In support of the motion for summary judgment, plaintiff only submitted an
affidavit of Paul R. Jensen, M.D., who was an employee of Associates in Radiology, who
testified the charges were reasonable (R. 274-276). However, the affidavit specifically
declined to address the issue of necessity.
Oral argument occurred on the motion for summary judgment on March 13, 1995
(R. 450-451). The minute entry states: "Daniel Wilson is requesting the Court grant
Summary Judgment as to Associates in Radiology, in the amount of $30.00 for the XRay, as to Bums Chiropractic, and as to Bennet (sic) Chiropractic." The court thereafter
denied the motion on March 29, 1995, because a question of fact existed which needed to
be resolved by an evidentiary hearing (R. 454).
Thereafter, plaintiff filed another partial motion for summary judgment on the
identical Associates in Radiology $30 charge (R. 452). No new evidence was filed in
support of the motion. (Mr. Pennington did resubmit a prior affidavit of Dr. Balcombe
which had been filed in support of her Motion to Dismiss (see R. 285-288; 464-467). Dr.
Balcombe's affidavit only stated the "emergency room" standard of care was to take xrays. She did not testify in relation to medical necessity and reasonableness of the x-rays
in light of Mr. Pennington's excessive treatment and excessive x-rays.
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The trial court

summarily denied the Motion stating factual issues still needed to be resolved (R. 504506, 679-680). Attorney Wilson somehow convinced the trial court to again rehear the
argument on August 31,1995. The trial court again denied the Motion on September 13,
1995 (R. 768-769). The court also refused to grant another rehearing requested by
Attorney Wilson on the second Motion for Partial Summary Judgment filed October 19,
1995 (R. 956).
When the trial court ruled factual issues existed in relation to Associates in
Radiology $30 charge in regard to Pennington's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment
on March 29, 1995, that decision became the "law of the case" as to Associates in
Radiology $30 charge. Once the trial court had entered the law of the case, the trial court
did not have any further obligation to reopen the issue. Thurston v. Box Elder County,
892 P.2d 1034, 1037 (Utah 1995); Salt Lake City Corp. v. James Constructors, Inc., 761
P.2d 42,44-46 (Utah App. 1988).
In Thurston this Court defined the law of the case doctrine as follows:
The "law of the case" is a legal doctrine under which a decision made
on an issue during one stage of a case is binding in successive stages of the same
litigation. Plumb v. State, 809 P.2d 734, 739 (Utah 1990). The doctrine was
developed in the interest of economy and efficiency to avoid the delays and
difficulties involved in repetitious contentions and reconsideration of rulings on
matters previously decided in the same case. Richardson v. Grand Central Corp.,
572 P.2d 395, 397 (Utah 1977); State v. O'Neil, 848 P.2d 694, 697 (Utah
CtApp.), cert, denied, 859 P.2d 585 (1993); see also 18 Charles A. Wright,
Arthur R. Miller & Edward H. Cooper, Federal Practice and Procedure § 4478
(1981) [hereinafter Wright]; IB James W. Moore et al., Moore's Federal Practice
|0.404 [hereinafter Moore].

Id. The law of the case terminology justifies "a trial court's refusal to reconsider matters
in a continuing proceeding..." Id. at 1034.
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Once the trial court judge determined factual issues existed in relationship to the
$30 Associates in Radiology charge, the trial court judge had no obligation or
responsibility to allow continued argument on the issue. The trial court judge did not
have any responsibility to reopen an issue he had already decided. As stated by this Court
in Thurston:
Under this branch, a court is justified in refusing to reconsider matters it
resolved in a prior ruling in the same case for reasons of efficiency and
consistency. The doctrine is not a limit on power but, "as applied to the effect of
previous orders on the later action of the court rendering them in the same case,
merely expresses the practice of courts generally to refuse to reopen what has been
decided." Messenger v. Anderson. 225 U.S. 436,444, 32 S.Ct. 739, 740, 56 L.Ed.
1152 (1912); see also Arizona v. California, 460 U.S. 605, 618-19 & n. 8,103
S.Ct. 1382,1391-92 & n. 8, 75 L.Ed.2d 318 (1983). It rests on " 'good sense and
the desire to protect both court and parties against the burdens of repeated
reargument by indefatigable diehards.'" In re Department of Energy Stripper
Well Exemption Litig., 821 F.Supp. 1432,1434 (D.Kan.1993) (quoting Wright §
4478, at 790).
Id. at 1038-1039.
A lower court may reopen an issue only if exceptional circumstances are present.
These exceptional circumstances are narrowly defined to "(1) when there has been an
intervening change of controlling authority;

(2) when new evidence has become

available; or (3) when the court is convinced that its prior decision was clearly erroneous
and would work a manifest injustice." Id. The law of the case doctrine is especially
applicable "when, in the case of summary judgment, a subsequent motion fails to present
the case in a different light, such as when no new, material evidence is introduced." Salt
Lake City Corp. v. James Constructors, Inc., 761 P.2d 42, 46 (Utah App. 1988); see also,
Sittner v. Big Horn Tar Sands & Oil Inc., 692 P.2d 735, 736 (Utah 1984); Richardson v.
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Grand Central Corp., 572 P.2d at 397; Hammer v. Gibbons & Reed Co., 29 Utah 2d 415,
510 P.2d 1104, 1105 (Utah 1973).
In reviewing the lower court's record, no new authority was cited in Pennington's
Second Motion for Summary Judgment to justify the court reopening the issue of the $30
Associates in Radiology charge. Pennington cited no new evidence. No reason was
given to justify reopening the issue.
In response to Pennington's second motion, defendant Allstate also filed an
additional affidavit stating the $30 bill had not been received (R. 400-403). The affidavit
was unnecessary in that the court had already ruled from the facts presented a factual
issue existed as to the reasonableness and necessity of the charge. Thereafter, counsel for
Allstate reviewed the original file on September 1, 1995, and found the bill in Allstate's
file but never entered in Allstate's computer record. Counsel for Allstate immediately
informed the court by memorandum and also indicated Dr. Nord had the bill in his initial
evaluation (R. 720-723). With this information, the court again denied plaintiffs Motion
(R. 768-769).
The trial court consistently followed the law of the case regarding the disputed
reasonableness and necessity of Associates in Radiology charge. No additional hearing
was required or necessary. "The purpose of [this] doctrine is that in the interest of
economy of time and efficiency of procedure, it is desirable to avoid the delays and the
difficulties involved in repetitious contentions and rulings upon the same propositions in
the same case." Richardson v. Grand Central Corp., 572 P.2d 395, 397 (Utah 1977). The
trial court allowed Pennington three different times to argue his motion and consistently
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ruled a question of fact existed. Under the law of the case doctrine, the trial court did not
have any responsibility to grant another hearing on the same issue.
B. Pennington's Motion to Reconsider Was Appropriately Denied.
Under the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, a motion to reconsider is not expressly
available. Peav v. Peav, 607 P.2d 841, 843 (Utah 1980). The rationale for not allowing
multiple motions to reconsider was precisely addressed by this Court in Drury v.
Lunceford, 415 P.2d 662, 663 (Utah 1966) as follows:
When this has been done and the court has ruled upon the motion, if the
party ruled against were permitted to go beyond the rules, make a motion for
reconsideration, and persuade the judge to reverse himself, the question arises,
why should not be other party who is now ruled against be permitted to make a
motion for re-re-consideration, asking the court to again reverse himself?
Tenacious litigants and lawyers might persist in motions, arguments and pressures
and theoretically a judge could go on reversing himself periodically at the
entreaties of one or the other of the parties ad infinitum. This reflection brings
one to realize what an unsatisfactory situation would exist if a judge could carry in
his mind indefinitely a state of uncertainty as to what the final resolution of the
matter should be.
Mr. Pennington's counsel persuaded the trial court to listen to argument on the
$30 Associates in Radiology charge three different times. Every time the trial court ruled
against Mr. Pennington. His continued litigious requests cost the court and Allstate time
and expense. No additional time should have been spent by the trial court on another
motion to reconsider.
III. THE TRIAL COURT'S FINDINGS OF FACT ARE CLEARLY
SUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE
Mr. Pennington, through his counsel, Dan Wilson, mounts an attack against the
trial court's detailed and precise findings of fact and claims these facts are against the
clear weight of the evidence. In reality, the approach taken by Pennington and Attorney
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Wilson on appeal is simply an attempt to reargue his position based on selective excerpts
of evidence presented to the trial court. Pennington fails to establish the findings of fact
are clearly erroneous. Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 52(a), "Findings of fact. . .
shall not be set aside unless clearly erroneous, and due regard shall be given to the
opportunity of the trial court to judge the credibility of witnesses.'*; see also, State v.
Goodman, 763 P.2d 786 (Utah 1988), ProMax Development Corp. v. Mattson, 943 P.2d
247, 255 (Utah App. 1997), Sew v. Security Title Co. of Southern Utah, 902 P.2d 629,
634 (Utah 1995), MacKav v. Hardy, 896 P.2d 626, 629 (Utah 1995), In re Estate of
Bartell, 776 P.2d 885, 886 (Utah 1989).
As the Utah Court of Appeals explained in ProMax,
On the other hand, we review the trial court's findings of fact for clear
error, reversing only where the finding is against the clear weight of the evidence,
or if we otherwise reach a firm conviction that a mistake has been made. See
State v. Goodman, 763 P.2d 786, 786 (Utah 1988); Cummings v. Cummings, 821
P.2d 472,476 (Utah.Ct.App.1991). To succeed in its challenge to findings of fact,
ProMax may not simply reargue its position based on selective excerpts of
evidence presented to the trial court. See DeBry v. Cascade Enters., 879 P.2d
1353,1360 (Utah 1994) (rejecting sufficiency of evidence challenge where
appellant "essentially reargue[d] the evidence as if [the] appeal were a trial de
novo."); Oneida/SLIC v. Oneida Cold Storage & Warehouse, Inc., 872 P.2d 1051,
1053 (Utah.Ct.App.1994) (noting appellant's argument was "nothing more than an
attempt to reargue the case before this court—a tactic that we reject."). Instead,
ProMax must "first marshal all the evidence in support of the finding and then
demonstrate that the evidence is legally insufficient to support the finding even
when viewing it in a light most favorable to the court below." Willard Pease Oil
& Gas Co. v. Pioneer Oil & Gas Co., 899 P.2d 766, 773 (Utah 1995); accord
Oneida/SLIC, 872 P.2d at 1052-53.
Id.
A.

Pennington's Appeal Should Be Dismissed Because He Has Failed to

Marshall the Evidence Supporting the Trial Court's Findings of Fact and Demonstrate
This Evidence is Insufficient.
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In support of the judgment the trial court's findings of fact include 20 pages of
specific findings (R. 1085-1104). On appeal, Mr. Pennington must marshal all the
evidence supporting the findings. He must then demonstrate to this Court that even
viewing the findings of fact in a light most favorable to the court below, the evidence is
insufficient to support the findings. Scharf v. BMG Corp., 700 P.2d 1068, 1069-1070
(Utah 1985). Charlton v. Hackett 360 P.2d 176 (Utah 1961) This Court has consistently
held:
An appellate court does not lightly disturb the verdict of a jury nor the
findings of fact made by a trial court. If a challenge is made to the findings,
an appellant must marshal all evidence in favor of the facts as found by the
trial court and then demonstrate that even viewing the evidence in a light
most favorable to the court below, the evidence is insufficient to support the
findings of fact. If the appellant fails to marshal the evidence, the
appellate court assumes that the record supports thefindingsof the
trial court and proceeds to a review of the accuracy of the lower court's
conclusions of law and the application of that law in the case.
Saunders v. Sharp, 806 P.2d 198, 199 (Utah 1991); see also Grayson Roper Ltd. v.
Finlinson, 782 P.2d 467, 470 (Utah 1989); Scharf v. BMG Corp.. 700 P.2d 1068, 1070
(Utah 1985).
The Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 52(a) further emphasize the importance
of the lower court's findings of fact. "Findings of fact, whether based on oral or
documentary evidence, shall not be set aside unless clearly erroneous, and due regard
shall be given to the opportunity of the trial court to judge the credibility of the witnesses"
(emphasis added).
Pennington has spent considerable time marshaling the evidence supporting his
arguments to the lower court. The trial court in his advantaged position rejected this
evidence. He now attempts to reargue those facts on appeal to this Court. In doing so,
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Pennington has failed to follow this Court's rule that he must first marshal the evidence in
support of the trial court's findings of fact, and then show this Court this evidence
(overwhelming in this case) is insufficient to support the trial court's findings of fact.
Pennington has failed to do so, and this Court should assume the record supports the trial
court's findings of fact.
B. The Trial Court's Findings of Fact are Supported by the Evidence.
In review of the lower court's findings of fact, deference should be given by this
Court to the trial court's advantaged position to observe testimony first hand. Utah Rules
of Civil Procedure, Rule 52(a). The lower court's record demonstrates the trial court
judge actively participated in the trial and in judging and assessing the credibility of the
witnesses (R. 1082, Judgment, "the court having reviewed the volumes of evidence
produced, his extensive personal notes taken during several days of trials and hearings, all
exhibits in evidence, documents filed by each side, including numerous memorandum,
and having carefully observed the demeanor of witnesses during the testimony and having
reached conclusions as to the truthfulness and untruthfulness of these witnesses. . ."). A
review of the findings demonstrates immense support for the trial court's decision.
Specifically, Pennington argues findings of fact 21, 23 and 24 are not supported
by the record. Thesefindingsare as follows:
21. The court further finds that the recommendations and treatment plan
established by Dr. Taylor was a standard and proper treatment reasonable for this
type of cervical strain injury and had Mr. Pennington followed Dr. Taylor's
recommendation, this injury would have probably been resolved as soon, or
possibly sooner, (because of unnecessary and apparently damaging stressful
chiropractic manipulations) as if he had not obtained treatment from numerous
other medical providers.
23. The courtfindsthat rather than continue with Dr. Taylor, Mr.
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Pennington chose to 'shop' for other medical providers for the purpose of
increasing his medical expenses so he could exceed the $3,000 PIP amounts in
order to justify pursuing a personal injury claim against the other driver
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §31A-22-309 (1953 as amended).
24. The court finds that the further medical treatment obtained by
plaintiff, beyond that recommended by Dr. Taylor, was not only unnecessary,
but some of that treatment was given to areas of the body not injured in the
accident, and certain treatment probably increased plaintiffs pain and was
the cause of increased discomfort, (if indeed, same was experienced) above
that caused by the June 18th accident.
(R. 1091-1092).
The testimony at trial proved Mr. Pennington suffered injury of an minor,
uncomplicated cervical strain in the motor vehicle accident of June 18, 1993 (T. Vol. 2,
1413 (testimony of Dr. Nord); T. Vol. 1, 1220 (testimony of Dr. Balcombe); T. Vol. 3,
1820 (testimony of Dr. Wakefield). A cervical strain is a strain of a muscle. Time is the
healer of Mr. Pennington's type of injury; any treatment is simply for pain purposes and
not to cure the injury

(T. Vol. 2, 1474).

Physical therapy or non-manipulative

chiropractic therapy may reduce the pain, but nature does the healing (T. Vol. 2, 14761477).
Mr. Pennington went to his primary care physician, Dr. Paul Taylor, the day after
the accident (R. Exhibits, P-1). In accordance with a simple, uncomplicated cervical
strain, Dr. Paul Taylor recommended "neck flexion exercises," and "ice, heat, rest, and
Iboprofen." (Id.) Mr. Pennington's range of motion was "complete." (Id.) He again saw
Dr. Taylor on June 22, 1993, and Dr. Taylor simply recommended "doing more neck and
shoulder exercises, ice and then heat and muscle relaxant." (Id.)
Witnesses testified Dr. Taylor's care was entirely appropriate (T. Vol. 2, 1411
(testimony of Dr. Nord); T. Vol. 3, 1801 (testimony of Dr. Wakefield). Other than the
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continuation of the home exercise program established by Dr. Taylor and follow-ups as
needed with his primary care physician, Dr. Paul Taylor, no further treatment or medical
follow-up was necessary (T. Vol. 2, 1441).
Mr. Pennington does not return to his primary health care provider, Dr. Paul
Taylor. His attorney argued the reason he did not return was because he did trust his
primary health care provider. However, the evidence in the record before the court was
Mr. Pennington still listed Dr. Taylor as his primary health care provider when he was
seeing Bennett Chiropractic (Exhibit P-6). So in an effort to increase his PIP threshold
limit, Mr. Pennington seeks a third physical examination from Dr. Joan Balcombe, an
Emergency Room physician at St. Benedict's hospital. Dr. Balcombe's examination is
consistent with Dr. Taylor's. However, she orders x-rays because an Emergency Room
physician approaches a patient differently than a primary care physician in that they better
be right the first time because they are not likely going to see the patient again (Vol. 2, T.
1419). The standard of care is different for an Emergency Room doctor than a treating
physician (Vol. 2, T. 1418). Dr. Nord would not have ordered x-rays if no objective
change was observed in Mr. Pennington's physical examination.

Dr. Balcombe's

physical examination had no objective change from Dr. Taylor's examination (Vol. 2, T.
1416-1417). However, Dr. Balcombe, as an emergency room physician, ordered the xrays to avoid malpractice; and because the visit is usually a one-time basis, the emergency
physician wants to be positive all possible injuries to that patient are covered (Vol. 1, T.
1234, 1239). The x-rays are normal. (Pennington separately argues the $30 charge from
Associates in Radiology was reasonable and necessary. The clear weight of the evidence
was otherwise and supports Allstate's position that Dr. Taylor would not have ordered x-
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rays. The reference to Dr. Nord's testimony is taken out-of-context. In an emergency
setting, Dr. Nord testified the x-rays would be reasonable. However, he specifically
testified in regard to this case, he would not have ordered x-rays as Mr. Pennington's
treating physician (Vol. 2, T. 1415-1417)).
Mr. Pennington then receives a fourth examination on July 6, 1993, by Dr.
Trimble at the Burns Chiropractic Clinic. Now, Mr. Pennington is diagnosed with "an
acute traumatic acceleration/deceleration injury to the cervical spine resulting in
myofascities with bilateral occupital neuralgia and grade II radiculopathy of the right
upper extremity and an acute traumatic lumbosacral sprain/strain resulting in myofascitis"
(R. Exhibit D-44). Mr. Pennington seeks treatment from Burns Chiropractic seven times.
He receives x-rays from Burns Chiropractic—normal thoracic spine, two views with an
interpretation; normal lumbar spine, four views with an interpretation.
On July 15, 1993, Mr. Pennington received a fifth physical examination from
Bennett Chiropractic. His diagnosis is now "Acute, Moderate to Severe, Constant" (1)
"Brachial Radicular Neuralgia," (2) "Cervical Hyperflex/Hyperext. Inj.," (3) "Multiple
Cervical Subluxation," (4) "Thoracic Subluxation Unspec," and (5) "Lumbar
Subluxation Unspec." (Dist. Ct. Exhibits, D-45, Appendix C). He goes to Bennett
Chiropractic 20 times receiving spinal manipulations and adjustments to treat problems to
his thoracic spine, hips, ribs, lumbar spine, and cervical spine (R. Exhibits, P-6). Spinal
manipulations or adjustments performed by chiropractors involve placement in a certain
position with sudden forces applied to certain areas of the vertebral column. (Vol. 2, T.
1423-1427). Yet, Mr. Pennington's injury was to a muscle in the neck; the manipulations
were to the bony processes.
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Mr. Pennington again goes to the Emergency Room at St. Benedict's Hospital on
July 24, 1993. On the day prior he received treatment from Bennett Chiropractic for his
hips, his ribs, and thoracic pain (R. Exhibit P-6). Mr. Pennington's self report is his chief
complaint is swelling and pain in the back, worsening the last two daiys. No evidence is
given for the cause of onset of this increasing swelling and pain; no evidence ties it into
the automobile accident. Dr. Rollins cannot figure out his problem, so he refers him to a
neurologist, Dr. Bryson Smith. (Pennington separately argues Allstate should have paid
for this visit as a normal office visit to Dr. Taylor. The fallacy of this argument is,
according to other witnesses, Pennington probably did not need to seek Dr. Taylor again
inasmuch as time is the healer of his injury. Further, Pennington had been receiving
excessive chiropractic care which witnesses testified was not conducive to good care and
may have caused additional problems).
Dr. Smith conducts an MRI, everything is normal, and Mr. Pennington stops
treatment (although following Dr. Smith's first examination and before the last visit, Mr.
Pennington continues chiropractic treatment, adds additional physical therapy and
massage therapy, with some treatment overlapping days).
Dr. Nord conducted an independent medical examination of Mr. Pennington on
September 28, 1993. He concluded from his examination and review of the medical
records that:
The available medical evidence indicates that Mr. Pennington sustained no
more than a cervical strain as a consequence of the motor vehicle accident of
June 18, 1993, following which he generated undue personal concern which
led to involvement of an excessive number of practitioners being involved.
Other than the continuation of a home exercise program already established,
and follow-ups as needed with his primary care physician, Dr. Paul Taylor,
no further treatment or medical follow is indicated. The prognosis is
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excellent, with complete resolution of symptoms a reasonable expectation.
No activity restrictions are appropriate.
(R. Exhibits D-13, Addendum G).
Based on this evidence, and the opportunity of the court to determine the
truthfulness of the witnesses who testified, the trial court determined the
recommendations and treatment plan established by Dr. Taylor was a standard and proper
treatment reasonable for this type of cervical strain injury (R. 1091). The plan of Dr.
Taylor consisted of home exercise programs, ice, heat and muscle relaxant (Exhibit P-l).
Any further treatment, thereafter, was unnecessary (R. 1092) and was sought for the
purpose of increasing Mr. Pennington's medical expenses in order to exceed the PIP
threshold to justify a personal injury claim against the other driver (R. 1092). The trial
court found that Allstate had paid too much (R. 1099). However, payment by Allstate of
palliative procedures does not establish medical necessity (R. 1099) (Pennington attempts
to piece meal argue reasonableness and necessity of Bennett Chiropractic, Burns
Chiropractic, physical therapy, and Dr. Smith.

The clear weight of the evidence

established nothing after Dr. Taylor's second examination was reasonable, and additional
treatment was sought to inflate a personal injury claim (R. 1091-1092)).
The trial court, after listening to the testimony of all witnesses, including Mr.
Pennington, specifically determined the x-rays taken at the Emergency Room were
unreasonable and unnecessary and were part of the plaintiffs plan to build up the medical
expenses for his ultimate benefit in pursuing his additional claim against the other driver
(R. 1098).
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A review of the trial court's rationale and findings of fact with the evidence
adduced at trial establishes the trial court had sufficient evidence for its decision. This
Court should not set aside the trial court's decision supported by the record.
CROSS APPEAL
Attorney Wilson filed proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law on
March 6, 1996 (R. 821-830). In his Findings of Fact, Attorney Wilson stated: "Based on
the evidence, a reasonable attorney fee is $100 per hour for all time prior to July 15, 1995,
and $125 per hour for all time from and after July 15, 1995" (R. 828).

Between

November 30, 1993, and May 20, 1995, Attorney Wilson had spent 74.7 hours on this
matter.
Allstate's counsel, Jan P. Malmberg, filed an affidavit in support of Allstate's
request for attorney fees on December 19, 1996 (R. 997-1018). In her affidavit she
stated:
7. Numerous pleadings, correspondence, orders, telephone calls and
depositions were taken throughout the course of this action. By the time of
tiral, all defendants had been dismissed with the exception of Allstate. Plaintiff,
himself, had no stake in the outcome of the lawsuit. The lawsuit was
merely continued because the plaintiffs counsel, Dan Wilson, wanted this
court to award his attorney fees to be paid by Allstate even though the
entire lawsuit against Allstate was without legal basis (R. 997-998).
Her affidavit further recited that plaintiffs counsel, Dan Wilson, prepared 93
separate pleadings; she prepared 79 pleadings. Further, in support of her time, her
affidavit recited the specific time spent (R. 1000-1017). Mrs. Malmberg billed at a rate of
$75 an hour. Between February, 1994, and May 20,1995, she spent 55.6 hours.
The total attorney fees requested were $27,575. In the memorandum in support of
attorney fees, Allstate claims by extrapolating Mr. Wilson's charges through the end of
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time, his bill would have been $51,027 in attorney fees, nearly twice as much as
Allstate's.
Pennington never filed any memorandum in opposition to the attorney fees
claimed by Allstate. Pennington never submitted any objection to the reasonableness of
those fees. Pennington never disputed his counsel had spent approximately $51,000 in
attorney fees.
Under Utah Rules of Judicial Administration, Rule 4-501, Pennington had 10 days
to file any affidavits or other documents opposing the reasonableness of Allstate's
attorney fees. Plaintiff did not file any opposition. For purposes of the record before the
court at the time of ruling on the amount of attorney fees to be awarded, the trial court
had no documentation to challenge any of the claimed attorney fees. Under Rule 52(c) of
the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Pennington waived his right to challenge the attorney
fees, and attorney fees should have been entered in accordance with the request filed by
Allstate.
The Utah Supreme Court had held that while a trial court has discretion to
determine an award of attorney fees, the exercise of that discretion must be based on an
evaluation of the evidence. Dixie State Bank v. Bracken. 764 P.2d 985, 991 (Utah 1988).
An evaluation of the evidence indicates Attorney Wilson's hourly rate was higher.
Attorney Wilson's spent more hours on the case (at least through May, 1995) than
counsel for Allstate.

Attorney Wilson's total attorney fees would have been

approximately $51,000. Counsel for Allstate only claimed $27,575.
The Utah Supreme Court has indicated the factors the court should analyze in
awarding attorney fees. In Cabrera v. Cottrell 694 P.2d 622, 625 (Utah 1983), the Utah
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Supreme Court said the following items should be addressed: "the difficulty of the
litigation, the efficiency of the attorneys in presenting the case, the reasonableness of the
number of hours spent on the case, the fee customarily charged in the locality for similar
services, the amount involved in the case and the result attained, and the expertise and
experience of the attorneys involved." The trial court specifically found in this case
serious collateral matters which made the litigation difficult, including the conduct of
Attorney Wilson and the plaintiffs misconduct (R. 1082).

The trial court stated

excessive time was spent by Allstate's attorney, yet does not specifically identify what
hours were excessive, especially in light of the evidence which indicated plaintiffs
counsel spent more. The fee charged by Allstate's attorney was found to be less per hour
that often charged by attorneys. Thereby, even utilizing the $125 per hour charged by
plaintiffs counsel, with the 200 hours found reasonable, attorney fees should be at least
$25,000.
Finally, in light of the subject matter of this litigation, along with the conduct of
plaintiffs counsel with plaintiff, and the serious findings by the trial court of the
misconduct of both in filing a spurious action, all fees incurred by Allstate should be
awarded. To not award the full attorney fees incurred by Allstate in defending a frivolous
action would allow Pennington and his attorney to claim victory in their methods in that
Allstate was required to pay attorney fees and costs on a frivolous lawsuit filed in bad
faith. Pennington and his attorney, not Allstate should be the party punished for wasting
this court's time, the lower court's time, and causing Allstate to incur unnecessary
attorney fills and costs.
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CONCLUSION
Pennington and his father-in-law and attorney, Dan Wilson, attempted to
orchestrate a plan which would allow Pennington to bring a third-party action against the
driver that hit his vehicle when, in reality, he was barely injured. To accomplish this goal,
Pennington went shopping for various medical providers in an effort to build his case to be
one over $3,000 in medical expenses. He successfully accomplished his goal, sued the
third-party, recovered and kept thousands of dollars to which he was not entitled.
Allstate Insurance Company became suspicious during the course of receiving bills
from multiple providers on a case which appeared to be an uncomplicated cervical strain
which would resolve, without treatment, within a few weeks. Allstate exercised its rights
under its policy to verify its concerns through an independent medical examination.
Plaintiffs counsel thwarted that attempt until after Pennington could incur his $3,000 in
medical expenses. Pennington was also successful in obtaining his settlement from a thirdparty by violating his insurance contract with his own provider and never notifying them of
any lawsuit or settlement.
Successful in receiving money to which Pennington was not entitled, Pennington
now threatened his own company for challenging his incurrence of unnecessary and
unreasonable medical expenses. To avoid paying for those costs, a lawsuit was framed to
sue Allstate and his medical providers while at the same time, attempting to convince
those medical providers their treatment was reasonable and Pennington was representing
their interests in the lawsuit, while, in reality, Pennington was attempting to avoid paying
for those expenses.

When Allstate finally obtained the result sought by Pennington, i.e. all the medical
providers being dismissed, Pennington still sought to force his own company to pay for his
attorney fees. A trial was held. The trial court saw through the volumes of documents,
pleadings, and arguments made by plaintiffs counsel, and found the lawsuit was not
brought in good faith, was spurious, and was filed without merit. The trial court found
Pennington and his attorney attempted to deceive Allstate and the medical providers, and
entered judgment accordingly.
The trial record supports the decision of the trial court. This court should affirm
the ruling of the trial court that this action was spurious, without merit and not in good
faith. By affirming this conclusion, this Court should likewise award attorney fees in the
amount claimed at trial (as per the Cross Appeal), costs, and attorney fees and costs on
appeal under Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, Rule 33(b).
DATED this /9 f / ) day of January, 1998.
PERRY, MALMBERG & PERRY

a, (?. ^ J L J ^ ,
m P. Malmberg
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Addendum A

UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE
PART VII. JUDGMENT
RULE 54. JUDGMENTS; COSTS
(a) Definition; Form. "Judgment" as used in these rules includes a decree and any
order from which an appeal lies. A judgment need not contain a recital of pleadings, the
report of a master, or the record of prior proceedings.
(b) Judgment Upon Multiple Claims and/or Involving Multiple Parties. When
more than one claim for relief is presented in an action, whether as a claim, counterclaim,
cross-claim, or third-party claim, and/or when multiple parties are involved, the court may
direct the entry of afinaljudgment as to one or more but fewer than all of the claims or
parties only upon an express determination by the court that there is no just reason for
delay and upon an express direction for the entry of judgment. In the absence of such
determination and direction, any order or other form of decision, however designated,
which adjudicates fewer than all the claims or the rights and liabilities of fewer than all the
parties shall not terminate the action as to any of the claims or parties, and the order or
other form of decision is subject to revision at any time before the entry of judgment
adjudicating all the claims and the rights and liabilities of all the parties.
(c) Demand for Judgment.
(1) Generally. Except as to a party against whom a judgment is entered by default,
everyfinaljudgment shall grant the relief to which the party in whose favor it is rendered
is entitled, even if the party has not demanded such relief in his pleadings. It may be given
for or against one or more of several claimants; and it may, when the justice of the case
requires it, determine the ultimate rights of the parties on each side as between or among
themselves.
(2) Judgment by Default. A judgment by default shall not be different in kind
from, or exceed in amount, that specifically prayed for in the demand for judgment.
(d) Costs.
(1) To Whom Awarded. Except when express provision therefor is made either in
a statute of this state or in these rules, costs shall be allowed as of course to the prevailing
party unless the court otherwise directs; provided, however, where an appeal or other
proceeding for review is taken, costs of the action, other than costs in connection with
such appeal or other proceeding for review, shall abide the final determination of the
cause. Costs against the state of Utah, its officers and agencies shall be imposed only to
the extent permitted by law.

(2) How Assessed. The party who claims his costs must within five days after the
entry of judgment serve upon the adverse party against whom costs are claimed, a copy of
a memorandum of the items of his costs and necessary disbursements in the action, and file
with the court a like memorandum thereof duly verified stating that to affiant's knowledge
the items are correct, and that the disbursements have been necessarily incurred in the
action or proceeding. A party dissatisfied with the costs claimed may, within seven days
after service of the memorandum of costs, file a motion to have the bill of costs taxed by
the court in which the judgment was rendered.
A memorandum of costs served and filed after the verdict, or at the time of or
subsequent to the service and filing of the findings of fact and conclusions of law, but
before the entry of judgment, shall nevertheless be considered as served and filed on the
date judgment is entered.
(3) and (4) [Deleted.]
(e) Interest and Costs to Be Included in the Judgment. The clerk must include in
any judgment signed by him any interest on the verdict or decision from the time it was
rendered, and the costs, if the same have been taxed or ascertained. The clerk must,
within two days after the costs have been taxed or ascertained, in any case where not
included in the judgment, insert the amount thereof in a blank left in the judgment for that
purpose, and make a similar notation thereof in the register of actions and in the judgment
docket.

Addendum B

UTAH RULES OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE
TITLE V. GENERAL PROVISIONS
RULE 33. DAMAGES FOR DELAY OR FRIVOLOUS APPEAL; RECOVERY OF
ATTORNEY'S FEES
(a) Damages for Delay or Frivolous Appeal. Except in a first appeal of right in a
criminal case, if the court determines that a motion made or appeal taken under these rules
is either frivolous or for delay, it shall award just damages, which may include single or
double costs, as defined in Rule 34, and/or reasonable attorney fees, to the prevailing
party. The court may order that the damages be paid by the party or by the party's
attorney.
(b) Definitions. For the purposes of these rules, a frivolous appeal, motion, brief,
or other paper is one that is not grounded in fact, not warranted by existing law, or not
based on a good faith argument to extend, modify, or reverse existing law. An appeal,
motion, brief, or other paper interposed for the purpose of delay is one interposed for any
improper purpose such as to harass, cause needless increase in the cost of litigation, or
gain time that will benefit only the party filing the appeal, motion, brief, or other paper.
(c) Procedures.
(1) The court may award damages upon request of any party or upon its own
motion. A party may request damages under this rule only as part of the appellee's motion
for summary disposition under Rule 10, as part of the appellee's brief, or as part of a
party's response to a motion or other paper.
(2) If the award of damages is upon the motion of the court, the court shall issue
to the party or the party's attorney or both an order to show cause why such damages
should not be awarded. The order to show cause shall set forth the allegations which form
the basis of the damages and permit at least ten days in which to respond unless otherwise
ordered for good cause shown. The order to show cause may be part of the notice of oral
argument.
(3) If requested by a party against whom damages may be awarded, the court shall
grant a hearing.
Advisory Committee Note
Rule 33 is substantially redrafted to provide definitions and procedures for
assessing penalties for delays and frivolous appeals.
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If an appeal is found to befrivolous,the court must award damages This is in
keeping with Rule 11 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure However, the amount of
damages—single or double costs or attorney fees or both—is left to the discretion of the
court Rule 33 is amended to make express the authority of the court to impose sanctions
upon the party or upon counsel for the party This rule does not apply to a first appeal of
right in a criminal case to avoid the conflict created for appointed counsel by Anders v
California, 386 U S 738 (1967) and State v Clayton, 639 P 2d 168 (Utah 1981) Under
the law of these cases, appointed counsel must file an appeal and brief if requested by the
defendant, and the court must find the appeal to be frivolous in order to dismiss the
appeal
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Addendum C

TITLE 31 A. INSURANCE CODE
CHAPTER 22. CONTRACTS IN SPECIFIC LINES
PART III. MOTOR VEHICLE INSURANCE
§ 31A-22-307. Personal injury protection coverages and benefits
(1) Personal injury protection coverages and benefits include:
(a) the reasonable value of all expenses for necessary medical, surgical, X-ray,
dental, rehabilitation, including prosthetic devices, ambulance, hospital, and nursing
services, not to exceed a total of $3,000 per person;
(b)(i) the lesser of $250 per week or 85% of any loss of gross income and loss of
earning capacity per person from inability to work, for a maximum of 52 consecutive
weeks after the loss, except that this benefit need not be paid for the first three days of
disability, unless the disability continues for longer than two consecutive weeks after the
date of injury; and
(ii) a special damage allowance not exceeding $20 per day for a maximum of 365
days, for services actually rendered or expenses reasonably incurred for services that, but
for the injury, the injured person would have performed for his household, except that this
benefit need not be paid for the first three days after the date of injury unless the person's
inability to perform these services continues for more than two consecutive weeks;
(c) funeral, burial, or cremation benefits not to exceed a total of $1,500 per person;
and
(d) compensation on account of death of a person, payable to his heirs, in the total
of $3,000.
(2)(a) To determine the reasonable value of the medical expenses provided for in
Subsection (1) and under Subsection 31A-22-309 (l)(e), the commissioner shall conduct a
relative value study of services and accommodations for the diagnosis, care, recovery, or
rehabilitation of an injured person in the most populous county in the state to assign a unit
value and determine the 75th percentile charge for each type of service and
accommodation. The study shall be updated every other year. In conducting the study,
the department may consult or contract with appropriate public and private medical and
health agencies or other technical experts.
The costs and expenses incurred in
conducting, maintaining, and administering the relative value study shall be funded by the
tax created under Section 59-9-105. Upon completion of the study, the department shall
prepare and publish a relative value study which sets forth the unit value and the 75th
percentile charge assigned to each type of service and accommodation.
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(b) The reasonable value of any service or accommodation is determined by
applying the unit value and the 75th percentile charge assigned to the service or
accommodation under the relative value study. If a service or accommodation is not
assigned a unit value or the 75th percentile charge under the relative value study, the value
of the service or accommodation shall equal the reasonable cost of the same or similar
service or accommodation in the most populous county of this state.
(c) This subsection does not preclude the department from adopting a schedule
already established or a schedule prepared by persons outside the department, if it meets
the requirements of this subsection.
(d) Every insurer shall report to the Commissioner of Insurance any patterns of
overcharging, excessive treatment, or other improper actions by a health provider within
30 days after such insurer has knowledge of such pattern.
(e) In disputed cases, a court on its own motion or on the motion of either party
may designate an impartial medical panel of not more than three licensed physicians to
examine the claimant and testify on the issue of the reasonable value of the claimant's
medical services or expenses.
(3) Medical expenses as provided for in Subsection (l)(a) and in Subsection 31A22-309 (l)(e) include expenses for any nonmedical remedial care and treatment rendered
in accordance with a recognized religious method of healing.
(4) The insured may waive for the named insured and the named insured's spouse
only the loss of gross income benefits of Subsection (l)(b)(i) if the insured states in
writing that:
(a) within 31 days of applying for coverage, neither the insured nor the insured's
spouse received any earned income from regular employment; and
(b) for at least 180 days from the date of the writing and during the period of
insurance, neither the insured nor the insured's spouse will receive earned income from
regular employment.
(5) This section does not prohibit the issuance of policies of insurance providing
coverages greater than the minimum coverage required under this chapter nor does it
require the segregation of those minimum coverages from other coverages in the same
policy.
(6) Deductibles are not permitted with respect to the insurance coverages required
under this section.

As last amended by Chapter 71, Laws of Utah 1994.
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Addendum D

TITLE 31 A. INSURANCE CODE
CHAPTER 22. CONTRACTS IN SPECIFIC LINES
PART III. MOTOR VEHICLE INSURANCE
§ 31A-22-309. Limitations, exclusions, and conditions to personal injury protection
(1) A person who has or is required to have direct benefit coverage under a policy
which includes personal injury protection may not maintain a cause of action for general
damages arising out of personal injuries alleged to have been caused by an automobile
accident, except where the person has sustained one or more of the following:
(a) death;
(b) dismemberment;
(c) permanent disability or permanent impairment based upon objective findings;
(d) permanent disfigurement; or
(e) medical expenses to a person in excess of $3,000.
(2)(a) Any insurer issuing personal injury protection coverage under this part may
only exclude from this coverage benefits:
(i) for any injury sustained by the insured while occupying another motor vehicle
owned by or furnished for the regular use of the insured or a resident family member of
the insured and not insured under the policy;
(ii) for any injury sustained by any person while operating the insured motor
vehicle without the express or implied consent of the insured or while not in lawful
possession of the insured motor vehicle;
(iii) to any injured person, if the person's conduct contributed to his injury:
(A) by intentionally causing injury to himself; or
(B) while committing a felony;
(iv) for any injury sustained by any person arising out of the use of any motor
vehicle while located for use as a residence or premises;
(v) for any injury due to war, whether or not declared, civil war, insurrection,
rebellion or revolution, or to any act or condition incident to any of the foregoing; or
(vi) for any injury resulting from the radioactive, toxic, explosive, or other
hazardous properties of nuclear materials.
(b) The provisions of this subsection do not limit the exclusions which may be
contained in other types of coverage.
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(3) The benefits payable to any injured person under Section 31A-22-307 are
reduced by:
(a) any benefits which that person receives or is entitled to receive as a result of an
accident covered in this code under any workers' compensation or similar statutory plan;
and

(b) any amounts which that person receives or is entitled to receive from the
United States or any of its agencies because that person is on active duty in the military
service.
(4) When a person injured is also an insured party under any other policy,
including those policies complying with this part, primary coverage is given by the policy
insuring the motor vehicle in use during the accident.
(5)(a) Payment of the benefits provided for in Section 31A-22-307 shall be made
on a monthly basis as expenses are incurred.
(b) Benefits for any period are overdue if they are not paid within 30 days after the
insurer receives reasonable proof of the fact and amount of expenses incurred during the
period. If reasonable proof is not supplied as to the entire claim, the amount supported
by reasonable proof is overdue if not paid within 30 days after that proof is received by the
insurer. Any part or all of the remainder of the claim that is later supported by reasonable
proof is also overdue if not paid within 30 days after the proof is received by the insurer.
(c) If the insurer fails to pay the expenses when due, these expenses shall bear
interest at the rate of 1- 1/2% per month after the due date.
(d) The person entitled to the benefits may bring an action in contract to recover
the expenses plus the applicable interest. If the insurer is required by the action to pay
any overdue benefits and interest, the insurer is also required to pay a reasonable
attorney's fee to the claimant.
(6) Every policy providing personal injury protection coverage is subject to the
following:
(a) that where the insured under the policy is or would be held legally liable for the
personal injuries sustained by any person to whom benefits required under personal injury
protection have been paid by another insurer, including the Workers' Compensation Fund
of Utah, the insurer of the person who would be held legally liable shall reimburse the
other insurer for the payment, but not in excess of the amount of damages recoverable;
and

2

(b) that the issue of liability for that reimbursement and its amount shall be decided
by mandatory, binding arbitration between the insurers.
As last amended by Chapter 4, Laws of Utah 1994.
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Allstate Indemnity Company
The Company Named In the Declarations
A Stock Company • Home Office • Northbrook, Illinois
GENERAL
This policy is a legal contract between you
and us. A coverage applies only when a
premium for it is shown on the declarations
page If more than one auto is insured,
premiums will be shown for each auto. If
you pay the premiums when due and comply
with the policy terms, Allstate, relying on the
information you have given us, makes the
following agreements with you.
When And Where The Policy Applies
Your policy applies only during the policy
period During this time, it applies to losses to
the auto, accidents, and occurrences within
the United States of America, its territories or
possessions, or Canada, or between their
ports The policy period is shown on the
declarations page.
Insurance Coverage In Mexico
Auto accidents in Mexico are subject to the
laws of Mexico — NOT the United States of
America In the Republic of Mexico an auto
accident can be considered a CRIMINAL
OFFENSE as well as a civil matter.
In some cases, the coverage under this policy
may NOT be recognized by Mexican
authorities and w e may not be allowed to
provide any insurance coverage at all in
Mexico For your protection, you should
seriously consider purchasing auto coverage
from a licensed Mexican insurance company
before driving into Mexico.

However, when possible, protection will be
afforded for those coverages for which a
premium is shown on the declarations page
for an insured auto while that auto is within
75 miles of the United States border and only
for a period not to exceed ten days after each
separate entry into the Republic of Mexico
If loss or damage occurs which may require
repair of the insured auto or replacement of
any part(s) while the auto is in Mexico, the
basis for adjustment of the claim will be as
follows any amount payable resulting from
any loss or damage occurring m the Republic
of Mexico shall be payable in the United
States of America We will not be liable for
more than the cost of having the repairs or
replacement parts made at the nearest point
in the United States where the repairs or
replacements can be made. The costs for
towing, transportation and salvage
operations of the auto while within Mexico
are not covered under this policy
Changes
Premium Changes
The premium for each auto is based on
information Allstate has received from you
or other sources. You agree to cooperate with
us in determining if this information is correct,
if it is complete, and if it changes during the
policy period You agree that if this
information changes or is incorrect or
incomplete, w e may adjust your premium
accordingly during the policy period
Changes which result in a premium
adjustment are contained in our rules. These
include, but are not limited to*
Page !
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1. autos insured by the policy including
changes in use.
2. drivers residing in your household, their
ages or marital status.
3. coverages or coverage limits.
4. rating territory.
5. discount eligibility.
Any calculation or adjustment of your
premium will be made using the rules, rates,
and forms in effect, and on file if required, for
our use in your state.
Coverage Changes
When Allstate broadens a coverage during
the policy period without additional charge,
you have the new feature if you have the
coverage to which it applies. The new feature
applies on the date the coverage change is
effective in your state. Otherwise, the policy
can be changed only by endorsement. Any
change in your coverage will be made using
the rules, rates, and forms in effect, and on
file if required, for our use in your state.
Duty To Report Policy Changes
Your policy was issued in reliance on the
information you provided concerning autos
and persons insured by the policy. To properly
insure your auto, you should promptly
notify us when you change your address or
whenever any resident operators insured by
your policy are added or deleted.
You must notify us within 30 days when you
acquire an additional or replacement auto. If
you don't, coverage will not be afforded
under this policy.
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Combining Limits Of Two Or More Autos
Prohibited
The limits of liability applicable to any one
auto shown on the declarations page will
not be combined with or added to the limits
of liability applicable to any other auto
shown on the declarations page or covered
by the policy, even though a separate
premium is charged for each of those autos,
regardless of the number of:
1. vehicles or persons shown on the
declarations page;
2. vehicles involved in the accident;
3. persons seeking damages as a result of
the accident; or
4. insured persons from whom damages are
sought.
If two or more autos are shown on the
declarations page and one of these autos is
involved in the accident, the limits of liability
shown on the declarations page for the
involved auto will apply. If none of the autos
shown on the declarations page is involved in
a covered accident involving an insured auto,
the highest limits of liability shown on the
declarations page for any one auto will
apply.
Transfer
This policy can't be transferred to anyone
without our written consent. However, if
you die, coverage will be provided until the
end of the policy period for:
1. your legal representative while acting as
such, and
2. persons covered on the date of your
death.

Provisional Premium
The coverages of this policy and the premium
shown on the declarations page for these
coverages have been established in
accordance with the provisions of the Utah
Insurance Code. If a court of competent
jurisdiction declares or enters a judgment,
from which there is no appeal, the effect of
which is to render the provisions of such
Code invalid or unenforceable in whole or in
pan, Allstate shall have the right to revise
the affected coverages afforded by this policy
Also, Allstate shall have the right to
recompute the premium payable for this
policy.
Payment
If your payment of the initial premium
amount due is by check, draft, or any
remittance other than cash, such payment is
conditional upon the check, draft, or other
remittance being honored upon presentation.
If such check, draft, or remittance is not
honored upon presentation, this policy shall
be deemed void from its inception. This
means that Allstate will not be liable under
this policy for any claims or damages which
would otherwise be covered had the check,
draft, or remittance been honored upon
presentation.
Termination
If we offer to renew your policy and your
required premium payment isn't received on
or before the end of the then current policy
period, your policy will terminate on the
expiration date of the then current policy
period.
Non-Renewal
If we don't intend to renew your policy, w e
will mail you notice at least 30 days before
the end of the policy period.

Fraud or Misrepresentation
Your policy was issued in reliance on the
information you provided on your auto
insurance application concerning autos and
persons insured by the policy. You agree that
if your policy was obtained through material
misrepresentation, fraud or concealment of
material facts, or if any material
misrepresentation was made on your auto
insurance application, Allstate has the right
to void or rescind your policy. If the policy is
deemed void from its inception, w e will
return the premium paid.
Cancellation
You may cancel this policy by writing us the
future date you wish to stop coverage.
Allstate may cancel part or all of this policy
by mailing notice to you at your last known
address. If w e cancel because you didn't pay
the premium, the date of cancellation will be
at least 10 days after the date of mailing. If
w e cancel for any other reason, and the
notice is mailed to you within the first 59 days
of the policy period, the date of cancellation
will be at least 10 days after the date of
mailing. Otherwise, w e will give you 30 days
notice.
Proof of mailing the notice will be proof of
notice. Any refund, if due, will be
proportional to the time your policy has been
in effect. Cancellation will be effective even if
the refund is not made immediately.
After your policy has been in effect 59 days,
Allstate won't cancel or reduce your
coverage during the policy period unless:
1. you don't pay the premium when it's
due;
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/ou or any other operator who either
esides in your household or customarily
>perates the insured auto has had a
iriver's license suspended or revoked;
le policy was obtained through material
^representation;
)ere is a substantial change in the risk
>sumed by us;
ere are substantial breaches of
ntractual duties, conditions, or
arranties; or
Istate has mailed you a notice of
icellation within the first 59 days.

Parti
Automobile Liability Insurance
Bodily Injury — Coverage AA
Property Damage — Coverage BB
Allstate will pay those damages an insured
person is legally obligated to pay because of:
1. bodily Injury sustained by any person;
and
2. damage to or destruction of property.
Under these coverages, your policy protects
an insured person from liability for damages
arising out of the ownership, maintenance or
use, loading or unloading of an insured auto.
We will defend an insured person sued as the
result of a covered auto accident, even if the
suit is groundless or false. We will choose the
counsel. We may settle any claim or suit if we
believe it is proper. We will not defend an
insured person sued for damages which are
not covered by this policy.
Additional Payments Allstate Will Make
When we defend an insured person under
this part, we will pay:
1 • up to $ 50 a day for loss of wages or
salary if we ask that person to attend
hearings or trials to defend against a
bodily injury suit. We won't pay for loss
of other income. We will pay other
reasonable expenses incurred at our
request.
2. court costs for defense.
3. interest accruing on damages awarded.
We will pay this interest only until we
have paid, offered, or deposited in court
the amount for which we are liable under
this policy. We will only pay interest on

damages not exceeding our limits of
liability.
4. premiums on appeal bonds and on bonds
to release attachments, but not in excess
of our limit of liability. We aren't required
to apply for or furnish these bonds.
We will repay an insured person for:
1. the cost of any bail bonds required due to
an accident or traffic law violation
involving the use of the insured auto. We
won't pay more than $300 per bond. We
aren't required to apply for or furnish
these bonds.
2. any expense incurred for first aid to
others at the time of an auto accident
involving the insured auto.
Insured Persons
1. While using your insured auto:
a) you,
b) any resident, and
c) any other person using it with your
permission.
2. While using a non-owned auto:
a) you, and
b) any resident relative using a private
passenger auto or utility auto.
3. Any other person or organization liable
for the use of an insured auto provided:
a) the auto is not owned or hired by the
person or organization,
b) the use is by an insured person as
defined under 1. or 2. above, and
c) w e cover only the insured person's
acts or omissions.

Insured Autos
1. Any auto described on the declarations
page. This includes the private passenger
auto or utility auto you replace it with.
2. An additional private passenger auto or
utility auto you become the owner of
during the policy period. This auto will be
covered if w e insure all other private
passenger autos or utility autos you
own. You must, however, tell us within
30 days of acquiring the auto. You must
pay any additional premium. Coverage
will not continue after 30 days if we are
not notified of the additional auto.
3. A substitute private passenger auto or
utility auto, not owned by you or a
resident, being temporarily used with
the owner's permission while your
insured auto is being serviced or repaired
or if your insured auto is stolen or
destroyed.
4. A non-owned private passenger auto
used by you or a resident relative with
the owner's permission. This auto must
not be available or furnished for the
regular use of an insured person.
5. A trailer while attached to an insured
auto. The trailer must be designed for use
with a private passenger auto or utility
auto. This trailer can't be used for
business purposes with other than a
private passenger auto or utility auto.
Definitions
1. "Allstate", "We", "Us" or "Our" means the company shown on the
declarations page of the policy.
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2. "Auto" — means a land motor vehicle
with at least four wheels designed for use
principally upon public roads.
3. "Bodily Injury" — means bodily injury
sickness, disease, or death.
4.

"Resident" — means a person who
physically resides in your household and
intends to continue residing there. Your
unmarried dependent children while
temporarily away from home will be
considered residents if they intend to
resume residing in your household.

5. "Utility Auto" — means an auto of the
pick-up body sedan delivery or panel
truck type. This auto must have a gross
vehicle weight of 10,000 pounds or less,
according to manufacturer's
specifications.
6. "You" or "Your" - means the
policyholder named on the declarations
page and that policyholder's resident
spouse.
Exclusions — What Is not covered
Allstate will not pay for any damages an
insured person is legally obligated to pay
because of:
1. bodily Injury or property damage arising
out of the use of your insured auto while
used to carry persons or property for a
charge, or any auto you are driving
while available for hire by the public. This
exclusion does not apply to
shared-expense car pools.
2. bodily Injury or property damage arising
out of auto business operations such as
repairing, servicing, testing, washing,
parking, storing, or selling of autos.
However, coverage does apply to you,
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resident relatives, partners, or employees
of the partnership of you or a resident
relative when using your insured auto.
3. bodily Injury or property damage arising
out of the use of a non-owned auto in
any business or occupation of an insured
person. However, this exclusion does not
apply while you, your chauffeur, or
domestic servant are using a private
passenger auto or trailer.
4. bodily Injury to an employee of any
insured person arising In the course of
employment. This exclusion does not
apply to your domestic employee who is
not required to be covered by a workers
compensation law or similar law.
5. bodily Injury to a co-worker injured in
the course of employment. This exclusion
does not apply to you.
6. bodily Injury or property damage which
may reasonably be expected to result
from the intentional or criminal acts of an
insured person or which are in fact
intended by an insured person.
7. bodily Injury to any person who is
related by blood, marriage, or adoption
to an insured against whom claim is made
if such person resides in the same
household as such insured, to the extent
that the limits of liability for this coverage
exceed the limits of liability required by
the Utah Financial Responsibility of Motor
Vehicle Owners and Operators Act.
8. damage to or destruction of property an
insured person owns, transports, is in
charge of, or rents. However, a private
residence or a garage rented by that
person is covered.

9. bodily Injury or property damage which
would also be covered under a nuclear
energy liability policy issued by Nuclear
Energy Liability Insurance Association,
Mutual Atomic Energy Liability
Underwriters or Nuclear Insurance
Association of Canada, or any other such
policy. This applies even if the limits of
that insurance are exhausted.
10. bodily Injury or property damage arising
out of the ownership, maintenance, or
use of a motor vehicle with less than four
wheels.
11. bodily Injury or property damage arising
out of the participation in any
prearranged or organized racing or speed
contest or in practice or preparation for
any contest of this type.
Ftnanciai Responsibility
When this policy is certified as proof under
any motor vehicle financial responsibility law,
the policy will comply with the provisions of
that law.
Limits of Liability
The limits shown on the declarations page are
the maximum w e will pay for any single
accident involving an insured auto. The limit
stated for each person for bodily Injury is our
total limit of liability for all damages because
of bodily Injury sustained by one person in
any single accident involving an insured
auto, including all damages sustained by
anyone else as a result of that bodily Injury.
Subject to the limit for each person, the limit
stated for each accident is our total limit of
liability for all damages for bodily Injury
sustained by t w o or more persons in any
single accident involving an insured auto. For
property damage, the limit stated for each
accident is our total limit of liability for

property damage sustained in any single
accident involving an insured auto.
The liability limits apply to each insured auto
as shown on the declarations page. The
insuring of more than one person or auto
under this policy will not increase our liability
limits beyond the amount shown for any one
auto, even though a separate premium is
charged for each auto. The limits also won't
be increased if you have other auto
insurance policies that apply.
There will be no duplication of payments
made under the Bodily Injury Liability and
Uninsured Motorists Coverages of this policy.
An auto and attached trailer are considered
one auto. Also, an auto and a mounted
camper unit, topper, cap, or canopy are
considered one auto,
if There Is Other Insurance
If an insured person is using a substitute
private passenger auto or non-owned auto,
our liability insurance will be excess over
other collectible insurance. If more than one
policy applies on a primary basis to an
accident involving your insured auto, we
will bear our proportionate share with other
collectible liability insurance.
Assistance and Cooperation
When w e ask, an insured person must
cooperate with us in the investigation,
settlement, and defense of any claim or
lawsuit. If w e ask, that person must also help
us obtain payment from anyone who may be
jointly responsible.
We can't be obligated if an insured person
voluntarily takes any action or makes any
payments other than for covered expenses
for bail bonds or first aid to others.
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. ; : on Against Allstate
No insured person may sue us under this
coverage unless there is full compliance with
all the policy terms.
If liability has been determined by judgment
after trial or by written agreement among the
insured, the other person, and us, then
whoever obtains this judgment or agreement
against an insured person may sue us up to
the limits of this policy. However, no one has
the right to join us in a suit to determine legal
responsibility.
?dnkruptcy or Insolvency
The bankruptcy or insolvency of an insured
person or that person's estate won't relieve
us of any obligation.
lubrogatJon Rights
When w e pay, an insured person's rights of
recovery from anyone else for damages w e
have paid become ours up to the amount w e
have paid. The insured person must protect
these rights and help us enforce them.
Uiditional Interested Parties
If one or more additional interested parties
are listed on the declarations, the Automobile
Liability Insurance coverages of this policy
will apply to the parties as insureds.
We will provide 10 days written notice to the
additional interested party if w e cancel or
make any change to this policy which
adversely affects that party's interest. Our
notice will be considered properly given if
mailed to the address shown on the
declarations.
The naming of an additional interested party
does not increase that party's rights to
recovery under this policy, nor does it impose
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aa obligation for the payment of premiums
under this policy
What To Do In Case Of An Auto Accident
Or Claim
If an insured person has an auto accident, w e
must be informed promptly of all details. If an
insured person is sued as the result of an auto
accident, w e must be informed immediately.

Part II
Personal Injury Protection
Coverage VA

fllhtnf will pny tn nr nn hrhalf nf rrn
Injurgctperson theiojjgwing benefits subject
tO the \im\t<jfl<j*perif\*fi

»n fhP I imitc nf

Liability provision. Payments will be made
only when bodily Injury is caused by an
accident arising from the use of a motor
vehicle as a motor vehicle.
!.

Medical Expenses
All rpasnpahte and necessary expenses.
incurred for necessary medical, surgical,
X-ray dental, rehabilitation services,
including prosthetic devices, necessary
ambulance, hospital, and nursing
services, and any non-medical remedial
care and treatment rendered in
accordance with a recognized method of
healing; however, it does not include
expenses in excess of those for a
semiprivate room unless more intensive
care is medically required.

2. Work Loss
Loss of income and loss of earning
capacity by the Injured person during his
lifetime from inability to work during a
period commencing three days after the
date of the bodily Injury and continuing
for a maximum of 52 consecutive weeks.
If the Injured person's inability to work
continues for more than a total of two
consecutive weeks after the date of
bodily Injury, the three day elimination
period will not apply. Benefits end upon
death of the Injured person.

3. Essential Services
Reasonable expenses incurred for services
actually rendered or expenses incurred
for services that, if he had not been
injured, the Injured person would have
customarily performed for his household.
The allowance will commence three days
after the date of the bodily injury and
continue for a maximum of 365
consecutive days. If the Injured person's
inability to perform such services
continues in excess o f ! 4 consecutive
days after the date of the bodily Injury,
the three day elimination period will not
apply Benefits end upon death of the
injured person.
4. Funeral Expenses
Reasonable charges normally incurred for
funeral, cremation or burial services.
5. Survivors' Loss
Compensation on account of the death of
an Injured person payable to his or her
heirs.
Definitions
1. "Allstate", "We", "Us" or "Our" means the company shown on the
declarations page of the policy.
2. "Bodily Injury" — means bodily injury,
sickness, disease, or death.
3. "Injured Person" — means:
(a) you or a resident relative who
sustains bodily Injury:
(i) while in, on, getting into or out
of a motor vehicle; or
(ii) when struck as a pedestrian by a
motor vehicle.
(b) any other person who sustains
bodily Injury:
(i) while in, on, getting into or out
Page?

of the Insured motor vehicle; or
(ii) when struck as a pedestrian by
the Insured motor vehicle
within the state of Utah.
'Insured Motor Vehicle" — means a
motor vehicle with respect to which:
(a) the bodily injury liability insurance of
this policy applies and for which a
specific premium is charged; and
(b) you are required to maintain security
under the provisions of the Utah
Financial Responsibility of Motor
Vehicle Owners and Operations Act,
Title 41 Chapter 12a.
"Motor Vehicle" — means any vehicle
which is required to be registered with
:he Division of Motor Vehicles of the
Jtah Tax Commission under Title 41,1-19,
Jtah Code Annotated 1953 as amended,
Dut excluding motorcycles, trailers and
;emi-trailers as enacted by Utah Insurance
Iode31A-22-302(2).
'Pedestrian" — means any person not
n, on, getting into or out of, or riding
jpon a motor vehicle; excluding,
lowever, any person riding upon a
notorcycle or in, on, getting into or out
)f a trailer or semi-trailer.
Resident" — means a person who
Physically resides in your household and
itends to continue residing there. Your
nmarried dependent chiidren while
?mporarily away from home will be
onsidered residents if they intend to
?sume residing in your household.
You" or "Your" — means
le policyholder named in the
eclarations page and that policyholder's
?sident spouse.
10

Exclusions — What Is not covered
This coverage does not apply to bodily
Injury:
1. to you or a resident relative while in, on,
getting into or out of any motor vehicle
you own which is not an Insured motor
vehicle.
2. to any person while operating the
Insured motor vehicle without the
expressed or implied consent of the
insured or while not in lawful possession
of the Insured motor vehicle.
3. to any pedestrian, other than you or a
resident relative, when struck by an
owned, but not Insured motor vehicle.
4. to any pedestrian, other than you or a
resident relative, through the use of the
Insured motor vehicle outside of the
state of Utah.
5. to any person whose injury is self
inflicted or is the result of an attempt to
intentionally injure another person. If the
injury is self inflicted and that person
dies, Survivors' Loss benefits will not be
paid.
6. to any person while committing a felony.
7. to any person resulting from the
radioactive, toxic, explosive or other
hazardous properties of nuclear
materials.
8. to any person due to any act of war,
insurrection, rebellion, or revolution.
9. to any person while in, on, getting into or
out of a motor vehicle while located for
use as a residence or premises.

10. to any person, other than you or a
resident relative while in, on, getting
into or out of any motor vehicle
operated by, but not owned by you.
Limits of Liability
The limits of our liability for Personal Injury
Protection are stated on the declarations
page. These amounts are the maximum
Allstate will pay per Injured person for any
motor vehicle accident, regardless of the
number of vehicles insured under this or
other policies.

5. The amount payable for Survivors' Loss is
$3,000, and is payable only to the Injured
person's heirs.
6. Any amount payable by Allstate for
Personal Injury Protection benefits will be
reduced by the amount paid, payable, or
required to be provided on account of
such bodily Injury:
(a) under any workers' compensation
plan or similar statutory plan; or
(b) by the United States or any of its
agencies because of the Injured
person being on active duty in the
military services.

1. The maximum amount payable for
Medical Expenses will not exceed the
amount shown on the declarations. The
first $3,000 of medical expenses caused
by an accident covered by this section can
be incurred at any time. If the amount
shown on the declarations page for
Medical Expenses is greater than $3000,
any additional Medical Expenses must be
incurred within three years of the date of
the accident to be payable.

Unreasonable or Unnecessary Medical
Expenses
—\
( t f t h e insured person incurs medical expenses \
which are unreasonable or unnecessary, w e
may refuse to pay for those medical expenses
and contest them. Unreasonable medical
expenses are fees for medical services which
are substantially higher than the usual and
'
icustomary charges for those services.
J

2. The maximum amount payable for Work
Loss is eighty-five percent (85%) of any
loss of gross income and earning capacity,
not to exceed $250 per week for a
maximum of 52 consecutive weeks.

Unnecessary medical expenses are fees for \
medical services which are not usually and ]
customarily performed for treatment of the I
injury, including fees for an excessive numben
amount,
or duration of medical services, r—'
I amo

3. The maximum amount payable for
Essential Services is $20 per day for a
maximum of 365 consecutive days for an
Injured person's inability to perform
services for his or her household.

If the insured person is sued by a medical
services provider because w e refuse to pay
contested medical expenses, w e will pav all
de££n$£.costs and any resulting judgment
against the insured person. We willjchoose
the counsel. The insured person must
coofifijatfij^vith us in the defense of any claim
or lawsuit. If w e ask the insured person to
attend hearings or trials, w e will pay up to
$50 per day for loss of wages or salary. We
will also pay other reasonable expenses
incurred at our request.

4. The maximum amount payable for
Funeral Expenses shall not exceed
$1,500.
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DH Against Allstate
1
ne may sue us under this coverage 1
,s there is full compliance with all the \
/ terms.
:e To Allstate
on as possible, the Injured person or
one on that person's behalf must give us
?n notice of the accident. This notice
include the time, place and
nstances of the accident and the identity
? injured person. If an Injured person or
one on that person's behalf sues a third
to recover damages from anyone"
fed responsible for the injury a copy of
immons, complaint or other document
be sent to us as soon as possible.
r

of Claim; Medical Reports
on as possible, the Injured person or
one on that person's behalf must give us
>n proof of claim. It must include all
s we may need to determine the
nts payable. We may also require any
n making claim to submit to questioning
oath and sign the transcript.
ijured person may be required to take
al examinations by physicians w e
e, as often as w e reasonably require.
ust be given authorization to obtain
a I reports and other records pertinent
claim.
;upilcatlon of 8enef\ts; Priority of
ents; Other Insurance
lured person shall recover duplicate
its for the same elements of loss under
any other similar insurance including
surance. If two or more insurers or
surers are liable to pay personal injury
tion benefits for the same elements of
le maximum benefit payable shall not
i the highest limit of any one policy
2

providing benefits as required by the
Financial Responsibility of Motor Vehicle
Owners and Operators Act.
Primary personal injury protection coverage
shall be provided by the policy insuring the
motor vehicle occupied by the injured
person in use at the time of the accident.
Excess personal injury protection coverage
provided by this policy will be afforded
when:
(a) the benefits of the primary policy
have been exhausted; and
(b) the limits of this policy exceed the
limits of the policy providing the
primary coverage.
When two or more insurers are liable to pay
personal injury protection benefits on the
same level of priority, Allstate will not be
liable for more than the proportion of our
limit of liability under this coverage to the
sum of our limit of liability of this coverage
and that of any other applicable insurance for
the same element of loss.
Any personal injury protection benefits
payable by this policy with respect to bodily
Injury sustained by an Injured person, while
in, on, getting into or out of a motor vehicle
being operated by, but not owned by you,
shall be excess over any other collectible
personal injury protection benefits, and any
other automobile medical payments
insurance, or any similar insurance.
Subrogation Rights
When we pay, an Injured person's rights of
recovery from anyone else for damages w e
have paid become ours up to the amount w e
have paid. However, our rights of recovery
only apply if thp Igjuryd person has been
fully r n m p p n ^ f P d fnf [ftp loss, J h f Injured

p e r s o n mi ^T prntt^rt fhPCP righfr inri halp I K

enforce {hem.
disbursement and Trust Agreement
When w e pay any person underlhis
coverage:
1 • we^re^ptirlPd to repayment nf *mmm^
pak±byjjj out of the proceeds of any
settlement that person, rernvprs from any

^i^itip^siM? p*rfy ° r i™ur»r. w^

are not entitled to repayment until after
the person w e have paid under this
coverage has been compensated for all
damages which that person is legally
entitled to recover.
.2. ail rights of recovery against any legally
responsible part^or insurer must be
maintained and preserved for our.
benefit.
Our rights under this provision are subject to
any applicable limitations provided in the
Utah Insurance Code.

r

Assistance and Cooperation
When w e ask, an insured person must
cooperate with us in the investigation,
settlement and defense of any claim or
lawsuit. If w e ask, that person must also help
us obtain payment from anyone else who
may be jointly responsible.

1

\ We can't be obligated if an insured person
| voluntarily takes any action or makes any
t. payments other than for covered expenses I
i for first aid to others.
\

Part III
Uninsured Motorists Insurance
Coverage SS

Section I
Bodily Injury Caused By Uninsured
Motorists
We will pay those damages which an insured
person Is legally entitled to recover from the
owner or operator of an uninsured motor
vehicle because of bodily Injury sustained by
an insured person. The bodily Injury must be
caused by accident and arise out of the
ownership, maintenance or use of an
uninsured motor vehicle. We will not pay
any punitive or exemplary damages.
If an insured person sues a person believed
responsible for the accident without our
written consent, w e are not bound by any
resulting judgment
Insured Persons
1. you and any resident relative.
2. any other person while in, on, getting
into or out of your insured auto with
your permission.
3. any other person who is legally entitled
to recover because of bodily Injury to
you, a resident relative, or an occupant
of your insured auto with your
permission.
An insured auto Is:
1. an auto described on the declarations
page to which the bodily injury liability
coverage of this policy applies. This
includes the auto you replace it with.
However, you must notify us within 30
Page 13

385

days of the replacement auto. You must
pay any additional premium. Coverage
will not continue after 30 days if we are
not notified of the replacement auto.
an auto you become the owner of
during the policy period. This additional
auto will be covered if Allstate insures
a\l other private passenger autosyou
own. You must, however, tell us within
30 days after you acquire the auto. You
must pay any additional premium.
Coverage will not continue if w e are not
notified of the additional auto.
an auto not owned by you or a resident
relative, if being temporarily used while
your insured auto is being serviced or
repaired, or if your insured auto is stolen
or destroyed. The auto must be used with
the owner's permission. It can't be
furnished or available for the regular use
of you or any resident relative.
an auto not owned by you or a resident
relative, if being operated by you with
the owner's permission. The auto can't
be furnished or available for the regular
use of you or any resident relative.
nsured auto is not an auto made
(able for public hire by an insured person.
inlnsured motor vehicle Is:
»motor vehicle which has no bodily
njury liability bond or insurance policy in
'ffect at the time of the accident.
motor vehicle covered by a bond or
isurance policy which doesn't provide at
?ast the minimum financial security
?quirements of the state in which your
isured auto is principally garaged.
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3. a motor vehicle for which the insurer
denies coverage, or the insurer becomes
insolvent.
4. a hit-and-run motor vehicle which
causes bodily Injury to an insured
person. The identity of either the
operator or owner of the hit-and-run
vehicle must not be ascertainable. The
accident must be reported within 24
hours to the proper authorities. We must
be notified within 30 days.
If the hit-and-run motor vehicle causes
the bodily Injury without physical
contact with the insured person or the
vehicle the insured person was
occupying, then the insured shall show
the existence of the other motor vehicle
by clear and convincing evidence, which
shall consist of more than the insured's
testimony
We shall have a right to inspect the
insured auto or any motor vehicle the
insured person was occupying at the time
of the accident.
An uninsured motor vehicle Is not:
1. an auto which is insured under Part 1 of
this policy.
2. a motor vehicle that is lawfully
self-insured.
3. a motor vehicle owned by any state,
federal or local government or agency.
4. a motor vehicle or trailer operated on
rails or crawler-treads.

5. a farm-type tractor or equipment
designed for use principally off public
roads, except while actually on public
roads.
Exclusions — What Is not covered
Allstate will not pay any damages an insured
person is legally entitled to recover because
of:
1. bodily Injury to any person who makes a
settlement without our written consent.
2. bodily Injury sustained while in, on,
getting into or out of, or when struck by
an uninsured motor vehicle which is
owned by you or a resident relative.
3. bodily Injury if the payment would
directly or indirectly benefit any workers'
compensation or disability benefits
insurer, including a self-insurer.
4. bodily Injury while in, on, getting into or
out of a motor vehicle you own which is
insured for this coverage under another
policy.
5. bodily Injury sustained while in, on,
getting into or out of, or while operating
a motor vehicle which is not an insured
auto but is owned by, furnished or
available for the regular use of you or a
resident relative.
6. any punitive or exemplary damages or
related defense costs, regardless of any
other provision of this policy.
7. bodily Injury arising out of an insured
person's ownership, maintenance or use
of a motor vehicle with less than four
wheels.

8. bodily Injury arising from the
participation in any prearranged or
organized racing or speed contest or in
practice or preparation for any contest of
this type.
Limits of Liability
The coverage limit shown on the declarations
page for:
1. "each person" is the maximum that we
will pay for damages arising out of bodily
Injury to one person in any one motor
vehicle accident, including all damages
sustained by anyone else as a result of
that bodily Injury.
2. "each accident" is the maximum that we
will pay for damages arising out of bodily
Injury to two or more persons in any one
motor vehicle accident. This "each
accident" limit is subject to the limit for
"each person."
These limits are the maximum Allstate will
pay for any one motor vehicle accident
regardless of the number of:
1. claims made;
2. vehicles or persons shown on the
declarations page; or
3. vehicles involved in the accident.
The Bodily Injury Caused By Uninsured
Motorists limits apply to each insured auto as
shown on the declarations page. This means
the insuring of more than one person or auto
under this or other auto policies will not
increase our uninsured motorists limit of
liability beyond the amount shown for any
one auto. Coverage on any auto on this
policy may not be stacked or added upon the
coverage of any other auto on this policy
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even though a separate premium is charged
for each auto.
Subject to the above limits of liability
jamages payable will be reduced by:
3) all amounts paid by or on behalf of the
owner or operator of an uninsured
motor vehicle or anyone else
responsible. This includes all sums paid
under the bodily injury liability coverage
or property damage liability coverage of
this or any other auto policy.
) all amounts payable under any workers'
compensation law, disability benefits
law, or similar law, automobile medical
payments insurance, or any similar
personal injury protection coverage.
'e are not obligated to make any payment
r bodily Injury under this coverage which
ises out of an accident involving the use of
i uninsured motor vehicle until after the
n'ts of liability for all liability protection in
:
ect and applicable at the time of the
cident have been exhausted by payment of
jgments or settlements.
:tion II
sperty Damage Caused By Uninsured
jtorlsts
? will pay those damages that an insured
son is legally entitled to recover from the
ner or operator of an uninsured motor
ilcle because of property damage. The
perty damage must be caused by
dent and arise out of the ownership,
ntenance or use of an uninsured motor
Icle. We will not pay any punitive or
nplary damages.
perty damage is covered only if:
a separate limit is shown on the
declarations page for Property Damage
16

Caused By Uninsured Motorists;
b) the accident causing the property
damage involves actual physical contact
between the insured auto and an
uninsured motor vehicle;
c) the owner, operator, or license plate
number of the uninsured motor vehicle
is identified; and
d) the insured or someone on his behalf
reports the accident within 10 days to
Allstate.
The insured person or other person making
claim for property damage must allow us to
inspect any damaged property.
If an insured person sues a person believed
responsible for the accident without our
written consent, w e are not bound by any
resultingjudgment.
Insured Persons
1. you and any resident relative.
2. any other person who is legally entitled
to recover because of property damage.
An Insured auto is:
1. an auto described on the declarations
page to which the bodily injury and
property damage liability coverage of this
policy applies. This includes the auto you
replace it with. However, you must notify
us within 30 days of the replacement
auto. You must pay any additional
premium. Coverage will not continue
after 30 days if we are not notified of the
replacement auto.
2. an auto you become the owner of
during the policy period. This additional
auto will be covered if Allstate insures
all other private passenger autos you
own. You must, however, tell us within

30 days after you acquire the auto. You
must pay any additional premium.
Coverage will not continue if w e are not
notified of the additional auto.
An insured auto is not an auto made
available for public hire by an insured person.

Exclusions — What \s not covered
Allstate will not pay any damages an insured
person is legally entitled to recover because
of:
1. property damage to any insured auto
when an insured person makes a
settlement without our written consent.

An uninsured motor vehicle Is:
1. a motor vehicle which is not covered
under a liability policy at the time of the
accident.

2. property damage to any auto you own
which is not insured for Property
Damage Caused By Uninsured Motorists
under this policy.

2. a motor vehicle covered by a bond or
insurance policy which doesn't provide at
least the minimum financial security
requirements of the state in which your
insured auto is principally garaged.

3. property damage which is paid or
payable under any other property
insurance.

3. a motor vehicle for which the insurer
denies coverage, or the insurer becomes
insolvent.
4. a hit-and-run motor vehicle which
causes property damage to the insured
auto as a result of physical contact
between the vehicles. We shall have a
right to inspect the insured auto or any
motor vehicle the insured person was
occupying at the time of the accident.
An uninsured motor vehicle Is not:
1. an auto which is insured under Part I of
this policy.
2. a motor vehicle that Is lawfully
self-insured.
3. a motor vehicle owned by any state,
federal or local government or agency.
4. a motor vehicle or trailer operated on
rails or crawler-treads.

4. property damage if the payment would
directly or indirectly benefit any insurer
of property.
5. any punitive or exemplary damages or
related defense costs, regardless of any
other provision of this policy.
6. property damage arising out of an
insured person's ownership, maintenance
or use of a motor vehicle with less than
four wheels.
7. property damage arising from the
participation in any prearranged or
organized racing or speed contest or in
practice or preparation for any contest of
this type.
Limits of Liability
Allstate's limit of liability for Property
Damage Caused By Uninsured Motorists is
the lesser of:
1. the actual cash value of the insured
auto;
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2. the amount necessary to repair or replace
the insured auto; or
3. the limit of liability shown on the
declarations page for the insured auto.
Subject to the above limit of liability, damages
payable will be reduced by:
I. all amounts paid by the owner or
operator of the uninsured motor vehicle;
I. any deductible shown on the
declarations page.
X/e are not obligated to make any payment
or property damage under this coverage
vhich arises out of an accident involving an
jninsured motor vehicle until after the limits
)f liability for all liability protection in effect
md applicable at the time of the accident
iave been exhausted by payment of
udgment or settlements.
ectlon III
iommon Provisions
)eflnltions
. "Actual Cash Value" — means the
current replacement cost of the property
new reduced by an allowance for
depreciation.
.

"Allstate", "We", "Us" or "Our" means the company shown on the
declarations page of the policy.

.

"Auto" — means a land motor vehicle
with at least four wheels designed for use
principally upon public roads.

.

"Bodily Injury" — means bodily injury,
sickness, disease or death.
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5. "Depreciation" — means the decrease in
value of property due to age and
wear-and-tear.
6. "Motor Vehicle" — means a land motor
vehicle or trailer other than
a) a vehicle or other equipment
designed for use off public roads,
while not upon public roads,
b) a vehicle operated on rails or
crawler-treads, or
c) a vehicle while used as a residence or
premises and not as a motor vehicle.
7. "Property Damage" — means damage
to or destruction of the insured auto but
does not include loss of use to the insured
auto or damage to personal property
contained in the insured auto.
8. "Resident" — means a person who
physically resides in your household with
the intention of continuing residence
there. Your unmarried dependent
children while temporarily away from
home will be considered residents if they
intend to resume residing in your
household.
9. "You" or "Your" - means the
policyholder named on the declarations
page and that policyholder's resident
spouse.
Non-Duplication of Benefits
No person will recover duplicate benefits for
the same elements of loss under this or any
other insurance, including approved plans of
self-insurance.
Proof Of Claim; Medical Reports
As soon as possible, any person making claim
must give us written proof of claim. It must
include all details w e may need to determine

the amounts payable. We may also require
any person making claim to submit to
questioning under oath and sign the
transcript.
The insured person may be required to take
medical examinations by physicians w e
choose, as often as w e reasonably require.
We must be given authorization to obtain
medical reports and copies of records.
Assistance and Cooperation
We may require the insured person to take
proper action to preserve all rights to recover
damages from anyone responsible.
Legal Actions
No one may sue us under this coverage
unless there is full compliance with all policy
terms.
If, at any time before w e pay for the loss, an
insured person institutes a suit against
anyone believed responsible for the accident,
w e must immediately be given a copy of the
summons and complaint or other process. If a
suit is brought without our written consent,
w e aren't bound by any resulting judgment.
if There Is Other Insurance
If the insured person was in, on, getting into
or out of a vehicle which is insured for this
coverage under another policy, coverage
under this policy will be excess. This means
that when the insured person is legally
entitled to recover damages in excess of the
other policy limit, w e will pay only the
amount by which the limit of liability of this
policy exceeds the limit of liability of that
policy.
If more than one policy applies to the accident
on a primary basis, the total benefits payable
will not exceed the maximum benefits

payable by the policy with the highest limit
for uninsured motorists coverage. We will
bear our proportionate share with other
uninsured motorists benefits. This applies no
matter how many autos or auto policies may
be involved, whether written by Allstate or
another company.
Trust Agreement
When w e pay any person under this
coverage:
1. w e are entitled to repayment of amounts
paid by us and related collection
expenses out of the proceeds of any
settlement or judgment that person
recovers from any responsible party or
insurer.
2. all rights of recovery against any
responsible parity or insurer must be
maintained and preserved for our
benefit.
3. insured persons, if w e ask, must take
proper action in their name to recover
damages from any responsible party or
insurer. We will select the attorney. We
will pay all related costs and fees.
We will not ask the insured person to sue the
insured of an insolvent insurer.
Payment Of Loss By Allstate
Any amount due is payable to the insured
person, to the parent or guardian of an
injured minor, or to the spouse of any insured
person who dies. However, w e may pay any
person lawfully entitled to recover damages.
Subrogation Rights
When w e pay, an insured person's rights of
recovery from anyone else for damages w e
have paid become ours up to the amount w e
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help us enforce them.
if We Cannot Agree
If the insured person and w e don't agree on
that person's right to receive any damages or
the amount, then upon mutual consent, the
disagreement will be settled by arbitration.
Arbitration will take place under the rules of
the American Arbitration Association.
If either party objects to the use of the rules of
the American Arbitration Association, the
Following alternative method of arbitration
A/ill be used. The insured person will select
one arbitrator. We will select another. The
w o arbitrators will select a third. If they can't
jgree on a third arbitrator within 30 days, the
udge of the court of record in the county of
urisdiction where arbitration is pending will
ippoint the third arbitrator. The written
lecision of any t w o arbitrators will determine
he issues. The insured person will pay the
rbitrator that person selects. We will pay the
>ne w e select. The expense of the third
rbitrator will be shared equally. However,
ttorney fees and fees paid to medical and
ther expert witnesses, are not considered
rbitration expenses. These costs are paid by
le party incurring them.
jgardless of the method of arbitration, any
bitration award will be binding and may be
itered as a judgment in a proper court.

Part IV
Protection Against Loss To The Auto

The following coverages apply when
indicated on the declarations page.
Additional payments, autos insured,
definitions, exclusions, and other information
applicable to all these coverages appear
beginning on page 21.
COVERAGE DD
Auto Collision Insurance
Allstate will pay for direa and accidental loss
to your insured auto (including insured loss
to an attached trailer) from a collision with
another object or by upset of that auto or
trailer. The deductible amount won't be
subtracted from the loss payment in collisions
involving your insured auto and another
auto insured by us.
COVERAGE HH
Auto Comprehensive Insurance
Allstate will pay for direct and accidental loss
to your insured auto not caused by collision.
Coverage includes but is not limited to loss
caused by missiles, falling objects, fire, theft or
larceny, explosion, earthquake, windstorm,
hail, water, flood, malicious mischief or
vandalism, and riot or civil commotion. Glass
breakage, whether or not caused by collision,
and collision with a bird or animal is covered.
Allstate will pay up to $2500 for loss to a
sound system permanently installed in your
auto by bolts, brackets, or other means, its
antennas, or other apparatus in or on your
auto used specifically with that system.
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By agreement between you and Allstate, the
deductible amount will not be subtracted
from a glass breakage loss if the glass is
repaired rather than replaced.

2. if the auto is stolen, when w e offer
settlement or your auto is returned to
use; or
3. thirty full days of coverage.

COVERAGE JJ
Towing and Labor Costs
Allstate will pay costs for labor done at the
initial place of disablement of your insured
auto. We will also pay for towing made
necessary by the disablement. The total limit
of our liability for each loss is shown on the
declarations page.

COVERAGE ZA
Sound System Coverage
Allstate will pay for loss to a sound system
permanently installed in your auto by bolts,
brackets or other means, its antennas or other
apparatus in or on your auto used
specifically with that system.

COVERAGE UU
Rental Reimbursement Coverage
If you have either collision or comprehensive
coverage under this policy and the loss
involves either coverage, Allstate will repay
you for your cost of renting an auto from a
rental agency or garage. We will not pay
more than the dollar amount per day shown
on the declarations page. We won't pay
mileage charges.
If your insured auto is stolen, payment for
transportation expenses will be made under
the terms of paragraph 3. of "Additional
Payments Allstate Will Make." However, the
limits for this coverage will apply if they
exceed the limits stated under "Additional
Payments Allstate Will Make."
If your insured auto is disabled by a collision
or comprehensive loss, coverage starts the
day after the loss. If it is drivable, coverage
starts the day after the auto is taken to the
garage for repairs.
Coverage ends when whichever of the
following occurs first:
1. if the auto is disabled by a collision or
comprehensive loss, completion of repairs
or replacement of the auto;

Coverage ZA applies only if comprehensive
insurance is in effect under this policy.
Coverage ZA provides coverage for sound
systems in excess of the coverage provided
under comprehensive insurance (Coverage
HH). The limit of our liability is shown on the
declarations page.
COVERAGE ZZ
Tape Coverage
Allstate will pay for loss to any tapes or
similar items used with any auto sound
systems. Coverage applies to tapes or similar
items you or a resident relative o w n that are
in or on your insured auto at: the time of loss.
The total limit of our liability for each loss is
shown on the declarations page.
This coverage applies only if you have
comprehensive insurance under this policy.
Coverage ZZ makes tapes or similar items
insured property under your comprehensive
insurance.
Additional Payments Allstate Will Make
1. Allstate will pay up to $200 for loss of
clothing and personal luggage, including
its contents, belonging to you or a
resident relative while it is in or upon
your insured auto. This provision does
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not apply if the insured auto is a
travel-trailer.
This coverage applies only when:
a) the loss is caused by collision and you
have purchased collision insurance.
bj the entire auto is stolen, and you
have purchased comprehensive
insurance.
cj physical damage is done to the auto,
clothing and luggage caused by
earthquake, explosion, falling
objects, fire, lightning, or flood and
you have purchased comprehensive
insurance.
2. Allstate will repay you up to $ 10 for the
cost of transportation from the place of
theft or disablement of your insured auto
to your destination, if
a) the entire auto is stolen and you
have comprehensive insurance under
this policy.
b) the auto is disabled by a collision or
comprehensive loss, and you have
the coverage under this policy
applicable to the loss.
This provision does not apply if the
insured auto is a travel-trailer.
3. If you have comprehensive insurance
under this policy, Allstate will repay up
to $ 10 a day but not more than $300 for
each loss for the cost of transportation
when the entire auto is stolen. This
coverage begins 48 hours after you
report the theft to us, and ends when w e
offer settlement or your auto is returned
to use.
4. If you have purchased collision or
comprehensive insurance under this
policy, Allstate will pay general average
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and salvage charges imposed when your
insured auto is being transported.
Insured Autos
1. Any auto described on the declarations
page. This includes the private passenger
auto or utility auto you replace it with if
you notify Allstate within 30 days of the
replacement and pay the additional
premium. Coverage will not continue
after 30 days if we are not notified of the
replacement auto.
2. An additional private passenger auto or
utility auto you become the owner of
during the policy period. The auto will be
covered if Allstate insures ail other
private passenger autos or utility autos
you own. You must, however, tell us
within 30 days of acquiring the auto. You
must pay any additional premium.
Coverage will not continue after 30 days
if w e are not notified of the additional
auto.
3. A substitute private passenger auto or
utility auto, not owned by you or a
resident, temporarily used with the
permission of the owner while your
insured auto is being serviced or
repaired, or if your insured auto is stolen
or destroyed.
4. a non-owned private passenger auto
used by you or a resident relative with
the owner's permission. This auto must
not be available or furnished for the
regular use of you or any resident.
5. A trailer while attached to an insured
auto. This trailer must be designed for use
with a private passenger auto or utility
auto. This trailer can't be used for
business purposes with other than a

private passenger auto or utility auto.
Home, office, store, display, or passenger
trailers are not covered. Travel-trailers or
camper units are not covered unless
described on the declarations page.
Definitions
1. "Allstate", "We", "Us" or "Our" means the company shown on the
declarations page of the policy.
2. "Auto" — means a land motor vehicle
with at least four wheels designed for use
principally on public roads.

material; or
c) supplying power to cellular or similar
telephone equipment.
6. 'Travel-trailer" — means a trailer of the
house, cabin or camping type equipped
or used as a living quarters.
7. "Utility Auto" — means an auto of the
pick-up body, sedan delivery or panel
truck type. This auto must have a gross
vehicle weight of 10,000 pounds or less,
according to manufacturer's
specifications.

3. "Camper Unit" — means a demountable
unit designed to be used as temporary
living quarters, including all equipment
and accessories built into and forming a
permanent part of the unit. A camper unit
does not include:
a) caps, tops or canopies designed for
use as protection of the cargo area of
a utility auto; or
b) radio or television antennas,
awnings, cabanas, or equipment
designed to create additional
off-highway living facilities.

8. "You" or "Your" - means the
policyholder named on the declarations
page and that policyholder's resident
spouse.

4. "Resident" — means a person who
physically resides in your household with
the intention of continuing residence
there. Your unmarried dependent
children while temporarily away from
home will be considered residents if they
intend to resume residing in your
household.

2. any auto used for the transportation of
people or property for a fee. This
exclusion does not apply to
shared-expense car pools.

5. "Sound System" — means any device
within the insured auto designed for:
aj voice or video transmission, or for
voice, video or radar signal reception;
or
b) recording or playing back recorded

4. loss to any non-owned auto used in auto
business operations such as repairing,
servicing, testing, washing, parking,
storing or selling of autos.

Exclusions — What is not covered
These coverages don't apply to:
1. loss which may reasonably be expected
to result from the intentional or criminal
acts of you or any resident, or any other
person using the insured auto with your
permission or which is in fact intended by
that person.

3. any damage or loss resulting from any act
of war, insurrection, rebellion or
revolution.

5. loss due to radioactive contamination.
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6. damage resulting from wear and tear,
freezing, mechanical or electrical
breakdown unless the damage is the
burning of wires used to connect
electrical components, or the result of
other loss covered by this policy
7. tires unless stolen or damaged by fire,
malicious mischief or vandalism.
Coverage is provided if the damage to
tires occurs at the same time and from the
same cause as other loss covered by this
policy.
8. loss, other than collision, to any sound
system within your auto including any
apparatus in or on the auto designed for
use with that system.
If you have purchased Coverage HH, this
exclusion will not apply to any sound
system up to the limit stated in Coverage
HH for sound systems. Losses in excess
of the limit for loss to sound systems
provided under Coverage HH will be
covered if you have purchased Coverage
ZA.
9. loss to any tapes or similar items, unless
you have purchased Coverage ZZ under
this policy.
10. loss to a camper unit whether or not
mounted. This exclusion will not apply if
the camper unit is described on the
declarations page.
11. loss to appliances, furniture, equipment
and accessories that are not built into and
forming a permanent part of a
travel-trailer.

12. loss to your travel-trailer while rented to
anyone else unless a specific premium is
shown on the declarations page for the
rented vehicle.
13. any loss arising out of the participation in
any prearranged or organized racing or
speed contest or in practice or
preparation for any contest of this type.
14. loss due to conversion or embezzlement
by any person who has the vehicle due to
any rental, lien, or sales agreement.
Right To Appraisal
Both you and Allstate have a right to
demand an appraisal of the loss. Each will
appoint and pay a qualified appraiser. Other
appraisal expenses will be shared equally. The
two appraisers, or a judge of a court of
record, will choose an umpire. Each appraiser
will state the actual cash value and the
amount of loss. If they disagree, they'll submit
their differences to the umpire. A written
decision by any two of these three persons
will determine the amount of the loss.
Payment Of Loss By Allstate
Allstate may pay for the loss in money, or
may repair or replace the damaged or stolen
property. We may, at any time before the loss
is paid or the property is replaced, return at
our own expense any stolen property, either
to you or at our option to the address shown
on the declarations page, with payment for
any resulting damage. We may take all or
part of the property at the agreed or
appraised value. We may settle any claim or
loss either with you or the owner of the
property.
Limits Of Liability
Allstate's limit of liability is the actual cash
value of the property or damaged part of the
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property at the time of loss. The actual cash
value will be reduced by the deductible for
each coverage as shown on the declarations
page. However, our liability will not exceed
what it would cost to repair or replace the
property or part with other of like kind and
quality. The limit for loss to any covered trailer
not described on the declarations page is
$500.
An auto and attached trailer are considered
separate autos, and you must pay the
deductible, if any, on each. Only one
deductible will apply to an auto with a
mounted camper unit. If unmounted, a
separate deductible will apply to the auto
and camper unit.
When more than one coverage is applicable
to the loss, you may recover under the
broadest coverage but not both. However,
Coverage ZA, if purchased, will provide
coverage in excess of the limit for loss to
sound systems provided under Coverage
HH.
If There Is Other Insurance
If there is other insurance covering the loss at
the time of the accident, w e will pay only our
share of any damages. Our share is
determined by adding the limits of this
insurance to the limits of all other insurance
that applies on the same basis and finding the
percentage of the total that our limits
represent.
When this insurance covers a substitute auto
or non-owned auto, we will pay only after
all other collectible insurance has been
exhausted.

Action Against Allstate
No one may sue us under these coverages
unless there is full compliance with ail the
policy terms.
Subrogation Rights
When we pay, your rights of recovery from
anyone else for damages w e have paid
become ours up to the amount we have paid.
You must protect these rights and help us
enforce them.
Loss Payable Clause
If a lienholder is shown on the declarations
page, w e may pay loss under this policy to
you and to the lienholder as its interest may
appear. The lienholder's interest will not be
voided by:
1. any act or neglect of the owner of the
auto; or
2. any change in title or ownership of the
auto if the lienholder notifies us within
10 days.
If you do not pay the premium when due, the
lienholder must, at our request, pay the
premium; otherwise w e cancel this policy.
The lienholder must notify us of any known
increase in hazard. The lienholder must pay,
at our request, the premium for any increase
in hazard; otherwise this policy will be void.
We may cancel this policy according to its
terms. Cancellation will also be effective with
respect to the lienholder's interest. We may
also cancel this clause of the policy. In either
event, w e will provide 10 days notice to the
lienholder. Our mailing of notice will be proof
of notice.

When this insurance covers a replacement
auto or additional auto, this policy won't
apply if you have other collectible insurance.
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If you do not submit proof of loss within the
time specified in this part, the lienholder must
do so within 60 days. Proof of loss must be
submitted in the form and manner specified
below. The lienholder will be subject to
provisions relating to appraisal, time of
payment, and bringing suit.
When w e make payment to the lienholder
for loss under this policy, w e will be
subrogated to the rights of the party w e pay,
to the extent of our payment. When w e pay
a lienholder for a loss for which you are not
covered, w e are entitled to the lienholder's
right of recovery against you to the extent of
our payment. We have the option to pay the
lienholder the entire amount due or which
will become due on the mortgage or other
security agreement with interest and receive
full assignment and transfer of the mortgage
or security agreement. Our right to
subrogation will not impair the lienholder's
right to recover the full amount of its claim.

What You Must Do If There Is A Loss
1. As soon as possible, any person making
claim must give us written proof of loss. It
must include all details reasonably
required by us. We have the right to
inspect the damaged property. We may
require any person making claim to file
with us a sworn proof of loss. We may
also require that person to submit to
examinations under oath.
2. Protect the auto from further loss. We
will pay reasonable expenses to guard
against further loss. If you don't protect
the auto, further loss is not covered.
3. Report all theft losses promptly to the
police.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF Allstate has caused this policy to be signed by its Secretary and its President at
Northbrook, Illinois, and if required by state law, this policy shall not be binding unless countersigned on
the declarations page by an authorized agent of Allstate.

^

^

>

Secretary
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^

^

\

President
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Addendum F

CJT
ORIN PENNINGTON

-\yjji

#47121

6-19-93 (LISA)

J\?This is a new address: 367 W. 4900 S., Washington Terrace, 84405. Phone number:

476-9174.
Lorin experienced automobile accident yesterday, 18th of June, about 1:30 P.M.
Said he was crossing Washington Blvd. at 12th Street and headed East. A car
in front of him slowed down and he slowed down, the car behind him traveling about
30mph, struck him in the hind end. He was driving a Nissan pickup truck. It was
a 1985 Ford Bronco that hit him from the back side. The Bronco was pretty well totalis"
and his Nissan is surviving the accident rather well. He had a high head rest, he
said he was knocked forward and back, but because of the headrest, neck certainly
wasnft whipped as far as it could have been. He was in a seatbelt. Had some
headache last night. Today has some soreness to his neck, but particularly the
areas of the left sternocleidomastoid insertion. ROM seems to be complete. Will
start on some neck flexion exercises. Elected not to do x-ray of neck at this time.
Suggested ice, heat, rest, will use IBUPROFEN 800mg t.i.d. with food at Harmon's in
Roy. Not allergic to any medicines. If pain isn't resolving over the weekend, will take a set of cervical spine films, but as of now, doubt this will be necessary. K
;30 OC $8 AHC $15 Accident
PRT/dc
A$
~

TANNER MEMORIAL CUNIC, LAYTON. UTAH
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LORIN PENNINGTON
#47121
6-22-93
Follow up on neck pain. Automobile accident on the 18th of June, 1993. Whiplash
or acceleration and deceleration injury. Will get him doing more neck and shoulder
exercises, ice and then heat and muscle relaxant.
$30 OC $8 AHC
PRT/dc

Addendum G

Jan P. Malmberg, #4084
PERRY, MALMBERG & PERRY
Attorney for Defendant
29 West 100 North
P.O. Box 364
Logan, UT 84323-0364
(801) 753-5331
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IN THE SECOND DISTRICT COURT, WEBER COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH, OGDEN DEPARTMENT
]1
>
]

LORIN PENNINGTON,
Plaintiff,
vs.

AFFIDAVIT OF
DR. NATHANIEL M. NORD

]

ALLSTATE INSURANCE COMPANY,
BURNS CHIROPRACTIC,
DR. DAVID R. TRIMBLE, D.C.,
DR. DALE BENNETT, D.C.,
DR. BRYSON SMITH,
DR. JOAN BALCOME,
ST. BENEDICT'S HOSPITAL,
ASSOCIATES IN RADIOLOGY,
Defendants.
STATE OF UTAH

j
]
]
]
]!
]
]i
]
I
]

rf>

\v

# "

Civil No. 940900042
Judge Roger S. Dutson

)

:ss

COUNTY OF SALT LAKE )

Dr. Nathaniel M. Nord, M.D., being first duly sworn, deposes and says as
follows:
1.

I am a medical doctor specializing in adult neurology and make this

affidavit upon personal knowledge and belief.
2.

On September 28, 1993, I met with Mr. Lorin Pennington in relation to

a motor vehicle accident which occurred on June 18, 1993.
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3.

Mr. Pennington had been referred to me by Allstate Insurance Company

for an independent medical examination.
4.

On September 28,

1993, I performed an independent medical

examination of Mr. Pennington.
5.

In accordance with that medical examination, I have prepared a report as

to my findings dated October 4, 1993. A copy of that report is attached hereto as
Exhibit 1. I also prepared a follow-up report dated October 28, 1993, in response to
inquiry as to any disability of Mr. Pennington. A copy of that report is also attached
hereto as Exhibit 2.
6.

My review of the medical reports, medical expenses, medical treatment,

and in speaking to and personally examining Mr. Pennington, has led me to the
conclusion that Mr. Pennington sustained no more than a cervical strain as a result of
the motor vehicle accident on June 18, 1993. After that accident, Mr. Pennington
generated undue personal concern as to his condition which led to the involvement of
an excessive number of practitioners.

This undue personal concern led to his

generating some duplicative treatment and expenses which were not necessary.
7.

Appropriate treatment for Mr. Pennington in relationship to the

automobile accident of June 18, 1993, would have consisted of visits to his primary
care physician, Dr. Taylor, home exercises, and physical therapy or non-manipulative
chiropractic treatment for a period of eight weeks and professional evaluation, if not
improved, after eight weeks.
8.

Further, Mr. Pennington received numerous x-rays in relationship to this

motor vehicle accident, including x-rays taken on July 1, 1993, at St. Benedict's
Hospital (which were normal); x-rays taken on July 6, 1993, at the Burns Chiropractic
Clinic (which were normal); x-rays taken on July 15, 1993, at the Bennett Chiropractic
Clinic (which were normal except for a mild thoracolumbar scoliosis); and a cervical
MRI scan taken August 3, 1993, at St. Benedict's Hospital (which was also normal).

2
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This further reflects Mr. Pennington's undue solicitation of various providers and
services.
9.

I have also reviewed the medical services of St. Benedict's Hospital and

the medical services of Bennett Chiropractic and Burns Chiropractic. Mr. Pennington
obtained excessive unnecessary treatment when he visited both his chiropractor and
physical therapist on the same days.
Further, affiant saith not.

Dr. Nathaniel Nord
Subscribed and sworn to before ma this??'/

^tz

day of December, 1994

NOTARY PUBLIC

Francint R. Brown
370£tst8o.T«npto#$00
SftttUte City, Utah M l 11
My Committor* Expires
April 26,1987
STATE OF UTAH

otary Public

My commission expires:

3
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify a true and correct copy of the foregoing Affidavit was mailed,
postage prepaid, to the following individuals on this ff^^May of December, 1994:
Daniel L. Wilson
290 25th Street, Suite 204
Ogden, UT 84401

Cynthia Campbell
2485 Grant Avenue, Suite 200
Ogden, UT 84401

Jaryl Rencher
P.O. Box 2970
Salt Lake City, UT 84110-2970

Elaine Monson
P.O. Box 45835
Salt Lake City, UT 84145-0385

17 pennaffi
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EXHIBIT 1

Jlalhaniel

Jn. JVorJ, Jn.J).,

J^.L,.

JiduSI Jfturclcau
370 &»/ Jon ft Ttmflt. J mil, 300
(Jail lak. City. 1/lai 84/1/

80t.363.3777

October 4, 1993

Mr. Clay G. Hamblen
Senior Claim Representative
Allstate Insurance Company
P.O. Box 9988
Ogden, UT 84409
Re: Lorin Pennington
Claim Number: 6530551446 K15
Date of Injury: 06/18/93
Dear Mr. Hamblen:
I met with Mr. Lorin Pennington on September 28, 1993.
He is 28 years of age, and reports that on June 18, 1993 he sustained a cervical
injury as a consequence of a rear-end motor vehicle accident. He was slowing to a
stop, and moving at approximately 2 mph, he reports, when his vehicle was rear-ended
at a speed estimated to be 30 mph. Impact rocked him forwards and rearwards, and
except for him striking his head against the head rest, he struck no portions of the
interior of the vehicle, and remained seated. His vehicle was a Nissan pickup truck, and
the vehicle which rear-erjded.hirr^was a F:ord Bronco. Seatbelt and chest restraint were
being worn. As the accident was being investigated, Mr. Pennington experienced
nausea and headache. He sought no medical attention that day, although later, in the
evening, stiffness of the posterior neck region developed, which was more intense the
following day, and prompted him to be seen at the Tanner Memorial Clinic.
Dr. Paul R. Taylor was seen at the Tanner Clinic the following day, at which time
he reported soreness which involved the left sternocleidomastoid muscle in particular,
with examination of the neck revealing no restriction of range of motion. No other
examination findings were detailed. No x-rays were taken, and Mr. Pennington was
advised to apply ice and heat, and take ibuprofen 800 mg three times daily. He returned

Allstate Insurance Company
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Lorin Pennington

to Dr. Taylor on June 22nd when symptoms were not improved, and at that time
exercises and Flexeril were prescribed.
Mr. Pennington indicated that symptoms continued to intensify, and as a
consequence, he presented to the Emergency Room of the St. Benedict's Hospital on
July 1", for evaluation of neck pain and headaches, unaccompanied by other symptoms.
With the exception of mild tenderness of the cervical paravertebral muscles, physical
examination was normal. Cervical spine x-rays were obtained which were normal. An
acute cervical strain was diagnosed for which Anaprox and physical therapy were
prescribed.
One week later, on July 6th Mr. Pennington sought chiropractic treatments with
Dr. David R. Trimble, reporting constant neck pain, intermittent headaches, intermittent
numbness of the left upper extremity, intermittent low back pain, and constant mid-back
pain. X-rays of the thoracic and lumbar spine were obtained after examination revealed
areas of spinal tenderness and mild restriction of cervical and lumbar range of motion.
Four treatments were received through the date of July 12th, at which time symptoms
remained unchanged, and Mr. Pennington then transferred care to Dr. Dale J. Bennett
beginning July 15th. Approximately 20 treatments were received through the date of
August 12th. Mr. Pennington was placed on a total disability status from August 4th
through August 18th by a Dr. Steve Taylor.
On August 3rd Mr. Pennington was seen for neurosurgical consultation by
Dr. Bryson S. Smith, after he had returned to the St. Benedict's Hospital Emergency
Department on July 24th for persisting pain and reports of areas of back swelling.
Examination at that time was performed by Dr. Val Rollins who reported that areas of
swelling were not evident, while range of motion was "fair". He recommended
neurosurgical opinion. Physical examination by Dr. Smith revealed cervical paravertebral
muscle tenderness, trigger points in the left trapezius and rhomboid muscles, reduced
light touch and pinprick perception in the left upper extremity which extended to the
shoulder and into the left trunk anteriorly and posteriorly, as well as into the neck and
maxillary region. Hypesthesia was also reported in portions of the left lower extremity.
Deep tendon reflexes were symmetrically present, there were no pathologic reflexes,
strength and gait functions were normal. Dr. Smith diagnosed a probable cervical strain
with myofascial syndrome, and because of the sensory findings on physical examination
felt that a cervical MRI scan should be performed to exclude a cord injury. The study
was accomplished on August 3rd at St. Benedict's Hospital, and was normal. Physical
therapy at Health Works was recommended, began on August 5th, and concluded on
August 18th, at which time headache was remitted and only occasional neck pain was
reported, which was judged to be 1 on a scale of 10 with respect to severity. A self
3xercise program was being satisfactorily performed by Mr. Pennington at home, which
/vas to be continued. A follow-up visit was made with Dr. Smith on September 8th, and

Allstate Insurance Company
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Lorin Pennington

the improvements noted. He felt that the condition of cervical strain was resolving and
that no further neurosurgical follow was required.
Mr. Pennington reports no prior symptoms of similar nature, or prior injuries to
portions of his vertebral axis. He has not previously received chiropractic care. Past
medical history otherwise reveals a remote appendectomy, no allergies to medication,
while review of systems is negative for cardiovascular, respiratory, gastrointestinal, and
genitourinary symptoms.
Current symptoms consist of low intensity dull posterior neck pain which extends
to the upper dorsal spine, present principally when sitting and hyperextending the head,
and otherwise not generally present, judged to be 1 on a scale of 10. Episodic mid and
low backaches occur when driving, on a daily basis, for perhaps one to two hours
duration. This symptom began approximately one week after the accident and then on
occasions have been associated with areas of muscular swelling of the back. Exercises
continue on a daily basis.
Several days of work were missed immediately after the motor vehicle accident,
and two weeks upon the recommendation of his chiropractor. Since, Mr. Pennington
has been working full time as a conveyor belt operator and mechanic.
Neurologic review reveals no impairments of vision, hearing, strength,
coordination, and sensation.
Physical examination revealed blood pressure of 118/76. No tenderness involved
occipital portions of the skull, cervical spinous processes and paravertebral muscles, as
well as dorsal and lumbar spinous and paraspinous areas. Muscular spasm was not
present in the paravertebral muscle regions. There was no evidence of TM joint
dysfunction. Multiple teeth were missing. The oropharynx was otherwise clear. External
examination of eyes and ears, including tuning fork examination of hearing was normal.
No vascular bruit was heard on the right, while a soft, perhaps venous hum, was heard
on the left. Heart rhythm was regular and no murmur was heard, and a grade 1/6 soft
systolic ejection murmur was heard intermittently. Lungs were clear to auscultation. The
abdomen was without palpable organomegaly. Extremity examination revealed no
deformities of long bones or joints. A 10 cm scar associated with loss of some
subcutaneous tissue was present in the extensor aspect of the left forearm. Median
Phalen's and Tinel's signs were absent, and provocative maneuvers for thoracic outlet
syndrome were negative. Cervical range of motion was measured at 40° left and 50°
right lateral flexion, 60° forward flexion and extension, 70° left and 80° right rotation.
Lumbar range of motion was 30° for extension, 60° for true forward flexion, 45° for left
and right rotation of the thoracolumbar junction, and 25° left and 35° right lateral flexion.
Straight leg raising was negative bilaterally to 90°. Heel and toe walking were
accomplished without difficulty. Buttock tone was normal. Cranial nerves and fundi
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Lorin Pennington

were normal. Deep tendon reflexes were 2+ in the upper extremities and 2+ to 3+ in
the lower extremities symmetrically, with Babinski responses absent. Language function
was normal. Light touch, vibration, and pinprick perception were normally perceived.
Cortical sensory function was normal. Tremor and ataxia were absent. Extremity and
muscle tone was normal, and no weakness involved major muscle groups of upper and
lower extremities, as well as intrinsic hand muscles. Routine gait mechanics were
normal.
Cervical spine x-rays dateoKluly 1, 1993^ken_at_SL_Bfinedict's Hospital were
normal. Dorsal and lumbar spin! x-rays dated^July 6,1993^jtaken at the Burns
Chiropractic Clinic were normal, with an incidemaflinding of an ectopic ossification
center off the superior and anterior aspect of L4. Lateral cervical spine x-rays and full
lenqtb-J^P views of the spine taken at the Bennett Chiropractic Clinic on
July 15, 1993~\frere normal except for a mild thoracolumbar scoliosis. Cervical MRI scan
aated-Augtisr^, 1993 performed at St. Benedict's Hospital was normal.
The available medical evidence indicates that Mr. Pennington sustained no more
than a cervical strain as a consequence of the motor vehicle accident of June 18, 1993,
following which he generated undue personal concern which led to involvement of an
excessive number of practitioners being involved. Other than the continuation of a home
exercise program already established, and follow-ups as needed with his primary care
physician, Dr. Paul Taylor, no further treatment or medical follow is indicated. The
prognosis is excellent, with complete resolution of symptoms a reasonable expectation.
No activity restrictions are appropriate.
No permanent partial physical impairment should eventuate.
Sincerely yours.

NATHANIEL M. NORD, M.D.
NMN:pt-kb

Addendum H

DAJilU

VILSON, $.fi*

A*-!
Creston Plaza Bldg.
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lawsuit and dismiss you from this case in exchange for your
agreement to be bound by the court's ruling even though you are not
a party. In other words, we will agree that if the court finds
your charges to be reasonable and we collect the money from
Allstate we will pay the money over to you. But, if the court
finds that the charges were not reasonable or were not necessary
and that Allstate doesn't have to pay, you must agree to write off
those charges with absolutely no adverse effect to my client or his
credit standing.
I encourage you to accept this offer. The outcome to you is
the same whether or not you are a party. This way you avoid the
inconvenience of being involved in this lawsuit. If you agree with
this approach, please sign the enclosed agreement and return to me
in the envelope provided.
If you don't want to agree to this and instead want to be a
party to this lawsuit, enclosed for your convenience is/iAcceptance
of Service. I would appreciate.it if you would sign the Acceptance
of Service and return it to me in the envelope provided. This will
avoid the necessity of having to have you served by a sheriff or
process server.
An Affidavit concerning the treatment provided is also
enclosed along with a separate letter explaining that.
Thank you for your consideration. Please contact me if you
would like to discuss this matter further.

a

^rely,

Daniel L. Wilson
Attorney at Law

DLW/kha
Attachments:
Agreement
Complaint
Summons
Acceptance of Service
Return Envelope
Letter
Affidavit
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Daniel I*. Wilson, #4257
Attorney for Plaintiff
290-25th Street, Suite /204
Ogden, Utah 84 401
Telephone: (801) 621-6119
IN TIIK SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
WEMEK COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
ACCEPTANCE OF SERVICE

LORIN PENNINGTON,
PJaintiff,
vs,
ALLSTATE INSURANCE COMPANY,
BURNS CHIROPRACTIC,
DR. DAVID R. TRIMBLE, D.C.
DR. DALE BENNETT, D.C.,
DR. OKYSOH SMITH,
DR. JOAN BALCOMR,
ST. BENEDICT'S HOSPITAL,
ASSOCIATES IN RADIOLOGY,

Civil No. 940-900-042 CN
Judge Stanton M. Taylor

Defendants.
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Addendum J

BRYSON S. SMITH
Neuros irt i
425 East 5350 South VOgden, 0
Telephone: (801) 479-91 19

v94

Utah State Bar Association'
645 South 200 East
Salt Lake City, Utah
I arm Pennington •'
Dear Ladies ami i i HIIMIMH
I am asking your assistance to hel| * < :ininie \\\w f*er thtic nas been a breach of
ethics on the part of Daniel L. Wilson, an
*K\ | ,* tu ,ng <u 290 25th Street, #204,
Ogden, Utah 84401. If you would kindly n \u w the Mimiu.uv whiel follows, and advise
me as to the appropriateness of Mr. Wils<
i«*t appreciative,
This situation involves Mr, Lorin I enn* ip*-\
, . . , c who was ii ivolved
in a motor vehicle accident in mid \W} I h was initially evaluated in an emergency
room and then referred to my office. 1 saw him on two occasions. On the first office
visit I ordered an imaging study. By the second office visit the patient's symptoms had
largely resolved,.such that no further follow up was necessary by me, and he was
discharged from, my care.
In January 1994 I was contacted by Mr. Wilson, who introduced himself as Mr.
Pennington's attorney. He informed pie that payment for all medical services had been
denied by the insurance company. (JHIe asked my permission to do "whatever was
necessary" to obtain reimbursement from the insurance company for his client. Mr.
Wilson explained carefully to me that he did not believe that, any of the medical care
given by the various providers, including myself, was in any way inappropriate
Nevertheless, he wanted to name me as a defendant in a suit claiming inappropriate
care/-He felt that this maneuver might i i lotivate the insurance company to pay the claim.
Again, he assured me that he did not believe my care of this patient had been
inappropriate. He offered that, should this go to trial, lie had a friend in Mwn who
would be willing to,defend me at no chargeQ
My response was that T *'f not appreciate bemy, named in a lawsuit, particulaily
one so contrived. He asked
discuss ilns wiin my nvui .nianiry and then advise him
further.

Dib

Utah State Bar Association
RE: Lorin Pennington

May 17, 1994
Page 2

On January 25, after discussing this with my own attorney, M Shane Smith, I
returned Mr. Wilson's call. I told him in veiy certain terms that I would not cooperate
with this scheme, and that 1 did not wish to have my name tarnished in such a fashion. I
informed him that I had insurance and reimbursement specialists in my office, and that I
would gladly make the services of those peisonnel available lo him and his client, so that
this matter, which is not atypical in my business, might be resolved in a more customary
manner. His response was that the suit had already been filed and that I had no more
say in the matter. He in fact told me that he wished I would not pursue reimbursement
from the insurance company for my own services, as that might decrease the chances of
his successful lawsuit.
I am not familiar enough with legal statutes to know whether Mr. Wilson's actions
represent a breach of ethics. However, it seems very unusual, and in my opinion does
not represent an honest use of the legal system. It will cost me both legal expenses and
time away from my practice. Furthermore, 1 have ical concerns about the potential
negative impact on my professional stature in the community.
Once again, thank you in anticipation for youi advice in this matter.
Sincerely,

Bryson S. Smith, M.D.
cc:

M. Shane Smith
Smith & Hannah
311 South State Street, #450
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

BSS/gb

BRYSON S. SMI 1 H, IVI.
Neurosurgery
425 East 5350 South, Sinli? 3!!'>
Ogden, Utah 84405
Telepl lone; (801) 479 9119
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Utah State Bar
Office of Attorney Discipline
c/o Pamela Blevins
645 South 200 East, #205
Salt .Lak.e City, Utah 841
Dear Ms, Blevins:
Thank you for your .correspondence dated July (>, IW4 regarding my complaint
against Daniel L. Wilson... You enclosed a copy of his M i n n> you dated June 29, 1994.
I would like to respond briefly to his letter
The overall context of
i
liability of the no-fault insurance policy is * u*
•
<* ( i v
^m
roughly half of that amount was paid to various provide i s In ^ .
ih
a\ *
approximately $1,400 at issue. The remaining unpaid medical bills total approximately
$2,300, Obviously, the insurance policy will fall short of the total cost of medical care
for Mr. Pennington. Therefore, in fairness io tie health as providers who have not
been paid for their services, the best course oi ^•!«
* **
1
efficiently and equitably disburses what fun,
those providers.
Mr. Wilson states that his plan i
• I
,
*
| y
bills that are "not his obligation to pay,' As Ma- 'd
• —, .-;i--i, it i- nttev IIV
to communicate medical information to third pa.ty payor \ understand iln
medical necessity of the care they are being asked to fund, in my experience, I i
usually leads to a reasonable resolution of payment issues such as this one. This is a
common practice, in fact almost tl ic noi in, and physicians are accustomed to providing
such information in these cases* In a discussion * •• tli Mi , Hal Palmer at Allstate
hm
Insurance, which I had today, this communication issue aros
'
^
rai -)*
that he requested such medical information from Mr. Pennington
information would have led to a greater understanding by the insurance company of the
medical necessity of the treatment rendered <*» K>h v»"*,:
n, and miuht ^^ n / Hkely
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have resulted in a satisfactory resolution of this problem outside the legal arena. Mr.
Palmer informs me that Allstate insurance never received any such information from Mr.
Pennington regarding any of the care delivered by the various health care providers.
Likewise, rather than encourage communication, Mr. Wilson in fact pleaded with me not
to provide information or communicate in anv way with (he insurance company as it
might weaken his legal position.
It appears to me that Mr. Wilson is not interested in facilitating an efficient and
equitable reimbursement process. In fact, one wonders al his real agenda. Ostensibly,
he may have some altruistic notion of effecting global insurance reform. After all, in his
letter to Mr. Smith dated April 14, 1994, he comments that "if the insurance company
gets away without paying the bills this doesn't make me very happy," and he makes
repeated reference to the "scope" of the problem. I lowcvcr, his primary agenda, 1
believe, is self service. In a situation where there are insufficient funds to completely
reimburse medical costs, he has blocked the customary process for disbursal of those
funds to the providers. At the same time, he has positioned himself carefully to secure
an award of attorney fees. He exploits the physicians and the insurance company to his
benefit.
Putting Mr. Wilson's simplistic patriotic rhetoric aside, justice includes the concept that
power and position should not be used maliciously or frivolously to exploit others. I
certainly agree with our system of justice, and have frequently been a participant, usually
as an expert witness. I appreciate very much your efforts to maintain the integrity of this
system. My concern is that Mr. Wilson may have violated that integrity by abusing his
position as an attorney at law.
Thank you again for your consideration in this matter.
Sineeiely,

Bryson S. Smith, M.D.
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Jan P. Malmberg, #4084
PERRY, MALMBERG & PERRY
Attorney for Defendant
29 West 100 North
P.O. Box 364
Logan, UT 84323-0364
(801) 753-5331
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR WEBER CO^F^rSS^TE-eFTrTAH

LORIN PENNINGTON,

ORDER OF DISMISSAL
WITH PREJUDICE

Plaintiff,
vs.

ALLSTATE INSURANCE COMPANY,
BURNS CHIROPRACTIC,
DR. DAVID R. TRIMBLE, D.C.,
DR. DALE BENNETT, D.C.,
DR. BRYSON SMITH,
DR. JOAN BALCOMBE,
ST. BENEDICT'S HOSPITAL,
ASSOCIATES IN RADIOLOGY,

Civil No. 940003226
Judge Roger S. Dutson

Defendants.
Based upon the Stipulation of the plaintiff, Lorin Pennington, and the
defendant, Allstate Insurance Company, and based upon the failure of Burns
Chiropractic, Dr. David R. Trimble, Dr. Dale Bennett or Dr. Bryson Smith to appear
in this lawsuit and answer the complaint herein, it is hereby ordered that the aboveaction of Lorin Pennington v. Burns Chiropractic, Dr. David R. Trimble, Dr. Dale
Bennett, Dr. Bryson Smith, is hereby dismissed with prejudice each party to bear their
own costs.

DATED this ^ / / p

day of August,
BY TtfEJGtfURT

Honorablfe/Roger S. Dutson

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify a true and correct copy of the foregoing Order was mailed,
postage prepaid, this

day of August, 1995, to the following:

Daniel L. Wilson
290 25th Street, Suite 204
Ogden, UT 84401

^,^J2JL
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Addendum L

IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
WEBER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
LORIN PENNINGTON,
Plaintiff,
vs.
ALLSTATE INSURANCE, et al,
Defendant.

:

MEMORANDUM DECISION

:
:
:
:

Civil No. 940900042 CN
Honorable Roger S. Dutson

:

Trial in this matter before Judge Roger S. Dutson commenced on
February 22, 1996, and continued on several different dates,
finishing

in mid-March,

1996'.

The trial was bifurcated to

separate the issue of liability from the issue of attorneys fees.
Trial was held on the issue of liability of Allstate Insurance
Company.

After numerous motions, stipulations, and court orders,

the only parties remaining were Lorin Pennington, Plaintiff, and
Allstate Insurance Company, Defendant.
On January 24, 1994, Attorney Dan Wilson filed a complaint in
the Second District Court for his son-in-law, Lorin Pennington,
against Allstate Insurance Company (Allstate), Burns Chiropractic,
Dr. David R. Trimble, D.C., Dr. Dale Bennett, D. C , Dr. Bryson
Smith, Dr. Joan Balcombe, St. Benedicts Hospital, and Associates
in Radiology.
Pennington

was

The complaint alleged that on June 18, 1993, Lorin
involved

in an

automobile

accident

and that

Pennington1s insurance company, Allstate, had failed to pay the
required $3,000.00 Personal Injury Protection (PIP) benefits, to
Plaintiff or to the other named Defendants, (who were medical
providers) pursuant to Utah Code Annotated, Sec. 31A-22-307 and the
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contract of insurance.

Plaintiff claimed the bills were past due

and prayed for judgment against Allstate, or in the alternative,
against the medical providers, in the event the services rendered
were determined by the court as unreasonable and/or unnecessary.
In summary, the Plaintiff requested this court determine that
Plaintiff's treatment and expenses were reasonable and necessary
pursuant to UCA 31A-22-307, for judgment against Allstate for
unpaid reasonable and necessary medical expenses plus attorneys
fees and costs because of Allstate's failure to pay under the
statute and contract of insurance.

In the alternative, Plaintiff

requested judgment against the medical providers he sued for
unnecessary or unreasonable treatment and charges. Prior to trial
the

medical

providers

had

been

dismissed

from

the

case by

stipulation though the court reserved the right to revisit that
issue

if

after

factual

findings

such was

determined

to

be

justified.
Defendant

asserted, among other things, full accord and

satisfaction, full payment of reasonable and necessary medical
expenses,

Plaintiff's

noncompliance

release

of

all

claims,

with the PIP statute, breach

Plaintiff's

of the

insurance

contract, as well as a general denial.
After reviewing the evidence presented during several days of
trial, the court finds the following facts:
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1.

The Plaintiff, Lorin Pennington, was injured in an

automobile accident on June 18, 1993, in Ogden, Utah, suffering
injury which was an uncomplicated "cervical strain".
2.

Mr. Pennington was not treated for any injuries on the

date of the accident but went to the Tanner Clinic and was seen by
Paul R. Taylor, M. D. the next day, Friday, June 19, 1993.
3. Mr. Pennington complained of soreness of neck though
examination revealed Plaintiff had full range of motion.

Dr.

Taylor did not feel it necessary to take any X-Rays or administer
any further tests on that visit but told the Plaintiff to follow a
treatment plan of flexion exercises, ice, heat and rest and
Ibuprofen, 800mg, and advised him to report back if the problem was
not resolved over the following weekend. Dr. Taylor mentioned the
possibility of X-Rays if problem did not resolve but stated he
"—doubted this will be necessary."
4. The following Monday, June 22, 1993, Mr. Pennington went
back to Dr. Taylor and he prescribed doing more neck and shoulder
exercises, ice and then heat and a muscle relaxant, Flexeril.
5.

The court finds that the recommendations and treatment

plan established by Dr.Taylor was a standard and proper treatment
reasonable for this type cervical strain injury and had his
recommendation been followed, this injury would have probably been
resolved

as soon, or possibly sooner, (because of unnecessary and

apparently damagingly stressful chiropractic manipulations') as if
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had

he

not

obtained

treatment

from

numerous

other

medical

providers.
6. The court finds that rather than continue with Dr. Taylor,
Mr. Pennington chose to 'shop" for other medical providers for the
purpose of increasing his medical expenses so he could exceed the
$3,000.00 PIP amounts in order to justify pursuing a personal
injury claim against the other driver pursuant to UCA 31A-22-309.
7.

The court finds that the further medical treatment

obtained by Plaintiff, beyond that recommended by Dr. Taylor, was
not only unnecessary, but some of that treatment was given for
areas of the body not injured in the accident and certain
treatment probably increased Plaintiff's pain and was the cause of
increased discomfort, (if indeed, same was experienced) above that
caused by the June 18th accident.
8.

The court finds that Plaintiff obtained the following

treatment after he decided not to continue with Dr. Paul Taylor's
reasonable treatment plan:
a. About one week after last seeing Dr. Taylor, Plaintiff
appeared at the Emergency Room at St. Benedicts Hospital and saw
Dr. Joan Balcombe, an emergency physician, who responded to
Plaintiff's subjective complaints of neck pain and headaches and
upon physical examination and responses given by Plaintiff, she
felt there was mild tenderness of cervical muscles and because of
his persistent and continued complaint of pain, coupled with
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pursuit of the complaint in the Emergency Room setting, X-Rays were
ordered, and though found to be normal, Anaprox medication and
physical therapy were prescribed•
b. Instead of following the Emergency Room Dr. Balcombe's
treatment recommendations, which were similar to Dr. Taylor's
previous recommendations, within four days after going to the
Emergency Room, Plaintiff began an intensive Chiropractic treatment
plan by his own choice.
manipulations.

This chiropractic treatment included

He first saw a Dr. Trimble at Burns Chiropractic

and started that treatment on about July 6, 1993, and had treatment
during about 6 of the next 8 days.
c. Attorney Wilson, his father-in-law, then suggested he
go to his, Attorney Wilson's, personal Chiropractor and long-time
acquaintance, a Dr. Bennett, where he first received treatment
about 10 days after he started chiropractic treatment with Burns
Clinic. Plaintiff then was treated by Bennett chiropractors on 20
of the next 30 calendar days.
d.

In the meantime, Plaintiff made another trip to the

Emergency Room at St. Benedicts and saw Dr. Val Rollins, M.D., who
found no swelling or other objective symptoms, but because of
Plaintiffs persistent complaints of pain and the normal X-Ray
previously taken in the E.R., he was referred by the E.R. doctor to
Dr. Bryson Smith for a neurological consultation.
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Dr* Smith saw P l a i n t i f f and based on P l a i n i t f f f s

e.

s u b j e c t i v e complaints and treatment h i s t o r y with the normal E.R.
X-Ray and some new complaints, which, i f they t r u l y e x i s t e d , the
c o u r t now f i n d s p r o b a b l y w e r e t h e r e s u l t of

unnecessary

c h i r o p r a c t i c treatments, Dr. Smith ordered an MRI scan to determine
i f there was a p o s s i b l e spinal cord i n j u r y .
f.

The MRI scan was performed at St. Benedicts Hospital

on about August 3, 1993, and was normal.

P h y s i c a l Therapy was

a g a i n recommended and t h i s t i m e P l a i n t i f f d i d go t o p h y s i c a l
therapy six times along -with massage therapy about 3 times.

Some

of t h i s time p e r i o d P l a i n t i f f was a l s o c o n t i n u i n g c h i r o p r a c t i c
treatment.

All treatment was completed by about August 26, 1993,

and P l a i n t i f f had now achieved h i s goal of exceeding the $3,000.
cap on medical expenses so he could pursue a claim a g a i n s t t h e
other d r i v e r .
g.

From t h e time of i n j u r y i n m i d - J u n e , 1993, u n t i l

t r e a t m e n t was completed about August 26, 1993, P l a i n t i f f
l e a s t four d i f f e r e n t medical d o c t o r s , about five

saw a t

different

c h i r o p r a c t o r s , involved an X-Ray technician and MRI technician and
a t l e a s t two m e d i c a l d o c t o r s were a p p a r e n t l y i n v o l v e d i n t h e
reading of those r e s u l t s , two p h y s i c a l t h e r a p i s t s and a massage
t h e r a p i s t , for a minimum of 12 d i f f e r e n t medical p r o v i d e r s .
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9.

Normal treatment for an injury such as was sustained by

Plaintiff is exercise, rest, ice and heat, a pain medication and/or
muscle relaxant medication, and possibly massage therapy and/or
physical therapy, and possibly a special pillow. This type injury
usually resolves itself in about six to ten weeks and time is
probably the most important factor in this healing process. Most
of the treatment normally recommended by doctors is to help the
patient feel better during the healing process and does not
contribute greatly to the rapidity of healing the injury.
10.

Towards the end of July, 1993, Clay Hamblin who worked

with claims for Allstate observed what he considered to be normal
physical movement and appearance of Plaintiff in the insurance
office and because of the extensive claims being filed by
Plaintiff, he became suspicious of the reasonableness and necessity
of the treatment Plaintiff had received and after consultation with
Hal Palmer, his boss, he informed Plaintiff that Allstate was going
to require an independent medical examination.

Attorney Wilson

subsequently contacted the insurance carrier and was very
antagonistic towards having the requested examination, including
the claim that it was too soon for such an examination.

Attorney

Wilson engaged in tactics which made it difficult to obtain a
medical examination by their own doctor, as requested by Allstate,
though ultimately, towards the end of September, 1993, an
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examination was conducted by Dr. Nathaniel Nord, the doctor
designated by Allstate.
11.

Dr. Nord conducted an examination of Plaintiff on

September 28, 1993, and reviewed his treatment history, for the
Insurance Company. He found no physical ailments relating to the
accident of June 18, 1993. He concluded there had been an
uncomplicated cervical strain which appeared fully resolved. The
court is persuaded that the medical examination and testimony of
Dr. Nord, although hired by Allstate, was objective, professionally
supported and of substantial value to the court in this case.
12.

The court found that the testimony of Dr. Don Rick

Wakefield, who was hired by Allstate to perform a 'utilization
review1, was interesting but not of great value to the court in
this case. Though very well qualified and trained in the
utilization review process and other areas, he is not a medical
doctor. His theories relating to the concept of necessary or
unnecessary medical treatment and expenses were somewhat helpful,
but the court did not rely on his testimony to any great extent.
He was found to be somewhat biased in favor of the insurance
carrier.
13. The court finds that the Emergency Room doctors which
attended Plaintiff, provided treatment in a somewhat different
manner than a regular doctor in a medical office would, in that
they do not have the continuity with the patient as does a regular
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doctor and were attempting to insure they did not miss a diagnosis
and therefore were somewhat more aggressive in ordering X-Rays and
referring to specialists. Based on the continued return visits to
the Emergency Room (even though symptoms given by Plaintiff were
subjective) and his continued complaints of pain, they readily
ordered an X-Ray and referred to the neurologist, whereas an
'office1 doctor would not likely order such tests so quickly.

It

was in this manner that the X-Ray and MRI were obtained by
Plaintiff through the emergency room. The court finds those tests
were unreasonable and unnecessary in this case and were part of the
Plaintiff's plan to build up the medical expenses for his ultimate
benefit in pursuing his additional claim against the other driver.
13. The physical therapy and massage therapy obtained by
Plaintiff were relaxing and comforting to Plaintiff, but were not
necessary medical treatment as it related to resolution of symptoms
arising from the accident.

These types of treatment are often

prescribed for this type of injury, but again, are not essential to
a speedy recovery, even though normally paid for by insurance
carriers. The chiropractic treatment was unnecessary treatment in
this case.

The only treatment the court finds reasonable and

necessary was that recommended by Dr. Paul Taylor, the first doctor
to treat Plaintiff/ and Plaintiff failed to follow up with that
doctorfs recommendations.
14.

The fact that Allstate paid several claims submitted to
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them for unnecessary and unreasonable treatment is not considered
by the court as estoppel, acquiescence, or agreement that those
expenses were necessary and reasonable.

In this case, it was

Plaintiff's purpose to deceive the medical providers as well as the
insurance carrier and just because he was somewhat successful some
of the time, the insurance carrier should not be punished for
paying more than they should have, and Plaintiff should be estopped
from having those medical providers claims against him set aside.
15.

The court has a great deal of concern about the

motivation of Attorney Wilson, Plaintifffs father-in-law, and
motivation of Plaintiff in intentionally incurring unnecessary
medical treatment and engaging in conduct to run up unnecessary
medical bills and have Allstate pay those bills.

The court finds

this lawsuit was filed with a lack of good faith and was an abusive
use of the courts.

The events that support this finding include:

(a) Plaintiff's willful failure to follow a properly prescribed
treatment plan initially recommended by Dr. Paul Taylor,

(b)

Intentional creation of unnecessary medical bills by shopping for
medical providers and jumping around to numerous medical providers,
(c) Inclusion among the many medical providers, a Chiropractor who
happens to be Attorney Wilson's personal chiropractor and a long
time acquaintance, (d) Willful exaggeration of symptoms in order to
make Plaintiff's injury seem more severe than it was, (e)
Intentionally 'creating' medical bills for the purpose of exceeding
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the $3,000 PIP cap under Utah Law in order to then pursue a
Personal Injury claim and thereby receive several thousand dollars
settlement against the other driver, (f) Lack of objective findings
to support any injury or treatment beyond that originally diagnosed
and recommended by Dr. Taylor,

(g) Failure of the Plaintiff or

Attorney Wilson to notify Allstate of the filing and settlement of
the claim against the other driver, as required by the insurance
contract and attorney ethics,

(h) Questionable conduct by Attorney

Wilson in attempting to obtain releases from medical providers and
at least implying to those medical providers that he would protect
their interests as much as they could expect their claims to be
protected in a lawsuit, even though he was suing those same medical
providers. The court finds there was an attempt by Attorney Wilson
to force Allstate to pay unnecessary and unreasonable expenses
incurred by Plaintiff, (i) Obstructionist conduct by Attorney
Wilson to avoid or delay medical examination by Allstatefs
doctor,

(j) Attorney Wilson's strong assertion throughout this

case that he was entitled to several thousands of dollars in
attorneys fees under the PIP statute for bringing this action,
while he knew or should have known most of the medical expenses and
treatment were unreasonable.
The court has reviewed volumes of materials including
extensive notes taken by the court during several days of trial and
hearings, including all exhibits and evidence.

The court has
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intentionally restrained from including details of much of that
material herein, as the record is clear in support of these
findings and the attorney drafting orders shall include details
from the record in support of these findings* The court notes that
it carefully observed the demeanor of witnesses during their
testimony and reached conclusions concerning truthfulness and
untruthfulness. The court finds that although the amounts claimed
under the PIP statute are relatively small, there are some serious
collateral issues involved in this case and therefore, subsequent
to trial the court has given the facts of this case much thought
and deliberation before preparing these findings. As indicated,
one issue which has been of great concern has been the conduct of
Attorney Wilson as well as Plaintiff's misconduct.
Plaintiff's claims should be dismissed and Defendant Allstate
is entitled to judgment and costs. Although Dr. Wakefield's
testimony was somewhat biased in favor of insurance carriers,
Allstate was required to present as much evidence as it could to
counter the misconduct of Plaintiff and therefore the costs for Dr.
Wakefield should be included. Evidence of charges for the experts
and professionals called by Allstate is accepted by the court as
reasonable charges and should be included as costs payable by
Plaintiff.
The court reserved some issues on motions by Plaintiff and all
those issues should be resolved by the findings herein.
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Defendant Allstate.is.directed to draft clear and factually
supported Findings, Conclusions and Order of Judgment consistent
herewith.
DATED this 3-/*—day of May,

jju^4i^y
DISTRLCT COURT JUDGE PRO-TEM
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I HEREBY certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the
foregoing Memorandum Decision by first class mail, postage prepaid, to the following parties this ZPXCJ day of ifey, 1996:
DANIEL L. WILSON
Attorney for Plaintiff
290 25th Street
Suite 204
Ogden, UT 84401

JAN P. MALMBERG
Attorney for Defendant
29 West 100 North
Logan, UT

84321

T\CUJU U XXDCL
DEPUTY COURT CLERK
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Jan P. Malmberg, #4084
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Attorney for Defendant Allstate
14 West 100 North
P. O. Box 364
Logan, UT 84323-0364
(801) 753-5331
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT

«M* & V ?9#?

IN AND FOR WEBER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

LORIN PENNINGTON,

FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
(AS TO LIABILITY)

Plaintiff,
vs.
ALLSTATE INSURANCE COMPANY,
et. al.
Defendant.

Civil No, 940900042
Judge:

Roger S. Dutson

The above-entitled matter came on regularly for trial pursuant to
notice on February 22, 1996, and continued on several different dates
until the trial was concluded in mid-March, 1996.

The plaintiff, Lorin

Pennington, was represented by his father-in-law, Daniel L. Wilson,
The defendant, Allstate Insurance Company, was represented by Jan P.
Malmberg,

After numerous motions, stipulations, and court orders, the

only parties remaining in the lawsuit at the time of trial were Lorin
Pennington,

plaintiff,

and Allstate

Insurance

Company,

defendant.

Pursuant to stipulation, the trial was bifurcated to separate the issue of
attorney's fees for the plaintiff pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §31A-22-

309(5)(d)

(1953 as amended) from the issue of liability of Allstate

Insurance Company.

BACKGROUND
On January 24, 1994, Attorney Dan Wilson filed a complaint in the
Second District Court for his son-in-law,

Lorin Pennington,

against

Allstate Insurance Company (Allstate), Burns Chiropractic, Dr. David
R. Trimble, D . C . , Dr. Dale Bennett, D . C . , Dr. Bryson Smith, Dr.
Joan Balcombe, St. Benedict's Hospital, and Associates in Radiology.
The complaint alleged that on June 18, 1993, Lorin Pennington was
involved in an automobile accident and that his insurance
Allstate,

had

failed

to

pay

the

required

$3,000

company,

Personal

Injury

Protection (PIP) benefits to plaintiff or to the other named defendants,
(who were medical providers) pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §31A-22-307
and the contract of insurance (indemnity) between Lorin Pennington and
Allstate.

Plaintiff claimed the bills were past due and prayed

for

judgment against Allstate, or in the alternative, against the medical
providers, in the event the services rendered were determined by the
court to be unreasonable and/or unnecessary.
In summary,
plaintiff's
pursuant

treatment
to Utah

the plaintiff
and

requested this court determine

expenses

Code Ann.

were

§31A-22-307

reasonable
(1953 as

and

that

necessary

amended)

and

pursuant to the contract between Mr. Pennington and Allstate, and for
judgment against Allstate for unpaid reasonable and necessary medical
expenses plus attorney's fees, costs and interest because of Allstate T s
failure to pay under the statute and contract of insurance.

In the

alternative, plaintiff requested judgment against the medical providers

2

ioftfi

he sued for providing to the plaintiff
treatment and charges.

unnecessary or unreasonable

Prior to trial the medical providers had been

dismissed from the case by Order and Stipulation although the court
reserved the right to revisit that issue if after factual findings such
was determined to be justified.
Allstate initially filed a Motion to Dismiss or in the alternative a
Motion to Appoint a Medical Panel on the basis plaintiff's claim for relief
was not ripe for decision under contract law, tendered the remaining
$1,305.41 under the PIP statute and contract with plaintiff to the court
for decision as to whether any was owing and requested the court
pursuant to Utah Code Ann.

§31A-22-307(2)(d)

to appoint a medical

panel to determine the reasonableness and the necessity of the claimed
charges and tender the remaining amount either to the providers or
back to Allstate depending upon the medical panel's decision.

The

court, through the Honorable Stanton M. Taylor, denied the Motion to
Dismiss and dismissed the medical panel idea on the basis the costs of
such a procedure would probably exceed the amount in controversy.
Allstate thereafter filed an Answer and asserted,

among other

things, full accord and satisfaction, full payment of reasonable and
necessary medical expenses, plaintiff's release of all claims, plaintiff's
noncompliance

with the

PIP statute,

a breach

by

plaintiff

of

the

contract of insurance with Allstate, as well as a general denial.
This Court reviewed the volumes of evidence produced as well as
reviewed his

extensive notes taken during several days of trial and

hearings, including all exhibits and evidence and after review of all the
documents filed by each side, including numerous memorandums.

This

Court also personally and carefully observed the demeanor of witnesses
3

during their testimony and reached conclusions as to their truthfulness
and untruthfulness.
statute

were

Although the amounts claimed under the PIP

relatively

small,

there

were

serious

collateral

issues

involved in this case and therefore, subsequent to trial this Court gave
the facts of this case much thought and deliberation, especially one
issue of great concern which had been the conduct of Attorney Dan
Wilson as well as the plaintiff's misconduct, and this Court, therefore,
being

fully

advised

in

the

premises,

hereby

makes

the

following

Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law:

FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

Prior to June 18, 1993, the plaintiff,

Lorin Pennington,

entered into a contract with Allstate Indemnity Company.
2.

Pursuant to that contract of insurance Allstate promised to

pay Personal Injury Protection (PIP) to Lorin Pennington, regardless of
fault, the first $3,000 of reasonable and/or necessary medical expenses
caused by an accident covered under the policy.
3.

Pursuant

to that

contract

and

pursuant

to

Utah

Code

Annotated §31A-22-307 (1953 as amended), the contract between Lorin
Pennington and Allstate Indemnity Company mandated that Allstate only
pay

Lorin

necessary

Pennington
medical,

"the

surgical,

reasonable
x-ray,

value

dental,

of

all

expenses

rehabilitation,

for

including

prosthetic devices, ambulance, hospital, and nursing services, not to
exceed a total of $3,000 per person."

(Utah Code Annotated §31A-22-

307(1)(a) (1953 as amended).

4

un

4.

ff

Unreasonable

medical

expenses

are

fees

for

medical

services which are substantially higher than the usual and customary
charges for those services."
5.

"Unnecessary medical expenses are fees for medical services

which are not usually and customarily performed for treatment of the
injury, including fees for an excessive number, amount, or duration of
medical services."
6.

Under the contract between Lorin Pennington and Allstate

Insurance Company, Allstate Insurance Company had an affirmative duty
to Lorin Pennington to not pay unreasonable and unnecessary medical
expenses.

This affirmative duty is to protect Lorin Pennington and to

preserve those benefits for him as he recovers from his injuries.
7.

Under the contract between Lorin Pennington and Allstate

Indemnity Company, Mr. Pennington must send to Allstate a summons,
complaint or other document relating to a third party claim as soon as
possible.
8.

Under the contract between Lorin Pennington and Allstate

Indemnity Company, Mr. Pennington may be required to take medical
examinations

by

physicians

Allstate

chooses,

as

often

as

Allstate

reasonably requires.
9.

Under the contract between Lorin Pennington and Allstate

Insurance Company, Mr. Pennington was to cooperate with Allstate in
the investigation, settlement and defense of any claim or lawsuit.

If

Allstate asked, Mr. Pennington must also help Allstate obtain payment
from anyone else who may be jointly responsible.
10.

Under the contract between Lorin Pennington and Allstate

Insurance Company, Allstate cannot be obligated if Mr.
5

Pennington
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voluntarily takes any action or makes any payments other than for
covered expenses for first aid to others.
11.

The

Plaintiff,

Lorin

Pennington,

was

injured

in

an

automobile accident on June 18, 1993, in Ogden, Utah, suffering injury
of an uncomplicated "cervical strain".
12.

Mr. Pennington was not treated for any injuries on the date

of the accident but went to the Tanner Clinic and was seen by Paul R.
Taylor, M.D. the next day, Friday, June 19, 1993.
13.

Mr.

Pennington complained of soreness

of neck

examination revealed plaintiff had full range of motion.

though

Dr. Taylor did

not feel it necessary to take any x-rays or administer any further tests
on that visit but told the plaintiff to follow a treatment plan of flexion
exercises, ice, heat and rest and Ibuprofen 800mg, and advised him to
report

back

weekend.

if

the

problem

not

resolved

over

the

following

Dr. Taylor mentioned the possibility of x-rays if the problem

did not resolve but stated he
14.

was

ff

. . . . doubted this will be necessary."

The following Monday, June 22, 1993, Mr. Pennington went

back to Dr. Taylor, and he prescribed doing more neck and shoulder
exercises, ice and heat and a muscle relaxant, Flexeril.
15.

Dr. Nord performed an independent medical examination on

Lorin Pennington, on September 28, 1993, and reviewed his treatment
history, for the insurance company.

He found no physical ailments

relating to the accident of June 18, 1993.

He concluded there had been

an uncomplicated cervical strain which appeared fully resolved.
16.

Dr.

Nord testified

that Dr.

Pennington was reasonable.

6

Taylor's treatment of Lorin

17.
not

Dr. Nord would not order x-rays when range of motion is

restricted;

no

visual

abnormalities

are

present;

and,

in Mr.

Pennington's case, no reports of symptoms of spinal cord dysfunction
were present.
18.

Dr. Nathaniel M. Nord graduated from the University of

Utah in medicine in 1965.

From 1965 until 1970, Dr. Nord obtained a

speciality

In 1970 to 1971 he spent

in neurology.

one

year

as

Assistance Chief of Neurology at the Salt Lake Veteran's Administration
Hospital.

Since 1971 Dr. Nord has been in the private practice of

neurology.

He is board certified in neurology by the American Board

of Psychiatry and Neurology.

He has served as a Department Chairman

of Medicine at Holy Cross Hospital.

His practice has been of general

neurology dealing with adolescence and adults.
19.

The majority of Dr. Nord's practice is involved in seeing

patients in his office on a continuum basis or patients which have been
referred for consultation and treatment by other physicians.
20.

The

court

finds

and

is

persuaded

that

the

medical

examination and testimony of Dr. Nord, although hired by Allstate, was
objective, professionally supported and of substantial value to the court
in this case.
21.

The

court

further

finds

that

the

recommendations

and

treatment plan established by Dr. Taylor was a standard and proper
treatment reasonable for this type of cervical strain injury and had Mr.
Pennington followed Dr.

Taylor's recommendation,

this injury would

have probably been resolved as soon, or possibly sooner, (because of
unnecessary

and

apparently

damaging

7

stressful

chiropractic

U9l

manipulations) as if he had not obtained treatment from numerous other
medical providers.
22.

Mr. Pennington,

thereafter,

does not seek treatment for

nine days, during whioh timo 4?io continued to work ac a laborer.

He

does not return or consult with his primary care physician, Dr. Paul
Taylor.
23.

The court finds that rather than continue with Dr. Taylor,

Mr. Pennington chose to 'shop1 for other medical providers for the
purpose of increasing his medical expenses so he could exceed the
$3,000 PIP amounts in order to justify pursuing a personal injury claim
against the other driver pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §31A-22-309 (1953
as amended).
24.

The court finds that the further medical treatment obtained

by plaintiff,

beyond that recommended by Dr. Taylor, was not only

unnecessary, but some of that treatment was given to areas of the body
not injured in the accident, and certain treatment probably increased
plaintiff's pain and was the cause of increased discomfort, (if indeed,
same was experienced) above that caused by the June 18th accident.
25.

The

court

finds

that

plaintiff

obtained

treatment after he decided not to continue with Dr.

the
Paul

following
Taylor's

reasonable treatment plan:
a.
Room at

St.

On July 1, 1993, plaintiff appeared at the Emergency
Benedict's

Hospital and

saw

Dr.

Joan Balcombe,

an

emergency physician, who responded to plaintiff's subjective complaints
of

neck

pain

and

headaches

responses given by plaintiff,
cervical

muscles

and

because

and

upon

physical

examination

and

she felt there was mild tenderness of
of

his
8

self-reported

persistent

and
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continued complaint of pain, coupled with pursuit of the complaint in
the Emergency Room setting, x-rays were ordered, and though found to
be normal, Anaprox medication and physical therapy were prescribed.
b.

Dr. Balcombe specifically ordered physical therapy for

Mr. Pennington.

She testified

considered physical therapy.

she explained specifically

what was

She also told him to recheck with her on

July 12 to assess improvement.
c.

Although he was told to specifically call the next day

to arrange for physical therapy, Mr. Pennington did not call the next
day to arrange for physical therapy; he did not return to see Dr.
Balcombe on July 12.
d.
BalcombeTs

Instead

treatment

of

following

recommendations,

the

Emergency

which

were

Room

similar

to

Dr.
Dr.

Taylor's previous recommendations, within four days after going to the
Emergency Room, plaintiff began an intensive Chiropractic treatment
plan by his own choice.

He first

saw a Dr.

Trimble at

Burns

Chiropractic and started that treatment on about July 6, 1993, and had
treatment during about 6 of the next 8 days.
e.

Attorney

Dan

Wilson,

his

father-in-law,

then

suggested he go to his, Attorney Wilson's, personal Chiropractor and
long-time acquaintance, a Dr. Dale Bennett, where he first

received

treatment about 10 days after he started chiropractic treatment with
Burns Clinic.

Plaintiff then was treated by Bennett chiropractors on 20

of the next 30 calendar days.
f.
and

the

spinal

No matter what the charge was for the office visits
manipulation

and

additional

9

manipulations

by

these

chiropractors, none of those charges were medically necessary in that
they did not lead to a resolution of Mr. Pennington1 s cervical strain.
g.

Dr. Burns and the chiropractors at Bennett

Clinic

were providing manipulative treatment on Mr. Pennington's entire spine,
hip,

and

ribs.

They

were

not

providing

non-manipulative

care

whatsoever.
h.

In the meantime, plaintiff made another trip to the

Emergency Room at St. Benedicts and saw Dr. Val Rollins, M.D., who
found

no

swelling

or

other

objective

symptoms,

but

because

of

plaintiff's self-reported persistent complaints of pain and the normal xray previously taken in the Emergency Room, he was referred by the
Emergency

Room

doctor

to

Dr.

Bryson

Smith

for

a

neurological

consultation.
i.

Dr.

Bryson

Smith

saw

plaintiff

and

based

on

plaintiff's subjective complaints and treatment history with the normal
Emergency Room x-ray and some new complaints, which, if they truly
existed, the court now finds probably were the result of unnecessary
chiropractic treatments, Dr. Smith ordered an MRI scan to determine if
there was a possible spinal cord injury.
j.

The MRI scan was performed at St. Benedicts Hospital

on about August 3, 1993, and was normal.

Physical therapy was again

recommended and this time plaintiff did go to physical therapy 6 times
along with massage therapy about 3 times (all of the massage therapy
occurring on the same day as the physical therapy),

During this

period of time plaintiff was also continuing chiropractic treatment, some
on the same day as the physical therapy.

All treatment was completed

by about August 26, 1993, and plaintiff had now achieved his goal of
10
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exceeding the $3,000 cap on medical expenses so he could pursue a
claim against the other driver.
k.

From the time of injury in mid-June,

1993, until

treatment was completed about August 26, 1993, plaintiff saw at least
four different

medical doctors,

about five

different

chiropractors,

involved an x-ray technician and MRI technician and at least two
medical doctors were apparently involved in the reading of those
results, two physical therapists and a massage therapist, for a minimum
of 12 different medical providers.
26.

Normal treatment for an injury such as was sustained by

plaintiff is exercise, rest, ice and heat, a pain medication and/or
muscle

relaxant

medication,

and possibly

massage

physical therapy, and possibly a special pillow.

therapy

and/or

This type of injury

usually resolves itself in about six to ten weeks, and time is probably
the most important factor in this healing process.

Most of the

treatment normally recommended by doctors is to help the patient feel
better during the healing process and does not contribute greatly to
the rapidity of healing the injury.
27.

Clay Hamblen is an experienced claims personnel at Allstate

who has been trained through various training seminars and through
handling of hundreds of claims.

He has the expertise and ability to

make visual observation of a claimant with a claimed injury to determine
if the claimed injury fits with the symptoms of the injury and the
mechanism of the injury.
28.

On July 30, 1993, Lorin Pennington came to the Ogden

Allstate Claim Office.
lobby.

He met with Clay Hamblen on that day in the

On that day, he claimed to Mr. Hamblen that he had a cervical
11

strain and a back strain.

Mr. Hamblen situated himself in such a way

that Mr. Pennington would have to move in a full range motion to talk
to Mr. Hamblen and discuss the claim.
Pennington
whatsoever.

at

that

time

did

not

Mr. Hamblen observed Mr.

have

any

guarded

movement

In fact, he determined Mr. Pennington appeared to have a

full range of motion of the full spine.
29.

Mr. Hamblen at this point in time was very suspicious of

the reasonableness and necessity of the treatment Mr. Pennington had
been receiving.

Mr. Pennington had gone to numerous providers and

seemed determined on seeing additional providers.

Because of

his

concern he spoke with the Casualty Claim Manager, Hal Palmer, and the
decision was made that Mr. Pennington should undertake an independent
medical examination.
30.
to

submit

Mr. Hamblen indicated to Lorin Pennington that he needed
to an independent

medical examination.

Following

that

conversation he received a phone conversation from Mr. Dan Wilson on
August 13, 1993.

Mr. Wilson represented himself as Lorin Pennington's

attorney and father-in-law.

Mr. Wilson was very antagonistic in regard

to having Mr. Pennington submit to an independent medical examination.
He stated that it was too soon for an independent medical examination to
occur, and he refused to have his client submit to it at that time.
31.

Attorney Wilson engaged in tactics which made it difficult to

obtain a medical examination by their own doctor, as requested
Allstate, though ultimately, towards the end of September,

by

1993, an

examination was conduced by Dr. Nathaniel Nord, the doctor designated
by Allstate.
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32.

Dr. Don Rick Wakefield performed a utilization review of the

treatment received by the various providers of Lorin Pennington.

He

was qualified by this court as an expert in utilization reviews and in
chiropractic care.
33.

Dr. Wakefield is qualified to perform utilization reviews and

as a chiropractor.

He received a Physician Associate degree from the

University of Florida.

He then was selected to attend Yale University

School of Medicine in a P.A. Surgical Residency Program (equivalent to
a Masters degree).

He later obtained a Chiropractor degree from Life

Chiropractic College and has also graduated from John Marshal Law
School.
34.

Dr. Wakefield has held many faculty positions.

He was a

Clinical Instructor at Yale University as well as the Clinical Coordinator
of the

Physician Assistant's

Medicine/Norwalk Hospital P.A.

program at Yale University
Residency program.

School of

He was also in

clinical practice from 1977 to 1981 while at Yale University.

Dr.

Wakefield has also taught at Emory University (as well as being on the
admissions committee), in the Physician Assistance Program.

He has

held instructor faculty positions at George Washington Medical School
and Hanaman Medical School in Pennsylvania.
35.

In the chiropractic arena,

Professor from 1983 to 1989.

he was a full time Associate

Since 1985 to the present he serves on

the Life Chiropractic College, Post Graduate Education Faculty.
Wakefield

personally

had a clinical

chiropractic

practice

from

Dr.
1984

through 1989.
36.

Since 1984, Dr. Wakefield has been the Medical Director of

International Healthcare Consultants.
13

He is certified in all states which

require certification to perform utilization reviews and also performs
utilization reviews across the United States in other states which do not
officially have a certification requirement
37.

The

court finds

Dr.

Wakefield

very

well

qualified

trained in the utilization review process and other areas,

and

However, he

is not a medical doctor.

His theories relating to the concept

necessary

medical

or

unnecessary

treatment

and

expenses

of

were

somewhat helpful, but the court did not rely on his testimony to any
great extent.

He was found to be somewhat biased in favor of the

insurance carrier.
38.

The court finds that the Emergency Room doctors which

attended plaintiff,

provided treatment in a somewhat different manner

than a regular doctor in a medical office would, in that they do not
have the continuity with the patient as does a regular doctor and were
attempting to insure they did not miss a diagnosis and therefore were
somewhat

more

specialists.

aggressive

in

ordering

x-rays

and

referring

to

Based on the continued return visits to the Emergency

Room (even though symptoms given by plaintiff were subjective) and
his continued complaints of pain, they readily ordered an x-ray and
referred to the neurologist, whereas an foffice' doctor would not likely
order such tests so quickly.

It was in this manner that the x-ray and

MRI were obtained by plaintiff through the Emergency Room.

The

court finds those tests were unreasonable and unnecessary in this case
and were part of the Plaintiff's plan to build up the medical expenses
for his ultimate benefit in pursuing his additional claim against the
other driver.
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39.

The physical therapy and massage therapy

plaintiff

were

relaxing

and

comforting

to

plaintiff,

obtained

but

were

necessary medical treatment as it related to resolution of
arising

from

the

accident.

These

types

of

treatment

by
not

symptoms
are

often

prescribed for this type of injury, but again, are not essential to a
speedy recovery, even though normally paid for by insurance carriers.
The chiropractic treatment was unnecessary

treatment in this

case.

The only treatment the court finds reasonable and necessary was that
recommended by Dr. Paul Taylor, the first doctor to treat plaintiff, and
plaintiff failed to follow up with that doctor's recommendations.
40.

The court finds the fact that Allstate paid several claims

submitted to them for unnecessary and unreasonable treatment is not
considered by the court as estoppel, acquiescence, or agreement that
those expenses were necessary and reasonable.
41.

The court finds in this case, it was plaintiff's purpose to

deceive the medical providers as well as the insurance carrier and just
because he was somewhat successful some of the time, the insurance
carrier should not be punished for paying more than they should have,
and the court finds plaintiff should be estopped from having those
medical providers claims against him set aside.
42.
behalf

On or about February 19, 1994, Mr. Wilson for and on

of the plaintiff,

filed

a third-party

complaint against

Brad

Beasley for the injuries Mr. Pennington allegedly received on June 18,
1993.
43.

No

copy

of

this

complaint

was

ever

sent

to

Allstate

Insurance Company.

15

IflQQ

44.

On March 17, 1994, plaintiff entered into a release with

Jane Beasley, Pharol Beasley, and Bradley Beasley releasing any and
all persons or corporations from any and all claims, damages, actions,
causes of actions or suits of any kind or nature whatsoever on account
of injuries Mr. Pennington received in the automobile accident of June
18, 1993.
final

The release expressly indicated the release was a full and

compromise and settlement

of any and all claims disputed

or

otherwise on account of injuries and damage above mentioned.
45.

A copy of the release and notice of the settlement was

never sent to Allstate Insurance Company.
46.

The court has a great deal of concern about the motivation

of Attorney Wilson, plaintiff's father-in-law, anQmotivation of plaintiff in
intentionally incurring unnecessary medical treatment and engaging in
conduct to run up unnecessary medical bills and have Allstate pay those
bills.

The court finds this lawsuit was filed with a lack of good faith

and was an abusive use of the courts.
finding include:

(a)

The events that support this

Plaintiff's willful failure to follow a properly

prescribed treatment plan initially recommended by Dr. Paul Taylor, (b)
Intentional creation of unnecessary medical bills by shopping for medical
providers

and jumping around

Inclusion

among

the

many

to numerous

medical

medical providers,

providers,

a

Chiropractor

(c)
who

happens to be Attorney Wilson's personal chiropractor and a long time
acquaintance, (d)

Willful exaggeration of symptoms in order to make

Plaintiff's injury seem more severe than it was,

(e)

Intentionally

'creating' medical bills for the purpose of exceeding the $3,000 PIP cap
under Utah Law in order to then pursue a Personal Injury claim and
thereby receiving a several thousand dollar's settlement against
16

the

other driver, (f)

Lack of objective findings to support any injury or

treatment beyond that originally diagnosed and recommended by Dr.
Taylor,

(g)

Failure of the plaintiff

or Attorney Wilson to

notify

Allstate of the filing and settlement of the claim against the other
driver, as required by the insurance contract and attorney ethics, (h)
Questionable conduct by Attorney Wilson in attempting to obtain releases
from medical providers and at least implying to those medical providers
that he would protect their interests as much as they could expect their
claims to be protected in a lawsuit, even though he was suing those
same medical providers*

The court finds there was an attempt by

Attorney Wilson to force Allstate to pay unnecessary and unreasonable
expenses incurred by plaintiff,

(i)

Obstructionist conduct by Attorney

Wilson to avoid or delay medical examination by Allstate's doctor,

(j)

Attorney Wilson's strong assertion throughout this case that he was
entitled to several thousands of dollars in attorney's fees under the PIP
statute for bringing this action, while he knew or should have known
most of the medical expenses and treatment were unreasonable.
[1]

Some specific examples of Mr. Wilson's conduct include that

on February 3, 1994, Dan Wilson wrote a letter to Hal Palmer indicating
that Allstate was required to pay the addition $1305.41 or else he would
bring suit for and on behalf of Lorin Pennington under Utah Code
Annotated 31A-22-309 ( 5 ) ( d ) .

He threatened Mr. Palmer that if Allstate

refused to pay this addition amount which Allstate had deemed was
unreasonable and unnecessary, pursuant to the statute if he recovered
$1,

he,

being

Dan Wilson,

would be

entitled

to full

payment

of

attorney's fees and costs.
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1

[2]

Rather

than

structuring

the

suit

against

Allstate

in

accordance with Utah Code Annotated 31A-22-309 ( 5 ) ( d ) , Mr. Wilson for
and on behalf of Lorin Pennington sued Allstate and all health care
providers which had not been paid.
Pennington,

Pursuant to that law suit, Lorin

by and through his attorney Dan Wilson, sent

letters,

dismissal agreements, and acceptance of service to each one of the
named defendants (but not his own insurance company, Allstate).
[3]

In the letters to each of the health care providers,

Mr.

Wilson acting as an agent of his client, merely indicated the law suit
against them was in reality a sham in that he was personally going
against Allstate Insurance Company for the attorney's fees and costs
and not against the medical providers.

He stated to these medical

providers that he recognized the dispute was, in reality, between the
health care providers and Allstate Insurance Company.

However, Mr.

Wilson stated that he was intending on pursuing this law suit against
Allstate Insurance Company.

He stated: "However my experience is

that because of the cost, the health care providers never pursue the
case and the insurance company gets away without paying the bills.
This doesn't make me very happy so I don't plan to do that in this
case.

Instead I plan to press this matter to trial."
[4]

Rather than having a law suit as provided

by

statute

between the plaintiff and his insurance company, Mr. Wilson attempted
to enter into an agreement with the health care providers that if the
court deemed the charges were reasonable and necessary,

he would

collect the money from Allstate and pay the money over to the health
care providers (even though more money was owing to the health care
providers that the remaining PIP benefits).
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In exchange, if the health
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care provider would sign the dismissal agreement and acceptance of
service, and the court determined that the charges were not reasonable
or not necessary,

the health care provider would not pursue Mr,

Pennington.
[5]
the

Mr, Wilson failed to mention to the health care providers in

dismissal

agreement

sufficient

funds

were

not

left

under

the

remaining policy PIP benefits under Mr. Pennington's policy to pay each
defendant if the court determined the charges were reasonable and
necessary.
[6]
dismissal

Mr. Wilson went even further than sending the letters and
agreements

to the

health

care providers.

He

contacted

specifically Dr. Bryson S. Smith and informed him that Allstate had
determined that his treatment was not medically necessary in regard to
the injuries Mr. Pennington had sustained (although he did not inform
him of all the various health care providers that have been seen prior
to him).

Dr. Smith testified: "He asked my permission to do "whatever

was necessary" to obtain reimbursement from the insurance company for
his client.

Mr. Wilson explained carefully to me that he did not believe

that any of the medical care given by the various providers including
myself, was in any way inappropriate.

Nevertheless, he wanted to

name me as a defendant in the suit claiming inappropriate care.

He felt

this maneuver might motivate the insurance company to pay the claim.
Again, he assured me that he did not believe my care of this patient
had been inappropriate.

He offered that, should this go to trial, he

had a friend in town who would be willing to defend me at no charge."
[7]

Mr. Wilson had informed Mr. Hamblen that Lorin Pennington

had seen too many health care providers; he thereafter informed the

health care providers that he felt their services were reasonable and
necessary but failed to inform them they would not receive full payment
if the court deemed all the medical expenses

were reasonable

necessary;

he went

hp was

defendants

inappropriately* on the basis

even further

to^ymditate

he wanted

to

suing
get

and
these

at

the

insurance company for not paying the $1305.41 in PIP benefits which
had been denied because the services were not reasonable and not
necessary.

He even offered so far as to provide an attorney to the

other defendants free of charge, ^to fight his, Lorin Pennington ! s own
insurance company.
[8]

At the time this matter went to trial, Mr. Pennington was

not obligated to pay any healthcare provider.

The only purpose for

the lawsuit was for Mr. Wilson to attempt to collect attorney's fees and
costs on this matter.

When Mr. Pennington was asked as to what relief

he expected to get from the lawsuit, he indicated that all he expected
was for Allstate to pay their part of the deal and affirmatively stated
that there is really nothing under the deal for which Allstate could be
responsible.

He also affirmed that in June of 1993, he had certain

obligations under his insurance contract with Allstate which he was
required to perform.
BASED upon the aforegoing Findings of Fact, this Court hereby
enters the following:

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.

On June 18, 1993, Lorin Pennington was involved in an

automobile accident where he sustained a simple cervical strain injury.
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2.

The court concludes that on that date, the plaintiff had a

valid insurance contract with Allstate Indemnity Company.
3.

Pursuant to that contract of insurance Allstate promised to

pay Personal Injury Protection (PIP) to Lorin Pennington, regardless of
fault, the first $3,000 of reasonable and/or necessary medical expenses
caused by an accident covered under the policy.
4.

Pursuant

to that

contract

and

pursuant

to

Utah

Code

Annotated §31A-22-307 (1953 as amended), the contract between Lorin
Pennington and Allstate Indemnity Company mandated that Allstate only
pay

Lorin

necessary

Pennington
medical,

"the

surgical,

reasonable
x-ray,

value

dental,

of

all

expenses

rehabilitation,

for

including

prosthetic devices, ambulance, hospital, and nursing services, not to
exceed a total of $3,000 per person."
5.

"Unreasonable

medical

expenses

are

fees

for

medical

services which are substantially higher than the usual and customary
charges for those services."
6.

"Unnecessary medical expenses are fees for medical services

which are not usually and customarily performed for treatment of the
injury, including fees for an excessive number, amount, or duration of
medical services."
7.

Under the contract between Lorin Pennington and Allstate

Indemnity Company, Mr. Pennington must send to Allstate a summons,
complaint or other document relating to a third party claim as soon as
possible.
struck

Plaintiff sued Brad Beasley, the driver of the car which

his vehicle,

required by contract.

and never informed

Allstate of the

lawsuit

as

Plaintiff further never informed Allstate of the

settlement of the lawsuit with the third party.
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8.

Under the contract between Lorin Pennington and Allstate

Indemnity Company, Mr. Pennington may be required to take medical
examinations

by

physicians

reasonably requires.

Allstate

chooses,

as

often

as

Allstate

The court concludes Attorney Wilson engaged in

obstructionist conduct to avoid or delay the medical examination by
Allstate's doctor.
9.

Under the contract between Lorin Pennington and Allstate

Insurance Company, Mr. Pennington was to cooperate with Allstate in
the investigation, settlement and defense of any claim or lawsuit.

If

Allstate asked, Mr. Pennington must also help Allstate obtain payment
from anyone else who may be jointly responsible.

Plaintiff failed to

even

time,

inform

Allstate

by

written

notice

of

the

place

and

circumstances of the accident thereby extinguishing Allstate's ability to
fully investigate the accident and the treatment being received by Mr.
Pennington.
10.

Under the contract between Lorin Pennington and Allstate

Insurance Company,

Allstate cannot be obligated if Mr.

Pennington

voluntarily takes any action or makes any payments other than for
covered expenses.
11.

The court concludes that the expenses

charged by

Dr.

Taylor were appropriate, and the recommendations and treatment plan
established by Dr. Taylor was a standard and proper treatment plan
reasonable

for

this

type

of

cervical

strain

injury

and

had

his

recommendation been followed, this injury would have probably been
resolved as soon, or sooner, (because of unnecessary and apparently
damagingly

stressful

chiropractic

manipulations)

as

if

obtained treatment from numerous other medical providers.
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he

had

not

12.

The court concludes that the normal treatment for Mr,

Pennington f s injury would have been exercise, rest, ice and heat, a
pain medication and/or muscle relaxant medication, and possibly massage
therapy and/or physical therapy, and possibly a special pillow.
13.

The court specifically concludes that this type of injury

usually resolves itself in about six to ten weeks, and time is probably
the most important factor in this healing process.
14.
treatment

The

court

obtained

by

further

concludes

plaintiff,

beyond

that
that

the

further

medical

recommended

by

Dr.

Taylor, was not only unreasonable and unnecessary, but some of that
treatment was given for areas of the body not injured in the accident,
and certain treatment probably increased plaintiff's pain and was the
cause of increased discomfort, (if indeed, same was experienced) above
that caused by the June 18th accident.
15.

Dr. Nord performed an independent medical examination on

Lorin Pennington, on September 28, 1993, and reviewed his treatment
history, for the insurance company.

He found no physical ailments

relating to the accident of June 18, 1993.

He concluded there had been

an uncomplicated cervical strain which appeared fully resolved
16.

Dr.

Nathaniel M. Nord is a qualified

expert

to

testify

concerning neurology having over 25 years of experience in neurology.
This court concludes his medical examination and testimony,

although

hired by Allstate, was objective, and professionally supported
17.

Dr.

Nord testified

that Dr.

Taylor's treatment of Lorin

Pennington was reasonable.
18.

The court concludes that rather than continue with Dr.

Taylor, Mr. Pennington chose to 'shop1 for other medical providers for
23
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the purpose of increasing his medical expenses so he could exceed the
$3,000 PIP amounts in order to justify pursuing a personal injury claim
against the other driver pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §31A-22-309 (1953
as amended).
19.
was

From the time of injury in mid-June, 1993, until treatment

completed about August

26,

1993,

plaintiff

saw at least

four

different medical doctors, about five different chiropractors, had x-rays
taken which involved an x-ray technician and had a MRI performed
which involved a MRI technician and at least two medical doctors were
apparently

involved in the reading of

therapists and a massage therapist,
medical providers.

those

results,

two

physical

for a minimum of 12

different

With the exception of the medical treatment obtained

by the plaintiff from Dr. Paul Taylor, the treatment, x-rays, and MRI,
received from these additional health care providers was unreasonable
and unnecessary treatment received by the plaintiff (which may have
caused increased discomfort and harm and included treatment unrelated
to the cervical strain) by which the plaintiff

incurred

unnecessary

medical expenses.
20.

This court concludes

that because Allstate paid

claims submitted to it for unnecessary and unreasonable
those

payments

acquiescence,

are

not

considered

by

the

court

as

several

treatment,
estoppel,

or agreement that those expenses were necessary and

reasonable.
21.

The court further concludes that in this case,

plaintiff's

purpose was to deceive the medical providers as well as the insurance
carrier and just because he was somewhat successful some of the time,
Allstate will not be punished for paying more than they should have.

22.

Further,

the court

concludes plaintiff

is estopped

from

having those medical providers claims against him set aside.
23.

Lorin Pennington had a contract of insurance with Allstate

Insurance Company.

Lorin Pennington breached his contract and filed

this lawsuit with a lack of good faith, and because of his breach of
duty of good faith and fair dealing which he has towards his insurance
company, his claims should be dismissed, and defendant Allstate should
be entitled to judgment and costs.
24.

This Court also has a great deal of concern about the

motivation of Attorney Wilson, plaintiff's father-in-law, and motivation
of plaintiff in intentionally incurring unnecessary medical treatment and
engaging in conduct to run up unnecessary medical bills and have
Allstate pay those bills.

This Court finds that Attorney Wilson and

plaintiff filed this lawsuit with a lack of good faith and the filing of
this lawsuit was an abusive use of the courts.
25.

The court concludes the evidence that plaintiff

and his

attorney filed this lawsuit with a lack of good faith and as an abusive
use of the courts is supported in brief by the following findings (and
others as set forth above):

(a) Plaintiff's willful failure to follow a

properly prescribed treatment plan initially recommended by Dr. Paul
Taylor,

(b)

Intentional

creation

of

unnecessary

medical

bills

by

shopping for medical providers and jumping around to numerous medical
providers,

(c)

Inclusion

among

the

many

medical

providers,

a

Chiropractor who happens to be Attorney Wilson's personal chiropractor
and a long time acquaintance, (d)

Willful exaggeration of symptoms in

order to make Plaintiff's injury seem more severe than it was,

(e)

Intentionally 'creating 1 medical bills for the purpose of exceeding the
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$3,000 PIP cap under Utah Law in order to then pursue a Personal
Injury

claim

and

thereby

receiving

a

settlement against the other driver, (f)

several

thousand

dollar f s

Lack of objective findings to

support any injury or treatment beyond that originally diagnosed and
recommended by Dr. Taylor, (g)

Failure of the plaintiff or Attorney

Wilson to notify Allstate of the filing and settlement of the claim against
the other driver, as required by the insurance contract and attorney
ethics, (h)

Questionable conduct by Attorney Wilson in attempting to

obtain releases from medical providers and at least implying to those
medical providers that he would protect their interests as much as they
could expect their claims to be protected in a lawsuit, even though he
was suing those same medical providers.

The court finds there was an

attempt by Attorney Wilson to force Allstate to pay unnecessary and
unreasonable expenses incurred by plaintiff,

(i)

Obstructionist conduct

by Attorney Wilson to avoid or delay medical examination by Allstate ! s
doctor,

(j)

Attorney Wilson's strong assertion throughout this case

that he was entitled to several thousands of dollars in attorney's fees
under the PIP statute for bringing this action, while he knew or should
have

known

most

of

the

medical

expenses

and

treatment

were

unreasonable.
Accordingly,

based

upon

this

Court's

Findings

of

Fact

and

Conclusions of Law, plaintiff's claims should be dismissed and Allstate
entitled to judgment and Order of Dismissal with prejudice and costs.
Evidence of charges for the experts and professionals called by Allstate
is accepted by this Court as reasonable charges and should be included
as costs payable by plaintiff.
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This court reserved some issues on motions by plaintiff and all
those issues are herewith resolved by these Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law and Order of Judgment herein.
DATED this

^ ^ c f a y of D^&combcp^l99y.
BY TH

Honorable Roger S. Dutson
Aoting District Court Judge

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of this document
was mailed to the plaintiff's counsel on this
1996.
Dan Wilson
290 - 25th Street, Suite #204
Ogden, UT 84401
Original to:
Clerk of the Court
SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
2549 Washington Blvd.,
Ogden, UT 84401
Courtesy copy:
Honorable Roger S. Dutson
SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
2549 Washington Blvd.
Ogden, UT 84401
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LORIN PENNINGTON,
Plaintiff,
vs.
ALLSTATE INSURANCE COMPANY,
Etal.

JUDGMENT AND ORDEBP^F,
DISMISSAL (AS TO LIABILITY), ^0
ATTORNEYS FEES AND COSTS
Case No. 940900042 CN
Honorable Roger S. Dutson

*h
JAN 2 1 1997

Defendant.
This action came on for trial before the above entitled Honorable Roger S. Dutson,
District Judge of the above entitled court on February 22, 1996, and continued on several
different dates, finishing mid-March, 1996. Trial was held on the issue of Allstate Insurance
Company's liability to the plaintiff based upon Allstate's decision to not pay to their insured
plaintiff or his medical providers a remaining amount available of $1,305.41 under the PIP
statute for treatment Plaintiff had obtained after an automobile accident. The plaintiff also sued
the medical providers, asserting their treatment was unreasonable and expenses unnecessary.
The plaintiff requested the court to determine if the plaintiffs treatment and expenses were
reasonable and necessary pursuant to Utah Code Annotated Section 31A-22-307 (1953 as
amended) and pursuant to the contract between Mr. Pennington and Allstate. The plaintiff
prayed for judgment against Allstate for the unpaid reasonable or necessary expenses plus
attorney's fees, costs, and interest because of Allstate's failure to pay under this statute and
contract of insurance. In the alternative, the plaintiff asked for a judgment against the medical
providers who treated him, alleging the treatment was unreasonable or the charges unnecessary.
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Pennington vs. Allstate
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The issue of attorney fees was bifurcated prior to trial. Subsequent to trial, Defendant Allstate
filed a Motion for Summary Judgment for Attorneys fees, and after reviewing said motion and
Plaintiffs response thereto, the court is awarding attorneys fees pursuant to UCA 78-27-56 and
believes UCA 78-27-56.5 may apply as well.
Prior to the trial on this matter, the medical providers had been dismissed from the case
by order and stipulation, though shortly after that was done, Plaintiff objected to the dismissal,
claiming a substitute attorney from Plaintiff attorneys office should not have entered that
stipulation, and the court reserved the right to revisit that issue if or after factual findings
determined such to be justified.
The court having reviewed the volumes of evidence produced, his extensive personal
notes taken during several days of trials and hearings, all exhibits in evidence, documents filed
by each side, including numerous memorandum, and having carefully observed the demeanor
of witnesses during the testimony and having reached conclusions as to the truthfulness and
untruthfulness of these witnesses, has entered Findings of Facts and Conclusions of Law. The
court has noted that although the amounts claimed under the PIP statute were relatively small,
there were serious collateral issues involved in the case, including large claimed amounts for
attorneys fees, the conduct of attorney Dan Wilson and the plaintiffs misconduct. The court
is also concerned that although the court deliberated extensively in this case, because of it's
complexity, it rendered it's Memorandum Decision on May 31, 1996, that substantial delays
thereafter have been occasioned by Defendant's attorney. The court is aware that Attorney
Malmberg has been in poor health, but there may still remain some issues to be resolved and
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if Attorney Malmberg is unable to speedily respond to all matters requiring her response, she
is directed to immediately notify her client or otherwise have substitute counsel respond in a
timely manner.
Therefore, the court being fully advised in the premises:
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED AND ADJUDGED:
All Plaintiffs claims against Defendant Allstate are hereby dismissed with prejudice, and
Judgment is entered in favor of Defendant Allstate, including costs.
IT IS HEREBY FURTHER ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that because of Plaintiff
Pennington's misconduct in bringing this spurious action, without merit and not in good faith,
Defendant Allstate Insurance is awarded Judgment against Plaintiff for attorney's fees in the
amount of $15,000.00, which the court finds to be a reasonable amount for defending this
action. The amount claimed is substantially reduced from the amount claimed by Defendant
Allstate, as the court believes excessive time was spent by Attorney for Defendant Allstate on
this matter, although it recognized the amount per hour claimed was less than often charged by
attorneys.

Additionally, there were some unnecessary motions and pleadings filed by the

defendant and some work for research of the law and superfluous reviews of documents which
should not be counted.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that costs are hereby awarded in favor
of Allstate Insurance Company as set forth in the Memorandum Decision of the court dated
10/3/97. Additional costs are claimed in the Amended Memorandum of Costs filed with the
court on 12/19/97, and Plaintiff may have 10 days from the date of receipt of this Order to

M&?

Pennington vs. Allstate
940900042 CN
Page Four

object or such additional costs set forth therein will be granted.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that all Motions, Objections and issues
not previously ruled on, or that have heretofore been reserved, are ruled on by these Findings,
Conclusions and Order.
DATED this ^ g ^ d a y of January, 1997.

ROGER S.'DUTSON
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I HEREBY certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing Judgment and
Order (as to liability), Attorney Fee's, and Costs by first class mail, postage pre-paid, to the
following parties this
day of January, 1997:
DANIEL L. WILSON
Attorney for Plaintiff
290 25th Street
Suite 204
Ogden, UT 84401
JAN P. MALMBERG
Attorney for Defendant
29 West 100 North
Logan, UT 84321

DEPUTY COURT CLERK
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